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A NEW METHOD OF UTILISING STABILITY STUDY RESULTS IN 
APPL YING OUT-OF-STEP PROTECTION TO ALLOW 
OBSERVABILITY OF ROTOR ANGLE UNSTABLE CONDITIONS 
by Juanita van Eyssen 
Abstract-i 
Abstract 
Power system rotor-angle unstable conditions may cause undesired operation of 
distance relays, resulting in the unnecessary switching of lines. To prevent the 
possible undesired operation of distance relays, a protection type known as out-
of-step blocking is used. This protection type is complemented by another type of 
protection, known as out-of-step tripping protection. The tripping protection's main 
functions are to detect total loss of synchronism and send tripping signals to 
selected locations in the system to initiate islanding. 
In this research the application of out-of-step blocking and tripping protection was 
investigated. The motivation for the research was provided by system unstable 
incidents that occurred in Eskom, the electricity utility of South Africa. Detailed 
out-of-step protection investigations indicated that the out-of-step blocking and 
tripping protection applied according to a method which is based on an existing 
approach failed to detect the unstable conditions. In summary, the detailed 
investigations showed that the existing approach of applying out-of-step blocking 
and tripping protection is not adequate as it does not allow the necessary 
observability1 and correct detection of rotor-angle unstable conditions. 
The existing approach seems to involve the following according to literature: 
1. the approach is based on the behaviour of the electrical quantities (voltage, 
current, rotor angle, etc.) of an equivalent two machine power system to 
determine suitable locations for out-of-step blocking qnd tripping relays; 
2. equivalent impedances representing system impedance are used to calculate 
the forward and reverse reach settings for the out-of-step protection relays; 
and 
1 The use of the term observability are in the context of local "observation" i.e. the trajectory of an 
impedance locus as 'seen' by an impedance type relay. It does not refer to "observability and 
controllability" of power system states. 
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3. a maximum swing frequency, determined from stability studies, is used to 
calculate the relay timer settings. 
The existing approach was tested and investigated by means of a case study in 
which out-of-step protection was applied to an actual power system. In summary 
the results indicate that too many assumptions are made in the existing approach 
and that there is a need to either improve the existing approach or to identify and 
develop a new approach for applying out-of-step protection. Therefore, from 
limitations and shortcomings identified in the investigation of the existing 
approach, a new approach, based on the study of the impedance locus at all 
locations, was developed. In summary the new approach entails: 
1. mathematical modelling of the power system (the actual power system); and 
2. studying the impedance locus behaviour at all relay locations to determine 
locations and settings for out-of-step protection relays. 
The new approach was tested and investigated by means of a case study in which 
out-of-step protection was applied to an actual power system. An investigation of 
the case study results indicated a significant improvement in the performance of 
the out-of-step protection during unstable conditions. 
As additional support for the new approach, a real case application of out-of-step 
tripping protection to the Eskom system was presented in Chapter 5. This real 
case is an Eskom investigation (led by the author) which took place in 1996 and 
1997. Eskom investigated the use of out-of-step tripping protection and in 1997 
out-of-step tripping protection was applied to the Eskom transmission system, 
using the new approach and methods of calculating reach and timer settings 
developed in the research. 
It should be noted that both the existing approach and the new approach are 
techniques for linking relay settings to the results of power system stability 
studies. A technique could never include the full range of events which may occur 
in a power system that could lead to system instability. The main reason for this is 
Abstract-iii 
that a power system model, and not the actual power system, is studied. It is 
therefore always possible that the experts performing the stability investigations 
may not identify an incident that could lead to instability on the actual power 
system. A margin of insecurity will therefore always exist i.e. for that percentage of 
system unstable cases which may not have been covered during the stability 
study investigation and therefore not covered in the selection of stability studies 
used, nonoperation of the protection could still occur. It is therefore important to 
include as many stability studies as possible in the stability investigation. 
In addition to the above, the use of too many stability studies may prove to be 
unnecessarily time consuming as some studies may be similar with regards to 
system conditions and contingencies. For this reason, a technique aims to use 
results from a selection of stability studies which represent a wide variety of 
incidents that could occur. 
It should further be noted that in stability study investigations done for the purpose 
of applying out-of-step protection, the studies could be more severe (e.g. n-2 or 
even n-3 contingencies) than the studies used for power system planning 
purposes. The reason for this is that these severe studies will provide protection 
settings for which the protection will be effective even beyond the planning 
criteria. 
The range of stability studies in the stability investigation and the choice of the 
selection of stability studies to represent a wide variety of incidents, were not 
covered in this thesis as this forms part of the specialised stability investigation. 
The use of individual stability study results for the purpose of applying out-of-step 
protection was the subject of the thesis (refer to section 1.1 in Chapter 1, Scope of 
Research). 
A specific technique of linking the individual stability study results with the relay 
settings could either improve or weaken the reliability of the protection to perform 
correctly during an unstable incident. The research has indicated that the 
technique used in the existing approach weakens the reliability of the protection to 
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perform correctly during an unstable incident while the technique used in the new 
approach improves the reliability of the protection to perform correctly during an 
unstable incident. 
In summary the conclusions drawn from the research are the following: 
1. the assumptions made in the existing approach over-simplifies the procedure 
of applying out-of-step protection; 
2. there is a need to either improve the existing approach or identify a new and 
better approach for applying out-of-step protection; 
3. applying out-of-step protection according to the new approach, shows an 
improvement of protection performance during unstable conditions; 
4. even though the new approach was only tested on the Eskom system, the new 
approach could be acceptable for any complex power system characterised by 
stability related constraints i.e. long transmission lines connecting generator 
power stations and supplying power over long distances to load demand 
areas; and 
5. the new approach increases the reliability of out-of-step protection and thus 
increases confidence in the correct performance and application thereof. 
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Abbreviations and tenninology i 
Abbreviations and Terminology used in this thesis 
Abbreviations 
1. ss = Substation 
2. PS = Power station 
3. SVC = Static var compensator 
4. ROW = Relay operating window 
Terminology 
1. Out-of-step protection 
2. Out-of-step blocking protection 
3. Out-of-step tripping protection 
4. Islanding 
5. Power swings 
6. Out-of-step condition 
7. Power system rotor angle 
unstable conditions 
Out-of-step blocking and tripping 
protection. 
Protection used to block undesirable 
operation of distance relays during rotor-
angle unstable conditions. 
Protection used to detect rotor-angle 
unstable conditions and initiate tripping at 
selected locations for the purpose of 
islanding. 
System separation between stable and 
unstable generators within a power 
system during unstable conditions. 
Power oscillations within a power system 
initiated by disturbances within that 
system. 
Loss of synchronism; also system 
instability. 
Power swings or out-of-step conditions 
within a power system, initiated by the 
response of generator rotor angles. 
8. Apparent impedance 
9. Operating zone 
10.Zone timer 
11. Relay Operating Window 
(ROW)1 
12. Observability 
1 Developed in research 
Abbreviations and terminology ii 
Impedance 'calculated' by protection 
relays measuring voltages and currents 
from voltage and current transformers 
respectively, the impedance 'seen' by an 
impedance type relay. 
An area defined by a protection 
characteristic, plotted on an RIX diagram, 
which initiates protection action when 
apparent impedance enters the zone. 
The timer that is started when apparent 
impedance enters the particular operating 
zone. 
An area, defined by boundaries, which is 
drawn in an impedance plane. This area 
is used to study the impedance locus 
behaviour at all locations for the purpose 
of applying out-of-step protection 
according to the new approach developed 
in the research. 
The use of the term observability are in 
the context of local "observation" i.e the 
trajectory of an impedance locus as 'seen' 
by an impedance type relay. It does not 
refer to "observabiltiy and controllability'' 
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Power system rotor-angle unstable conditions may cause undesired operation of 
distance relays, resulting in the unnecessary switching of lines [1-4, 9]. To prevent 
the possible undesired operation of distance relays, a protection type known as 
out-of-step blocking 1 is used. The main purpose of the out-of-step blocking 
protection is to detect unstable conditions (power swings or total loss of 
synchronism). Upon detection a blocking signal is sent to the distance relay 
supervised by the out-of-step blocking relay in order to prevent (block) its 
operation. 
This is complemented by another type of protection, known as out-of-step tripping 
protection2. Its main functions are to detect total loss of synchronism and send 
tripping signals to selected locations in the system to initiate islanding ( opening 
breakers to separate unstable areas in the system). 
In this research the application of out-of-step blocking and tripping protection was 
investigated. The motivation for the research was provided by a system unstable 
incident that occurred in Eskom (the electricity utility of South Africa)3 in 
November 1990. The loss of 400 kV and 765 kV lines to the Cape system load 
centre weakened transmission line connections between the large northern 
generation pool and the weaker generation pool in the south. As a consequence 
the generation in the south started oscillating in relation to the generation in the 
north. This caused undesired operation of distance relays, resulting in the 
switching of lines and a complete blackout of the northern, western and southern 
1 Other names for this type of protection also exist, e.g. power swing blocking [5-14). The function 
is, however, the same. 
2 Other names for this type of protection also exist, e.g. power swing tripping [5-14). The function 
is, however, the same. 
3 Appendix A provides a brief description of the Eskom network and Eskom's Cape system. 
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Cape system load centres for almost two hours (total load of approximately 2400 
MW at that time) [36]. 
Additional motivation for this research came in the form of two subsequent 
incidents related to system stability in the Eskom power system. In December 
1995 a single-phase busbar fault at a 400 kV substation located on the main 
supply route to the western Cape system load centre was cleared by remote line 
protection after 0,5 seconds. The result was the loss of a substation and severe 
weakening of the system, causing system instability and a consequent blackout 
[35]. 
The third incident occurred in June 1996 when a single-phase busbar fault at a 
400 kV substation located on the main supply route to the Cape system load 
centres was cleared by the busbar protection, resulting in the loss of 400 kV 
transmission lines. Approximately 30 minutes later another fault occurred at a 765 
kV substation also located on the main supply route. Correct protection operation 
resulted in the loss of the 765 kV transmission lines. With 400 kV lines already 
out of service, the main supply to the Cape system load centres was weakened 
even further, creating a power transfer problem and ultimately a loss of 
synchronism [37]. 
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Detailed out-of-step protection investigations indicated that the out-of-step 
blocking and tripping protection applied according to a method which is based on 
an existing approach4 failed to detect the unstable conditions. The investigations 
indicated problems with regard to the following [38,39]: 
• Locations of out-of-step tripping protection; 
• Out-of-step tripping-relay forward and reverse reach settings; 
• Out-of-step blocking and tripping protection timer settings; and 
• Characteristic types used for the purposes of out-of-step blocking and tripping 
protection. 
In summary, the detail investigations showed that the existing approach of 
applying out-of-step blocking and tripping protection is not adequate as it does 
not allow the necessary observability5 and correct detection of rotor-angle 
unstable conditions [38,39]. 
In the research the existing approach of applying out-of-step protection was 
investigated. From limitations and shortcomings identified in the investigation, a 
4 The existing approach refers to the general approach of applying impedance type out-of-step 
blocking and tripping protection. According to [1, 5, 11-14, 20, 23, 24, 40-44, 49) the approach 
involves the following: 
1. the existing approach of applying out-of-step protection is based on the behaviour of the 
electrical quantities (voltage, current, rotor angle, etc.) of a two machine power system. The 
reason for this is that a real power system that has generators or generator groups which could 
become unstable with one another, can be represented by a two machine equivalent model. 
The assumption is therefore made that when the real power system becomes unstable, the 
behaviour of the electrical quantities in the real power system will be similar to the behaviour 
of the electrical quantities in a two machine system; 
2. the tripping relay locations are selected based on the location of an electrical centre (also 
known as the voltage zero), determined from stability studies [13, 14, 23, 40, 41, 47]; 
3. in many cases out-of-step blocking protection is located at all the locations where distance 
relays are located [42, 43, 47]; 
4. a source impedance, or equivalent impedance representing system impedance in front of and 
behind a location are used to calculate the forward and reverse reach settings respectively for 
a relay located at that location [13, 40, 44, 47]; and 
5. a maximum swing frequency, determined from stability studies, are used to calculate relay 
timer settings [1, 12-14, 20, 40-43, 47). 
5 The use of the term observability are in the context of local "observation" i.e. the trajectory of an 
impedance locus as 'seen' by an impedance type relay. It does not refer to "observability and 
controllability" of power system states. 
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new approach, based on the studying of the impedance locus at all locations, was 
developed. In summary the new approach entails: 
1. mathematical modelling of the power system (the actual power system); and 
2. studying the impedance locus behaviour at all relay locations. 
Direct results regarding the behaviour of the electrical quantities of the power 
system is available when modeling the actual power system. There is therefore no 
need to make use of a two machine system approach to interpret system stability 
results. 
Studying the impedance locus behaviour at all relay locations eliminates the need 
to use equivalent impedances and swing frequencies to estimate required reach 
and timer settings respectively. The reason for this is that the impedance locus 
behaviour is a direct indication of what distance and out-of-step protection relays 
will 'see' during system unstable conditions. 
It should be noted that both the existing approach and the new approach are 
techniques for linking relay settings to the results of power system stability 
studies. A technique could never include the full range of events which may occur 
in a power system that could lead to system instability. The main reason for this is 
that a power system model, and not the actual power system, is studied. It is 
therefore always possible that the experts performing the stability investigations 
may miss an incident that could lead to instability on the actual power system. A 
margin of insecurity will therefore always exist i.e. for that percentage of system 
unstable cases which may not have been covered during the stability study 
investigation and therefore not covered in the selection of stability studies used, 
non-operation of the protection could still occur. It is therefore important to include 
as many stability studies as possible in the stability investigation. 
The use of too many stability studies will be unnecessarily time consuming as 
some studies may be similar with regards to system conditions and contingencies. 
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For this reason, a technique aims to use results from a selection of stability 
studies which represent a wide variety of incidents that could occur. 
It should further be noted that in stability study investigations done for the purpose 
of applying out-of-step protection, the studies could be more severe (e.g. n-2 or 
even n-3 contingencies) than the studies used for power system planning 
purposes. The reason for this is that these severe studies will provide protection 
settings for which the protection will be effective even beyond the planning 
criteria. 
The range of stability studies in the stability investigation and the choice of the 
selection of stability studies to represent a wide variety of incidents, were not 
covered in this thesis as this forms part of the specialised stability investigation. 
The use of individual stability study results for the purpose of applying out-of-step 
protection was the subject of the thesis (refer to section 1.1 in Chapter 1, Scope of 
Research). 
A specific technique of linking the individual stability study results with the relay 
settings could either improve or weaken the reliability of the protection to perform 
correctly during an unstable incident. The research has indicated that the 
technique.used in the existing approach weakens the reliability of the protection to 
perform correctly during an unstable incident while the technique used in the new 
approach improves the reliability of the protection to perform correctly during an 
unstable incident. 
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1.1 Scope of research 
When the application of out-of-step protection becomes a consideration in a 
utility, the procedure is as follows [9, 11-14, 20, 23, 33, 34, 40, 41]: 
1. System stability analyses through the simulation of a wide verity of incidents in 
respect of the system where out-of-step protection is to be applied. 
l I, ,, 
2. The application of 3. An investigation to 4. An investigation to 
out-of-step blocking determine the locations establish restoration 
and tripping where system procedures following 
protection. separation should take islanding. 
place for the purpose 
of islanding. 
Blocks 1, 2, 3 and 4 refer to specialised investigations. System stability and 
restoration were not addressed in this research. Block 2 therefore represents the 
topic of the research presented in this thesis. 
It may be· worthwhile to add that for the stability investigation in block 1, an 
unlimited amount i.e. any amount of stability studies are done to determine all 
possible system unstable scenarios. The stability studies done in block 1 are then 
used in the investigations shown in blocks 2, 3 and 4. However, because the 
number of stability studies could be large, the investigations in blocks 2, 3 and 4 
may become unnecessarily time consuming as some of the stability studies may 
be similar with regards to system conditions and contingencies. It therefore may 
become im-practical to perform all the possible stability studies identified in block 
1 when doing the investigations in blocks 2, 3 and 4. To eliminate the use of too 
many stability studies, the expert(s) performing the investigation in block 1 could 
choose a selection or number of stability studies that will be representative of the 
complete range of stability studies done. The selection or number of stability 
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studies could be different for different investigations and utilities. This number of 
stability studies chosen by the expert(s) are then used for the investigations in 
blocks 2, 3 and 4. The choice of stability studies as well the number of stability 
studies were not addressed in this thesis because, as mentioned above, block 2 
represents the topic of this thesis. 
1.2 Methodology 
To investigate the existing approach, out-of-step protection was applied to an 
actual power system. To record the performance of the out-of-step protection 
during unstable conditions, mathematical models, representing the behaviour of 
the protection, was included in the power system model. A stability study was 
done to evaluate and investigate the protection performance results. 
To test the new approach, out-of-step protection was applied to the same power 
system according to the new approach. As for investigating the existing approach, 
the performance of the out-of-step protection during unstable conditions were 
recorded by including mathematical models, representing the behaviour of the 
protection, in the power system model. To evaluate and investigate the protection 
performance results the same stability study referred to in the previous paragraph 
was done: 
The stability study done to provide necessary results for applying out-of-step 
protection as well as enable the evaluation and investigation of the protection 
performance, is a stability study which is based on the actual incident that 
occurred within the Eskom power system in June 1996. 
It should be noted that for the purpose of illustration within the thesis, only one 
stability study was done. The new approach was, however, also used by Eskom 
when out-of-step tripping protection relays within the Eskom transmission system 
had to be relocated and set at their new locations (This investigation was done by 
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Eskom in 1996 and 1997). This real case example of using the new approach 
uses a number of stability studies, and is presented in Chapter 5. 
1.3 Assumptions 
1. The exact load composition of the total Eskom load demand is not known. 
Simulations of the second and third of the aforementioned three incidents did, 
however, indicate that the behaviour of the load composition in the Cape 
system is closest to a constant impedance load type behaviour [35, 37]. During 
the simulations the remaining load in the Eskom system was represented as 
displaying a combination of constant current and constant impedance 
behaviour6. As the load model does not play a significant role in the research, 
the load was modelled as follows: 
Cape system load demand: 
P1oad+j01oad = 100% constant impedance load type behaviour 
Remaining load demand in the Eskom system: 
= 
= 
100% constant current load type behaviour 
100% constant impedance load type behaviour 
1.4 Other factors affecting the basis of the research 
1. The protection was applied to an actual power system (for the purposes of the 
research and reasons given under section 1.4 no 2, the Eskom power system 
was used). The reason for using an actual power system is that benchmark 
and equivalent systems are simplified systems and do not represent the actual 
behaviour of a real system that most protection and power system engineers 
have to contend with when applying out-of-step protection. 
6 Eskom uses the load model combination indicated in the text when doing dynamic analysis. 
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2. For the purposes of the research the Eskom power system was used 
(Appendix A provides a description of the Eskom power system). The reasons 
for this are the following: 
• The Eskom system is a complex power system and experiences a large 
variety of operating conditions and disturbances (small and large 
perturbations, transient and dynamic types of instability). It therefore 
represents an universal example of a real power system. 
• Eskom requested, motivated, supported and made available all 
necessary resources to enable this research. 
• Because of logistic limitations, testing of the new approach was limited to 
the use of the Eskom power system. 
3. The mathematical representation of the real power system used for this 
research was provided by Eskom. Eskom uses the data for system 
performance investigations on a daily basis. In addition, all three stability 
incidents referred to in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of this chapter, were simulated 
with this data and simulation results compared well with recorded results [35-
37]. It is therefore believed that the power system model used for the purposes 
of the research is adequately representing the real Eskom system. 
4. In the research the complete Eskom power system was modeled. However, 
due to the size of the Eskom power system, results for a portion of the Eskom 
power system were presented in Appendix D (results for case study done in 
Chapter 3) and Appendix F (results for case study done in Chapter 4). The 
reason for this is that the results for the remaining system are additional 
information and does not add any value to the thesis contribution. 
5. Because out-of-step blocking protection is applied, in practice, to supervise 
distance relays during power swings and out-of-step conditions, only 
undesired operation of distance relays was considered in this research. 
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6. Because out-of-step protection relays are mostly of the impedance type, i.e. 
operating in the impedance plane, impedance type out-of-step protection was 
used for the purposes of this research. 
7. To investigate and test both the existing approach and the new approach, an 
impedance type out-of-step protection relay with a concentric circle type 
characteristic, not necessarily centred at the origin of the impedance plain, 
was used. (Appendix B explains the operating philosophy). Many characteristic 
types exist [1, 9, 13, 14, 30, 40, 41, 43] and to investigate and test both the 
existing approach and the new approach, any one of these characteristic types 
can be used. The concentric circle characteristic type was chosen because it 
is representative and uncomplicated. 
8. Stability studies and power system modelling in this thesis were done by using 
the PTI PSS/E (Power System Simulator) software tool. The reason for this is 
that Eskom uses PSS/E for system analysis and the power system is therefore 
completely represented by PSS/E mathematical models. 
9. PSS/E has a variety of mathematical models for protection that can be 
included in the same way mathematical models for generators and other power 
system equipment can be included in the program when doing system studies. 
The thesis selected to use the 'Double Circle Blocking or Tripping Relay' 
model by PSS/E as this is a mathematical model representing the concentric 
circle type relay used for the purposes of the research. 
10. For the purposes of this research, one stability study was used. The reasons 
are: 
• one stability study is sufficient to investigate and identify limitations and 
shortcomings of the existing approach; and 
• one stability study is sufficient to demonstrate the use of the new 
approach and the improvement in protection performance. 
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In addition it is necessary to mention the following: 
When applying out-of-step protection to a utility, several stability 
studies, representing a wide verity of incidents which may lead to system 
instability on the power system, are done7. Each stability study's results are 
analysed to determine locations and settings suitable for the particular stability 
study. This is followed by analysing the complete set of results obtained for the 
individual stability studies. From this analysis, the choice of final locations, 
settings and an out-of-step protection scheme-design are done to be suitable 
for all the stability studies done. The purpose of out-of-step protection scheme-
design is to allow system islanding if relays at some locations did not detect 
due to fact that not all unstable scenarios can be covered in the selection of 
stability studies done8. The method of analysing the complete set of results 
(for the purpose of determining final locations, settings and an out-of-step 
protection scheme-design), could be different for each utility because 
protection coordination and application philosophies are different. Methods of 
analysing the complete set of results for the purpose of determining final 
locations, settings and a scheme-design were not addressed in this thesis. 
The thesis addressed the analyses of individual stability study results. 
Chapter 5 presents a real case application of out-of-step protection using the 
new approach. In this real case application the results of a number of stability 
studies which represent most of the incidents that could cause instability in the 
Eskom system, are used to link the relay settings with the stability study 
results. The complete set of results are analysed and final locations and 
settings as well as a scheme design are chosen according to Eskom's method 
7 Ideally the full range of system contingencies that could lead to system instability should be 
covered when applying out-of-step protection. However, the use of too many stability studies may 
prove to be unnecessarily time consuming as some studies may be similar with regards to system 
conditions and contingencies. For this reason results from a selection of stability studies which 
represents the wide verity of incidents covered in the stability investigation, are used. 
8 The specialised stability investigation could never include the full range of events which may 
occur in a power system that could lead to system instability. The main reason for this is that a 
power system model, and not the actual power system, is studied. It is therefore always possible 
that the expert(s) performing the stability investigation may miss an incident that could lead to 
instability on the actual power system. A margin of insecurity will therefore always exist i.e. for that 
percentage of system unstable cases which may not have been covered during the stability 
investigation, non-operation of some protection relays could still occur. 
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of analysing the complete set of results as well as Eskom's protection 
philosophies. 
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
Chapter 2 discusses the performance of distance relays during unstable 
conditions. Out-of-step blocking and tripping protection and the considerations in 
applying this protection to allow observability of rotor-angle unstable conditions 
are also discussed. 
Chapter 3 presents the existing approach as identified in literature reviews. As an 
example of out-of-step protection application according to the existing approach, 
Eskom's methods to determine locations and calculate settings, are presented. In 
addition Chapter 3 also includes a case study of out-of-step protection applied 
according to the existing approach. Protection performance results, showing 
limitations and shortcomings of the existing approach are also presented. 
Chapter 4 presents the new approach of applying out-of-step protection which is 
based on studying the impedance locus behaviour at all locations. A comparison 
between the existing approach and the new approach is given. A case study of 
out-of-step protection applied according to the new approach is also included in 
Chapter 4, together with protection performance results. A discussion on the 
protection performance results is also presented. 
Chapter 5 presents a real case example where out-of-step tripping protection was 
applied to the Eskom power system, using the new approach. 
Chapter 6 provides a summary of the research, a discussion of the findings of the 
research and the conclusions drawn from the research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
PROTECTION OPERATION AND BLOCKING DURING ROTOR-
ANGLE UNSTABLE CONDITIONS 
This chapter provides a brief introduction to the undesired operation of distance 
relays during rotor-angle unstable conditions (power swings and out-of-step 
conditions). It also discusses out-of-step blocking and tripping protection as well 
as the three considerations relating to the use and application of out-of-step 
protection. 
2.1 Distance relay performance during rotor-angle unstable conditions 
Due to the large fluctuations in a generator's electrical output quantities during 
rotor-angle unstable conditions, distance relay performance and power system 
stability are closely related [1-4, 8-10, 12-18, 22, 26, 27, 29]. 
Power system protection monitors the system's electrical and physical parameters 
in order to detect abnormal conditions. During rotor-angle unstable conditions, the 
performance of protection types that monitor voltages and currents is affected by 
the behaviour of these system parameters [1-4, 9]. 
Distance relays 
Distance relays measure voltages and currents for the purpose of 'calculating' 
impedance. This is known as apparent impedance and is represented in an 
impedance plane (R-X plane). If the apparent impedance describing an abnormal 
condition is within an operating zone, a zone timer (if used) is started. When this 
timer expires, the line protected by the distance relay is isolated from the system. 
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A typical distance relay have more than one operating zone: an instantaneous 
directional zone 1 and one or more time-delayed zones [1, 15]. Figure 2.1 shows 
the operating characteristics for a single distance relay using zones of protection. 
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I I felay location I 
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Figure 2.1: Operating characteristics for a distance relay using zones of 
protection 
The electrical voltages and currents in a power system oscillate during power 
system unstable conditions [5-16]. Due to the voltage and current oscillations, 
impedance calculated from measured voltages and current quantities will oscillate 
according to the following equation [43]: 
V 
z = I --------------------f.d'..:'1\,1) 
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· The impedance 'seen' by a distance relay during rotor angle unstable conditions 
will therefore display an oscillatory behaviour, with its magnitude increasing and 
decreasing. This behaviour of the impedance in the impedance plane results in 
undesired operation of distance relays when the impedance enters the relay 
characteristics [1-5, 17] and the zone timers time out. The combination of distance 
relays in intertripping schemes does not necessarily overcome the potential 
problem of an impedance relay's response to unstable conditions. 
2.2 Out-of-step blocking and tripping protection 
Out-of-step blocking protection 
From section 2.1 it is clear that protection action is necessary to prevent 
undesired operation of distance relays during rotor-angle unstable conditions. 
To prevent the undesired operation of distance relays during power system 
unstable conditions, out-of-step blocking protection is used. The function of the 
out-of-step blocking protection is to supervise a distance relay. Upon detection of 
a power swing or out-of-step condition it sends a blocking signal to the distance 
relay to prevent undesired operation when the impedance enters the distance 
relay characteristics. 
The method of detecting power system unstable conditions is based on the fact 
that the change in voltages and currents during rotor-angle unstable conditions is 
slow compared with the fast change in these electrical parameters during short-
circuit conditions. Rotor-angle unstable conditions can therefore be detected by 
monitoring the rate of change of the impedance 'seen' by the out-of-step blocking 
relay [1, 4, 9, 12, 13-15, 29, 31, 34, 40-43] (Appendix B explains the operating 
philosophy for the out-of-step blocking protection used for the purposes of the 
research). 
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Out-of-step tripping protection 
In addition to solving the problem of undesired operation of distance relays, it is 
necessary to protect the system in such a way that when it is unstable (out of 
step), system separation of the unstable generators can take place. The 
separation of the unstable generator stations is also known as islanding. 
To initiate islanding out-of-step tripping protection is used. The function of the 
out-of-step tripping protection is to detect out-of-step conditions; and upon 
detection it must send tripping signals to selected locations to initiate islanding. 
The detection of the rotor angle unstable conditions is as in the case of out-of-
step blocking protection. 
2.3 The three considerations affecting observability and detection of 
rotor-angle unstable conditions 
Three considerations are equally important in the application of out-of-step 
blocking and tripping protection to allow observability and detection of rotor-angle 
unstable conditions. To allow the correct application of these relays, these 
considerations must be taken into account. They are as follows: 
• Location 
• Reach settings 
• Timer settings 
Location 
If it is possible for a power system to undergo unstable conditions, undesired 
operation of distance relays may occur. The choice of out-of-step blocking relay 
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locations is therefore important because it must ensure that all such distance 
relays are blocked before undesired operation of the relay occurs. 
When the system is subjected to out-of-step conditions, detection of those 
conditions should take place at all times, and as soon as possible. The correct 
location(s) for out-of-step tripping relay(s) are therefore equally important to 
ensure successful islanding as soon as the system becomes unstable. 
Reach settings 
Reach settings determine the size of the out-of-step protection characteristics. If 
these settings are not correct, the apparent impedance may never enter the 
operating zones and enable detection. With incorrect reach settings, it is also 
possible for apparent impedance to enter the relay's operating zones under 
system healthy conditions and wrongly initiate blocking or tripping. Undesired 
operation of distance relays may also occur if reach settings for out-of-step 
protection were not coordinated with the distance relay reach settings at the same 
location. 
Timer settings 
The zone timer settings of out-of-step relays are the settings that allow distinction 
between fault conditions and system unstable conditions. The timer settings are 
therefore the settings that allow out-of-step blocking and tripping protection to 
perform their respective functions. With incorrect timer settings, out-of-step 
blocking and tripping protection will not perform their respective functions. 
2.4 Summary and conclusions 
This chapter provided a brief introduction to the undesired operation of distance 
relays during rotor-angle unstable conditions (power swings and out-of-step 
conditions). 
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It also discussed out-of-step blocking and tripping protection as well as the three 
considerations relating to the use and application of out-of-step protection to allow 
observability of rotor-angle unstable conditions. 
From this chapter, the following conclusions can be drawn: 
1. Preventative action is necessary to prevent undesired operation of distance 
relays during rotor-angle unstable conditions. 
2. To prevent the undesired operation of distance relays during power system 
unstable conditions, out-of-step blocking protection is used. 
3. In addition to solving the problem of undesired operation of distance relays, it 
is necessary to protect the system in such a way that when it is unstable (out 
of step), out-of-step tripping protection can operate to separate the unstable 
generator stations. 
4. Three considerations are equally important in the application of out-of-step 
blocking and tripping protection to allow observability of rotor-angle unstable 
conditions. They are as follows: 
• Location of the out-of-step relays 
• Reach settings of the out-of-step relays 
• Timer settings of the out-of-step relays 
CHAPTER 3 
EXISTING OUT-OF-STEP PROTECTION APPLICATION 
APPROACH 
3.1 The existing approach 
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Very little literature on the topic of out-of-step protection and the application 
thereof to a power system exists. However, from literature that does exist and 
personal experience it was found that the existing approach of applying out-of-
step protection consistently has three considerations to dealt with when using 
impedance type protection relays. These considerations are: 
1 . Relay locations; 
2. Relay reach settings; and 
3. Relay timer settings. 
How these considerations are dealt with individually is now briefly presented. 
1. Relay locations 
Out-of-step blocking 
Out-of-step blocking is nearly always used in conjunction with distance 
protection [42, 43]. For this reason out-of-step blocking protection could be 
located at every location where distance relays are located. Each utility may 
however decide whether the blocking protection should be enabled at every 
location or only certain locations. 
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Out-of-step tripping 
The choice of out-of-step tripping relay locations seem to be approached 
differently by different utilities. However, one common approach is to use the 
location of an area known as the electrical centre of the system, as an indication 
of the most suitable relay location(s). What the electrical centre is and how to 
find it, as defined and understood according to literature, is explained below. 
Reference [23] states that out-of-step tripping relays located closest to the 
electrical centre tend to operate whereas those located further away from the 
electrical centre tend to not operate. Out-of-step tripping relays are therefore 
located within the electrical centre area. 
Reference [41] supports the statement made in reference [23] by stating that the 
location of the electrical centre determines the location of measurement i.e. the 
location of out-of-step tripping relays. 
In both references [40] and [41] as well as in reference [14] it is stated that in 
cases, if the electrical centre is within the transmission system, some utilities 
prefer to not make use out-of-step tripping relays, but choose to call upon 
distance relays (the undesired operation of distance relays) to trip lines in order 
to separate unstable generators at the location where the electrical centre is 
located for the specific out-of-step condition. If, however, the electrical centre is 
within the generator or step-up transformer, an out-of-step tripping relay is 
located at the generator terminals. 
Another approach to determine the location of out-of-step tripping relays is given 
in references [14] and [13]. The approach entails determining the ideal location 
for system separation during instability. The location chosen is such that it 
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ensures a generation load balance within the islands formed as well as allows a 
fast and easy system restoration. Relays are then located at these locations and 
relied upon to detect an out-of-step condition to trip local breakers. 
In general it seems as if the electrical centre location is dominant when deciding 
on the location of out-of-step tripping relays. 
The electrical centre 
The electrical centre (also referred to as the voltage zero [20]) of a system is represented 
by the location where the voltage in the system decreases closest to zero during a power 
swing or an out-of-step condition [13, 14]. This definition is based on the assumption that a 
real power system that undergoes power swings and out-of-step conditions can be 
represented by a two-machine model [13, 14]. This assumption implies that during system 
unstable conditions there are moments when the angle difference between the phasers 
representing the voltage behind the subtransient reactance of the generating machines will 
be 180° [33, 12). In the two-machine model the 180° separation occurs at a location 
between the equivalent generating units. The electrical conditions at that stage are very 
similar to those of a three-phase fault condition (the voltages in all three phases are close 
to zero) [13, 14, 17, 33]. 
Another method to determine or find the electrical centre is presented in reference [41]. 
This method also uses a two machine equivalent model to represent a power system. 
Fro111 the equivalent model the source impedances and line impedances are plotted in an 
impedance plane to represent the system impedance, The impedance locus as seen by a 
relay during an unstable condition, as derived from the equivalent model, is also plotted 
within the impedance plane. The impedance locus is circular because it is derived from a 
two machine equivalent model [1, 2, 4, 13-15, 34, 40-43]. The position on the system 
impedance line which coincides with the impedance locus shows the location of the 
electrical centre within the equivalent model. The location determined is then used to 
approximate the electrical centre location within the real power system. 
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· 2. Relay reach settings 
The reach settings of an out-of-step protection relay (blocking or tripping), 
coordinated with load encroachment, determines the size of the relay 
characteristic(s). The size of the characteristic defines an operating zone and is 
important to allow detection of an out-of-step condition as the apparent 
impedance needs to enter the operating zone [40]. 
Out-of-step blocking 
In the case of blocking protection, reach settings for relay types using circular or 
blinder type characteristics, are normally chosen to be larger than the outermost 
distance relay characteristic reaches [1, 13, 14, 18, 33, 49]. The exact amount is 
chosen according to the relay type used. 
Out-of-step tripping 
The reach settings, as in the case of identifying locations, can be determined 
differently by different utilities. In reference [44] one method to determine the 
forward and reverse reach settings for a relay type using a circular type 
characteristic is given. (This method is also described under section 3.3.2b 
which presents the method used by Eskom.) The method entails the use of an 
equivalent two machine system to represent an actual power system. The 
impedance between the two generators within the two machine system is 
determined by calculating equivalent impedarices for the actual power system. 
The forward and reverse reaches for out-of-step tripping relays are then chosen 
to be such that the sum of the forward and reverse reaches is equal to the 
equivalent system impedance between the two generators within the two 
machine system. 
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In reference [13] a similar approach is used for out-of-step tripping relays using 
circular type characteristics. The equivalent impedance between the two 
machines in the two machine system is broken down more to represent 
equivalent impedances between substations. The impedance line within the 
impedance plane, which represents the impedance between the two generators 
in the two machine system, is drawn to superpose the impedance locus obtained 
from expected rotor angle behaviour. The crossing point between the impedance 
locus and the impedance line indicate up to what station the forward and reverse 
reaches be set to. 
Reference [401 provides a method to determine reach settings for out-of-step 
tripping relays using blinder type characteristics. An equivalent two machine 
system with equivalent impedance between the two generators is also used to 
represent the actual power system and an impedance locus is derived from 
expected rotor angle excursions. As the angle difference between the generators 
increases to the point where it is expected to represent an unstable system, a 
minimum resistance is recorded within the impedance plane. This minimum 
resistance value is used as the left and right side reach settings. 
In general one can derive from the above that to determine the required reach 
settings for out-of-step tripping relays, equivalent system impedances are used. 
3. Relay timer settings 
Impedance type out-of-step protection (blocking and tripping) uses operating 
zone timers [1, 5, 11-14, 20, 23, 24, 40-43, 49]. Timers are used because the 
rate of change of the impedance as it enters the operating zones is the 
indication of whether the condition is a fault or an unstable condition [1, 5, 11-
14, 20, 23, 24, 40-43, 49]. As the apparent impedance enters an operating zone, 
a zone timer is started. If the zone timer times out while the impedance is still 
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within the operating zone, detection will take place. Depending on the type of 
relay, more than one operating zone can be used and for each operating zone a 
zone timer exists. References [1, 5, 11-14, 20, 23, 24, 40-44, 49] gives examples 
of out-of-step protection relays using one or more operating zones. 
The timer settings are calculated from maximum swing frequencies which in turn 
is determined from the rotor angle oscillation results when doing stability studies. 
Typical swing frequencies obtained this way are in the order of 0,5 Hz to 3 Hz 
[14, 41, 43]. At times utility recordings have shown swing frequencies of up to 5 
Hz [37]. 
The maximum swing frequency is used to calculate the time it takes the apparent 
impedance 'seen' by an out-of-step relay, to move from one point to another 
point on the impedance locus i.e. the rate of change of the impedance that will 
indicate an out-of-step condition. The swing frequency, therefore, is used to 
represents the rate of change of the impedance within the impedance plane at 
any location where out-of-step protection relays are to be located. 
References [12, 34, 49] provide a formula with which the rate of change of 
impedance between two points on an impedance locus can be calculated. The 
formula is based on the assumption that the impedance loci 'seen' by out-of-step 
protection relays are circles or circular. This is the case when the impedance 
locus behaviour is derived from a two machine model which is the approach 
used in references [12, 34, 49]. The formula is derived in the same manner as 
shown under section 3.3.2c which presents the method used by Eskom to 
calculate the timer settings of out-of-step protection relays. 
In general the approach of calculating the timer settings for out-of-step 
protection relays is to determine a maximum swing frequency from stability study 
results, which, according to the above references, represents the rate of change 
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of the impedance as 'seen' by relays during an unstable condition. It is further 
assumed that the impedance loci during out-of-step conditions are circles or 
circular [1, 6, 7, 11-15, 40, 41, 43, 44, 49) which is true when an impedance 
locus is derived from a two machine system [1, 2, 4, 13-15, 34, 40-43]. 
3.2 Discussion of the existing approach 
The approach of applying out-of-step protection to a power system, as presented 
under section 3.1, uses many assumptions. With regards to out-of-step blocking 
protection locations, it is assumed in most cases that all distance protection 
relays require blocking, irrespective of whether all distance relays will undergo 
undesired operation or not. In the identification of out-of-step tripping protection 
locations, an electrical centre area is determined which in itself is derived from 
an equivalent two machine system. 
When determining the reach settings for out-of-step protection relays, the 
existing approach seems to be making use of an equivalent two machine 
system, with calculated equivalent impedances to represent the actual power 
system impedance. 
The timer settings are calculated from a rotor angle swing frequency. Firstly it is 
assumed that this frequency is the same as the rate of change of the impedance 
'seen' by any relay within the system. Secondly the approach seems to base its 
calculation of timer settings on the assumption that the impedance loci 'seen' by 
relays during unstable conditions are circular. 
From the above a number of comments can be made regarding the reliability of 
the existing approach when wanting to ensure correct application of out-of-step 
protection: 
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1. A real system cannot be represented by an equivalent two machine system. 
Even though it may be sufficient to use when analysing or illustrating other 
aspects of electrical engineering, it is not suitable when dealing with the 
application of out-of-step protection. The reason for this is that results 
obtained from an equivalent two machine system gives results that are not 
representative of real case scenarios. One example is the general belief that 
the impedance loci 'seen' by relays during unstable conditions are circles or 
are circular in appearance. 
2. The use of equivalent impedances between nodes of the actual power 
system, is another aspect of the existing approach that creates questions 
regarding its reliability. The reason for this is that the use of equivalent 
impedances ignores the influence of parallel lines, static and dynamic 
compensation element such as SVC, shunt capacitor and reactor banks and 
series capacitor banks, and other aspects determining the configuration and 
dynamic behaviour of a power system. 
3. The use of a rotor angle swing frequency to determine the rate of change of 
the impedance for which an out-of-step protection relay should detect, does 
not take into account the dynamic behaviour of the system between the 
generator and the relay location. It is assumed that the frequency of the rotor 
angle oscillations during instability causes apparent impedance oscillations 
with the same frequency everywhere within the power system. 
4. In addition to the above it appears as if the existing approach assumes that 
the rate of change of the apparent impedance 'seen' by a relay, is constant. 
The research found that this is not true. Results indicating these findings can 
be found in Appendix D, page D-iv and page D-xv. No literature discussing or 
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mentioning this aspect of the apparent impedance 'seen' by a relay during 
unstable conditions have been found. 
5. The need for blocking protection at all the locations where distance relays 
are located, creates questions regarding unnecessary expenditure and the 
increase in risk of incorrect out-of-step blocking protection performance i.e. 
protection failure or undesired operation. Out-of-step blocking protection, if 
located at all the locations where distance relays are located, are 
overcautious as not all locations may require blocking protection. This 
limitation has been recognised in reference [20] and blocking in these 
instances are located only where undesired operation of distance relays 
could occur. 
6. The electrical centre could be located at different locations for different 
unstable conditions. During a single unstable incident it is also possible for 
an electrical centre to move from one location to another. Locating out-of-
step tripping relays within the electrical centre area may, therefore, not detect 
when called upon. This behaviour of the electrical centre has been 
recognised in reference [12]. In this reference it is acknowledged that 
locating out-of-step tripping relays in the electrical centre area will not always 
ensure correct detection and more detail investigations of the impedance 
locus in the electrical centre area were studied to obtain optimal locations. 
7. The impedance 'seen' at the electrical centre is not always such that the 
relay will observe the unstable condition. The main reason being that the 
impedances 'seen' by relays during unstable conditions are not circular or 
behaving in the manner derived from a two machine model. Due to the 
dynamic behaviour of a power system, the impedance locus behaves 
erratically when subjected to unstable conditions. For example, in the existing 
approach it is said that when the generator is slipping a pole (i.e. instability) 
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the relay located at the electrical centre will observe an impedance locus in 
the impedance plane, moving from left to right ( or vice versa), crossing the X-
axis. The research results, however, indicate that cases may exist where the 
impedance loci does not behave in this way even though pole slipping is 
taking place. (As an example refer to the out-of-step tripping protection 
results in Appendix D, page D-xiv to page D-xviii.) 
8. It was found in this research that equivalent impedances used to determine 
reach settings produce characteristic sizes that are insufficient to allow 
observability of unstable conditions. Specific results in the research indicated 
that the use of equivalent impedances produced characteristics that are too 
small. In these cases the impedance locus never entered the operating 
characteristic zones to allow detection. As an example refer to the out-of-step 
blocking protection performance results in Appendix· D, page D-vii. 
Insufficient characteristic reaches determined in this manner have been 
identified by others [20]. In these cases more accurate analyses were made 
based on the use of the impedance loci behaviour at the location where the 
out-of-step protection was to be located. 
The research has identified a number of limitations introduced when using the 
existing approach presented above. These are: 
1. During system instability, the electrical quantities of an actual system does 
not necessarily behave similar to the behaviour of the electrical quantities in 
a two machine system; 
2. The use of equivalent impedances ignores dynamic influences within the real 
system that affects system impedance, thereby providing inaccurate forward 
and reverse reach requirements; 
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· 3. The assumption that rotor angle swing frequencies represent rate of change 
of impedance for which out-of-step protection must detect ignores the 
dynamic influences within the power system which affects the voltage and 
current measured by the relay at the relay location; 
4. The assumption that all distance relays should be equipped with out-of-step 
blocking protection is overcautious i.e. not all distance relays require 
blocking; and 
5. The use of an electrical centre area to identify locations for out-of-step 
tripping relays could result in the non-detection of the tripping relays as the 
location of the electrical centre changes continuously. 
In summary it is believed that too many assumptions are made in the existing 
approach even though this approach may have its advantages. The advantages 
of the existing approach could be the following: 
1. It is straight forward and not time consuming; 
2. The application of out-of-step protection is made simple when using this 
approach; 
3. Protection application engineers, not completely familiar with system 
dynamics, could easily understand the need for out-of-step protection and 
the principles when applying it to a power system; 
4. Powerful tools such as computers and computer software are not needed in 
order to follow the existing approach; and 
5. From points 1 to 4 one could go so far as to say that it is cost effective. 
However, the existing approach seems to over simplify the procedure of applying 
out-of-step protection to a power system. When considering the effect of 
incorrect performance of this protection (non detection) when a power system 
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becomes unstable should be proof enough that the application of the protection 
should not be made that simple. In addition one can add the number of incorrect 
performances of out-of-step protection relays (instability not detected) as further 
support that the existing approach may not be the best approach. With fast, 
powerful computers and new advanced computer software available for power 
system analysis, more detailed analyses are possible which is also less time 
consuming than in the past. 
In conclusion it seems that there is a need to either improve the existing 
approach or to identify and develop a new approach for applying out-of-step 
protection. 
3.3 Case study: Determining and testing the reliability of the existing 
approach using Eskom's application methods 
To determine and test the reliability of the existing approach the following were 
done: 
1. Out-of-step protection 1 was applied to the Eskom power system according to 
the existing approach. The methods of determining locations and calculating 
settings are Eskom's methods which are presented under section 3.3.2. 
Eskom's methods are based on the existing approach and are sufficient to 
illustrate the application of out-of-step protection according to the existing 
approach. 
2. The protection performance was recorded by including protection models, 
representing the behaviour of the protection relays at their locations, in the 
power system model. 
1 For the purposes of the research, out-of-step blocking and tripping protection using concentric 
type characteristics were used. The operating philosophy for the relay types is presented in 
Appendix B. 
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3. To evaluate and investigate the protection performance, a stability study was 
done (stability study presented under section 3.3.1 ). 
Due to the number of calculations involved in the application of the protection, 
all the calculations and examples are contained in Appendix C. 
The stability study done to provide the necessary results for applying out-of-step 
protection is the stability study presented under section 3.3.1. The same stability 
study was also done to evaluate and investigate the protection performance 
results. The stability study is a simulation which is based on an actual incident 
within Eskom that occurred in June 1996. As mentioned in Chapter 1 under 
section 1.4, only one stability study was used because it is sufficient to illustrate 
the application approach and its significant limitations and shortcomings. In 
addition the stability study represents a severe contingency which caused 
instability in an actual system and could cause system instability in any power 
system. 
A summary of the protection performance results are presented under section 
3.3.3. Appendix D provides details of the protection performance results. 
3.3.1. The stability study used in the case study 
The stability study is based on the actual incident that occurred within the Eskom 
system on the 7th June 1996. An Eskom report discussing this event is given in 
reference [37]. 
The stability study done involves (refer to Figure 3.1 a): 
• a three-phase permanent busbar fault at Grootvlei Substation, cleared by busbar 
protection within 100 ms (breaker operating time); 
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• a second permanent busbar fault at Alpha Substation, also cleared by busbar 
protection within 100 ms (breaker operating time); 
• the availability of only ±1 100 MW of generation in the Cape system (one 
Koeberg generator with a capacity of 900 MW and one Palmiet generator with a 
capacity of 200 MW); whereas the total load demand in the Cape system was 
±2 000 MW. For voltage control in the Cape system the first of the two units 
(each with capacity of 200 MW) at Palmiet is in SCO (synchronous condenser) 
mode. 
The clearance of the first fault, at Grootvlei Substation, involves the switching of 
all the 400 kV lines out of Grootvlei, leaving only the one 400 kV line from Matla 
Power Station and the 765 kV supply from Tutuka Power Station to supply the 
load demand in the Cape system. 
The clearance of the second fault, at Alpha Substation, involves the switching of 
both the 400/765 kV transformers at Alpha, leaving only the one 400 kV line from 
Matla Power Station to supply the total load demand in the Cape system 
(approximately 2000 MW). 
The above fault clearance weakens the system severely and, as a consequence, 
severe power swings, followed by an out-of-step condition, occurs after the 
clearance of the second fault at Alpha Substation. Figure 3.1 a is a 
representation of Eskom's main supply to the Cape system. The locations of the 
two faults, as well as the lines that were switched due to correct protection 
operation, are indicated in Figure 3.1 a. 
Figures 3.1 b and 3. 1 c show the behaviour of the rotor angle and the electrical 
power output behaviour respectively, as produced by the faults and their 
clearance. 
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Northern supply (large generation pool) 
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Koeberg PS (900 MW) 
1------\'rv Palmiet PS (200 MW) .__ __________ ___. 
• Lines switched out due to protection operation 
Figure 3.1 a: A simplified representation of the Eskom transmission system with 
large generation in the north and smaller generation in the south. 
2 Matla Power Station is the swing bus in this study. 
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Figure 3.1 b: Rotor-angle response 






Figure 3.1 c: Electrical power output response (power oscillation of Palmiet's 
first unit is shown - i.e. unit in SCO) 
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The graphs in Figure 3.1 show that oscillations start in the system due to the 
weakening of the transmission system between the northern generation pool and 
the Cape system after the first fault is cleared. An out-of-step condition results 
from further weakening of the system after the second fault is cleared. 
Figure 3.1 also shows that the power stations most affected by the two 
disturbances are Palmiet and Koeberg. The generators at these stations loses 
synchronism with the generators in the northern generation pool (Matla Power 
Station is the swing bus for this study). 
The generators at Tutuka Power Station, being located electrically close to the 
northern generation pool, undergo small oscillations but do not lose 
synchronism. 
3.3.2. Eskom's out-of-step protection application methods [38, 39) 
a). Identifying relay locations 
Out-of-step blocking protection 
The method assumes that undesired operation of all the distance relays in the 
transmission system (220 kV, 275 kV, 400 kV and 765 kV transmission lines) will 
occur during power swings and out-of-step conditions. For this reason all 
distance relays are equipped with out-of-step blocking protection. 
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· Out-of-step tripping protection 
The method locates out-of-step tripping protection in the area identified as the 
electrical centre of the system. The location of the electrical centre is identified 
by monitoring the voltage at different substations in the system when doing 
stability studies. The substation voltage magnitudes that comes closest to zero 
indicates the location known as the electrical centre. More tha~ one substation 
could be identified to represent the electrical centre location. The amount of out-
of-step tripping relays installed in the electrical centre location are determined by 
the amount of lines connected to the substation(s). 
To illustrate how the electrical centre is identified, and therefore the choice of 
location for the out-of-step tripping relay or relays, the following example is 
presented: 
Figure 3.2a shows voltage magnitude behaviour obtained in a stability study carried out on 
the real power system shown in Figure 3.2b. A two-machine representation of the real 
system is shown in Figure 3.2c. From the voltage magnitude behaviour results it can be 
seen that the voltage magnitude increases and decreases at the respective locations. At 
Substation F the voltage magnitude came closest to zero. Therefore the out-of-step 
tripping relay will be located at Substation F, on both lines leaving that station, as 
Substation F represents the electrical centre. 
For further clarity, if the voltage magnitude results indicated that the voltage magnitude at 
Substation E came just as close to zero as the voltage magnitude at Substation F, another 
two out-of-step tripping relays would have been installed at Substation E, on both lines 














Figure 3.2a: Voltage magnitude behaviour results 
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Figure 3.2b: The real power system 
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Figure 3.2c: The two-machine representation of the real system 
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The method calculates the forward reach and reverse reach for out-of-step 
protection relays (blocking and tripping) from the following (Figure 3.3 shows the 
quantities )3: 
1. the impedance of the line on which the relay is located (RI+ jXI); 
2. the line angle calculated from the line impedance (<1>1); 
3. the Thevenin equivalent system impedance4 in front of the next remote 
substation5 (Zrhevenin - in front), calculated at system maximum demand; and 
4. the Thevenin equivalent system impedance behind the local substation 
(Zrhevenin - behind), calculated at system maximum demand. 
3 It should be noted that some of the distance relays used by Eskom have out-of-step blocking 
protection functions that have fixed forward and reverse reaches. These are preset to be equal to 
the distance relay forward and reverse reaches. The above method does not apply to these relay 
types. 
4 Thevenin equivalent system impedance: In the calculation of this impedance it is assumed that 
a network which contains more than one generator can be represented by a single voltage 
source and series impedance [28]. The application of a short circuit to the terminals of the 
equivalent circuit will produce a current flow in the circuit. The voltage and current values at the 
terminals enable the calculation of a Thevenin equivalent impedance. 
5 The Thevenin equivalent system impedance at a substation is calculated on the assumption 
that the real system as seen between two points (the substation node and the system earth node) 
can be represented by one voltage source and a series impedance (Thevenin's theorem [281). 
Applying a short circuit between the substation node and system earth produces a voltage and 
current between the nodes. The impedance calculated from this voltage and current represents 
the Thevenin equivalent system impedance at the substation. This calculation is normally done 
using a fault analysis software program. 
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SSA SS B 
(local station) (next remote station) 
ZI Lq>1 = RI + jXI 
Line impedance (ZI), line angle (<1>1) 
Zrhevenin - behind 
Z Thevenin - in front 
--+ ,-------------, 
• 
Out-of-step protection relay 
location 
Figure 3.3: Forward and reverse reach calculation 
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impedance forward reach 
ABS[(line impedance)+(Thevenin impedance in front of next remote 
substation)] 
= I (Rl+jXI) + (Zrhevenin - in front) 1---------------------------------(3.3) 
\ - reverse reach 
= impedance reverse reach 
ABS(Thevenin impedance behind local substation) 
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= I (Zrhevenin - behind) 1---------------------------------------(3.4) 
cp, = line angle 
= I XI ta n - R I -------------------------------------------------------(3.5) 
Rl+jXI = line impedance 
c). Calculating the relay timer settings 
The relay timer setting for a specific operating zone is taken as the difference 
between the time when the apparent impedance 'seen' by a relay enters the 
relay operating zone and that time when the apparent impedance exits the 
operating zone to enter another operating zone (for example points A and B 
respectively in Figure 3.4 ). 
The timer setting is calculated from the following: 
1 . the maximum rate of change of the impedance that is expected during that 
time when the apparent impedance is within the operating zone; and 
2. the change in the angular separation of the unstable generators at that time 
when the apparent impedance is within the operating zone. 
1 . The maximum rate of change of the impedance. 
The rate of change of the impedance represents the time it takes for the 
apparent impedance 'seen' by a relay to move from one point to another on 
the impedance locus. The rate of change of the impedance is therefore 
used to calculate the time that the impedance spends within an operating 
zone. 
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The method used by Eskom is based on the existing approach in that it 
assumes that the rate the change of the impedance is equal to the rate of 
change of the angle separation (angle oscillations) between unstable 
generators. To ensure detection for the fastest angular oscillation that 
could occur, the maximum frequency of angular oscillation (swing 
frequency) is used. The swing frequency represents the time it takes for the 
unstable generators to experience an angle separation of 360° (pole slip). 
To determine the maximum swing frequency, the electrical power output of 
the unstable generators are monitored when doing a stability study. From 
the electrical power oscillations the maximum frequency of oscillation is 
calculated and used as the maximum swing frequency. 
2. The change in the angular separation of the unstable generators. 
It is assumed that the impedance loci 'seen' by impedance type relays, 
during unstable conditions, are circular and completes a 360° circular 
trajectory when generator pole slipping is taking place (360° angular 
separation between unstable generators). Those points where the 
impedance locus 'seen' by a relay crosses the operating zones defined by 
the relay's characteristics will therefore indicate the angle separation of the 
generators at that time. A change in angle separation during that time when 
the apparent impedance was within the operating zone ( t.\0 in Figure 3.4) 
can therefore be calculated. 
As mentioned the swing frequency represents the time it takes for the unstable 
generators to experience an angle separation of 360° (pole slip). With the 
change in angle separation t.\0 known, the time it takes for the unstable 
generators to experience this angle separation, can be calculated from the 
following equation: 
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change in angle separation during that time when the apparent 
impedance is within the operating zone (in degrees) 
0s - eA in Figure 3.4 
maximum swing frequency (Hz) 
To illustrate how timer settings are calculated, the following example is 
presented: 
Figure 3.4 shows a relay with a concentric circle out-of-step protection characteristic. For 
this example the forward reach and the reverse reach for the inner zone are equal and the 
characteristics are therefore centred at the origin. 
According to Eskom's method, a circular impedance locus will be 'seen' at this location. A 
circular impedance locus is therefore also shown in Figure 3.4. 
The system impedance line shown in Figure 3.4 is representing the system impedance 
between generator pool 1 and generator pool 2 in the real system shown in Figure 3.2b. 
The angle separation during instability will therefore take place between these generator 
pools. 
1. The maximum rate of change of the impedance. 
For the purposes of the example, the maximum swing frequency of the real system shown 
in Figure 3.2b is fs. 
43 
2. The change in the angular separation of the unstable generators. 
The timer setting for the operating zone known as the outer zone is calculated by 
considering the movement of the impedance between two points (A and 8 in Figure 3.4) 
on its circular trajectory. The two points are defined by the out-of-step protection's outer 
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Figure 3.4: Calculation of relay timer settings 
At point A the angular separation eA between generator pools 1 and 2 is 90° because the 
outer characteristic is a circle and centred at the origin. 
At point 8 the angular separation between generator pools 1 and 2 is calculated according 
to the following equation: 
= 2 
x (tan _1 outer· char· radius) 
inner· char · radius 
With the swing frequency and the change in angle separation (~e = e9 - eA) known, the 
timer setting can be calculated according to equation (3.6). 
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3.3.3 Verification and protection performance results 
As mentioned before, the protection performance was recorded during a stability 
study by including mathematical models for the protection in the power system 
model. In Appendix C the choice of locations and the calculations of settings 
were done according to Eskom's method. The protection was mathematically 
modelled, using the models presented in Appendix 8, at the selected locations 
with the calculated settings. The choice of locations and the calculated settings 
were taken from the results in Appendix C. 
According to the stability study results shown in Figure 3.1, the system 
underwent power oscillations before it became unstable. For this reason, it was 
expected that the impedance 'seen' by both the out-of-step blocking and the out-
of-step tripping relays at their respective locations in the system would pass 
through the relay characteristics a number of times. 
The performance of the out-of-step blocking and tripping protection was 
evaluated by determining the percentage of correct detection for the total 
number of locations where correct detection was expected to take place. The 
percenta.ge was calculated as follows: 
% Detection = number of locations where correct detection took place x 100% 
number of locations where protection is located 
Out-of-step blocking protection 
The purpose of the out-of-step blocking protection is to detect when the 
impedance enters the characteristic zones and stays there long enough to allow 
the zone timers to expire. This will enable distance relay blocking every time 
there is a possibility that undesirable operation of distance relays could occur. 
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In the stability study done, the impedance passed through the out-of-step 
blocking protection characteristics more than once. Table 3. 1 provides a 
summary of the out-of-step blockif1g protection evaluation results and the 
reasons why nondetection took place at some locations. The percentage of 
detection is 41,67% as shown in Table 3.1. Note that only the results for the 
portion of the Eskom system shown in Figure C1, in Appendix C was evaluated. 
Appendix D provides details of the protection performance results. 
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1. At some locations the zone timer setting for the out-of-step 
blocking relay was not sufficient The timer did not expire while the 
impedance was passing through the outer zone to enter the inner 
zone. The reason for this is that the rate of change of the impedance 
is not constant and that in those cases where nondetection occurred, 
the rate of change of the impedance, when entering the outer zone, 
was more than the maximum swing frequency f5 used for the 
calculation of the timer setting. 
2. At some locations the out-of-step blocking characteristics were 
not large enough to allow detection as the impedance entered the 
out-of-step blacking's outer zone, remained inside the outer zone long 
enough to allow the timer to expire, but never entered the inner zone 
to enable detection. 
3. At some locations the distance relay's largest characteristic 
encroached the out-of-step blocking relay characteristics. As a 
result undesired operation of the distance relay occurred because as 
the impedance entered the blocking relay's characteristics it also 
entered the distance relay's characteristics. 
1. At some locations the impedance never entered the out-of-step 
blocking relay's characteristics. Undesired operation at these 
locations did, however, not take place. Eventhough the non detection 
of the out-of-step blocking relay did not result in undesired operation 
of the distance relay, it does raise the concern that an out-of-step 
blocking relay has been placed at a location where it is not needed, It 
therefore reflects an unnecessary expenditure as well as an 
unnecessary increase in risk of protection relay failure. 
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Out-of-step tripping protection 
The purpose of the out-of-step tripping protection is to not detect power swing 
conditions but detect system out-of-step conditions. This will enable the out-of-
step tripping protection to send a tripping signal to selected locations to initiate 
islanding. 
Table 3.2 provides a summary of the out-of-step tripping protection evaluation 
results and the reasons why nondetection took place at some locations. The 
percentage of detection is 33,33 % as shown in Table 3.2. Note that as for the 
out-of-step blocking protection evaluation, only the results for the portion of the 
Eskom system shown in Figure C1, in Appendix C was evaluated. Appendix D 
provides a detailed presentation of the protection performance results. 
Table 3.2: Out-of-step tripping protection evaluation results 
Out-of-step tripping 3 
relay locations 
Out-of-step tripping 1 
relay detections 
% detection 33,33% 
Reasons for 1. At one location a zone timer setting was not sufficient. The timer 
nondetection did not expire while the impedance passed through the outer and 
inner zones. The reason for this is that the rate of change of 
impedance was more than the swing frequency used for calculating 
the timer setting. 
2. At another location the impedance locus behaviour did not allow 
detection i.e. the out-of-step condition was not observable to the 
out-of-step tripping relay. The reason for this is that the impedance 
locus did not enter the relay's characteristics in the manner for 
which locations and settings were determined. As a result the relay 
did not detect. 
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3.4 Discussion of verification and protection performance results for the 
case study presented under section 3.3 
For both out-of-step blocking protection and out-of-step tripping protection three 
main reasons for nondetection were found: 
1 . timer settings are insufficient; 
2. relay characteristic sizes i.e. the reach, are insufficient; and 
3. the unstable condition is not observable by the relay. 
1. Timer settings are insufficient 
When calculating the timer settings two assumptions are made: 
• the impedance loci 'seen' by impedance type relays are circular during 
unstable conditions; and 
• the swing frequency measured at the generator terminals is the same 
as the rate of change of the impedance 'seen' at an impedance relay 
location. 
Analyses of the results (refer to Appendix D) showed that the above 
assumptions are not correct. 
The impedance loci are not circular because system dynamic behaviour 
(generator excitation control, system reactive compensation, load demand, 
etc.) continuously influence the behaviour of the voltage and current 
measured at a relay location. 
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The swing frequency measured at the generator terminals is not 
representative of the rate of change of the impedance 'seen' at a relay 
location. As mentioned above, the dynamic behaviour of the system 
continuously influences the behaviour of the voltages and currents within 
the system. The rate of change is therefore not necessarily the same as the 
swing frequency. In addition it was also found that the rate of change of the 
impedance is not constant but increases (accelerates) and decreases 
(decelerates) continuously. 
From the above findings the manner of calculating timer settings using the 
existing approach could result in insufficient timer settings as found in the 
cases listed in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. 
2. Relay characteristic sizes i.e. the reach, are insufficient. 
Within the existing approach, calculation of the reach settings is based on 
system equivalent impedances. In Eskom's method Thevenin impedances 
are calculated from which the relay reach settings are determined. 
It was found in the research that the use of equivalent impedances may 
produce insufficient reach settings. The relay characteristics could be too 
small and the apparent impedance may not enter to within an inner zone to 
enable detection. 
When equivalencing system impedances, the effect of parallel lines, shunt 
and series compensation and the dynamic control of system impedance 
(using for example FACTS devices) are not considered. These system 
components all serve to decrease system impedance and increase power 
flow. Using equivalent impedances may therefore produce smaller 
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impedance quantities than is the case for the real system. Consequently 
this may lead to smaller reach settings for out-of-step protection relays. 
In addition the existing approach does not seem to consider the need to co-
ordinate the out-of-step blocking protection reach settings with the distance 
relay reach settings. As a consequence, large distance relay 
characteristics could encroach the out-of-step blocking relay's 
characteristics. This could lead to the undesired operation of the distance 
relay although the apparent impedance enters the out-of-step blocking 
relay's characteristics. 
From the above findings the manner of calculating reach settings using the 
existing approach could result in insufficient reach settings as found in 
practice during the study. 
3. The unstable condition is not observable by the relay. 
According to the existing approach, out-of-step blocking relays tend to be 
located where distance relays are located. The Eskom method locates 
blocking relays at all the locations where distance relays are located. 
The research indicated that not all distance relays within a power system 
are located within an area where system instability may cause undesired 
operation. The unstable condition is therefore not necessarily observable 
at all the locations. Applying out-of-step blocking protection at those 
locations where the unstable condition is not observed, causes over-
expenditure and an increased risk of protection failure. It should, however, 
be noted that one study alone is not enough indication of whether out-of-
step blocking protection is needed or not at a particular location. The use 
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of one study in the above case is purely for illustrative purposes. (refer to 
section 1.4, no 1 O of Chapter 1 ). 
According to the existing approach, out-of-step tripping relays tend to be 
located in an area identified as the electrical centre. This is also the case 
when using the Eskom method. 
The research results, however, indicated that the electrical centre location 
is not necessarily the correct location for an out-of-step tripping relay to 
observe an unstable condition. Due to the dynamic behaviour of the 
system, the behaviour of the impedance locus at the electrical centre is not 
as assumed when using the existing approach. The impedance locus is not 
circular and it does not necessarily move from left to right (or vice versa) 
during pole slipping conditions. In addition it also does not necessarily 
approach the origin in the impedance plane during system instability. As a 
result an out-of-step tripping relay located at the electrical centre of a 
power system may not detect during unstable conditions. 
From the above findings the manner in which locations for out-of-step 
blocking and tripping relays are chosen when using the existing approach, 
could result in out-of-step protection relays not observing unstable 
conditions when required. Ultimately the relays may not detect, as 
illustrated in the research. 
In conclusion, the statement made under section 3.2 is repeated: 
It seems that there is a need to either improve the existing 
approach or identify a new and better approach to apply out-of-step 
protection. 
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3.5 Summary and conclusions 
In this chapter the existing approach of applying out-of-step protection was 
presented. In summary the approach seems to entail the following according to 
literature: 
1. The existing approach of applying out-of-step protection is based on the 
behaviour of the electrical quantities (voltage, current, rotor angle, etc.) of a 
two machine power system. The reason for this is that a real power system 
that has generators or generator groups which could become unstable with 
one another, can be represented by a two machine equivalent model. The 
assumption can therefore be made that when the real power system 
becomes unstable, the behaviour of the electrical quantities in the real power 
system may be similar to the behaviour of the electrical quantities in a two 
machine system. 
2. The tripping relay locations are selected based on the location of an 
electrical centre (also known as the voltage zero), determined from stability 
studies. 
3. In many cases out-of-step blocking protection is located at all the locations 
where distance relays are located. 
4. A source impedance, or equivalent impedance representing system 
impedance in front of and behind a location are used to calculate the forward 
and reverse reach settings respectively for a relay located at that location. 
5. A maximum swing frequency, determined from stability studies, is used to 
calculate relay timer settings. 
The existing approach, using Eskom's methods was illustrated, tested and 
investigated by means of a case study in which out-of-step protection was 
applied to an actual power system. An investigation of the case study results 
indicated the following regarding the existing approach: 
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1. During system instability, the electrical quantities of an actual power system 
does not necessarily behave similar to the behaviour of the electrical 
quantities of a two machine system; 
2. The assumption that all distance relays should be equipped with out-of-step 
blocking protection may be over-cautious because many such blocking relays 
may be redundant in many stability events; 
3. The use of an electrical centre area to identify locations for out-of-step 
tripping relays is not reliable to ensure observability of unstable conditions; 
4. The use of equivalent impedances to calculate reach settings ignores 
dynamic influences within the real system that affects system impedance; 
and 
5. The use of swing frequencies ignores the dynamic influences within the 
power system which affects the voltage and current measured by the relay at 
the relay location. 
The conclusions drawn from this chapter are the following: 
1. assumptions made in the existing approach seems to be the following: 
• voltage zeros (electrical centre locations) seems to be used to 
determine tripping relay locations; 
• blocking relays seems to be located at all distance relay locations; 
• equivalent impedances seems to be used to determine reach settings; 
and 
• swing frequency seems to be used to determine timer settings. 
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These assumptions could lead to incorrect performance of out-of-step 
protection; 
2. the four assumptions made in the existing approach over-simplifies the 
procedure of applying out-of-step protection; and 
3. there is a need to either improve the existing approach or identify a new and 
better approach. An example of improving the existing approach could be 
anything which eliminates some or all of its limitations identified in Chapter 3. 
References [12] and [20] presents cases where improvements on the existing 
approach were studied. Examples of new and better approach could be 
either the use of the new approach presented in this thesis or the use of the 




PROPOSED OUT-OF-STEP PROTECTION APPLICATION APPROACH 
INVOLVING A STUDY OF THE IMPEDANCE LOCUS BEHAVIOUR AT 
ALL LOCATIONS 
4.1 Other approaches identified and used in the application of out-of-step 
protection 
As mentioned in Chapter 3 under section 3.2, the limitations introduced when using 
the existing approach, have been noticed and addressed by others. The need to 
either improve the existing approach or identify a new approach has therefore been 
recognised. Reference [20] has recognised that blocking protection for distance 
relays does not have to be enabled at all locations. In reference [12] the electrical 
centre location was used as an indication for where relays should be located, but 
more detailed investigation involving the studying of the impedance locus behaviour 
within the area where the electrical centre is located, was done to obtain the optimal 
locations for out-of-step tripping protection. In reference [20] the impedance locus 
behaviour was studied to determine the required reach settings for out-of-step 
tripping protection. 
A completely different approach was developed in references [24, 46, 47, 48]. This 
approach entails the measurement of phaser angle differences between distant 
points in a power system. Using this method, if applied correctly, system instability 
can be predicted by monitoring the angle difference between distant points (for 
example generation pools. The use of the phaser angle measurement technique is 
still very much in the research phase all over the world and although the system has 
been implemented and tested in certain utilities, correct operation during actual 
incidents has not yet been recorded. Research done on the phaser angle 
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measurement technique does however indicate that the method could be reliable 
and in the future may even replace impedance type out-of-step protection relays. 
In the research leading to this thesis, a new approach when applying impedance 
type relays was developed. The new approach involves a study of the impedance 
locus behaviour to determine locations and settings. The new approach is now 
presented under section 4.2. 
4.2 A new approach involving a study of the impedance locus behaviour at 
each relay location 
The new approach entails the following: 
1. The modelling of the power system (the actual power system); and 
2. Studying the apparent impedance at all the locations within the power system to 
determine locations and settings. 
The new approach addresses the limitations and shortcomings of the existing 
approach in the following way (Table 4.1 provides a comparison between the 
existing approach and the new approach): 
1. Direct results regarding the behaviour of the electrical quantities of the power 
system is available when modelling the actual power system. There is therefore 
no need to make use of a two machine system approach to interpret system 
stability results. 
2. Studying the impedance locus behaviour at all locations is an indication of what 
an impedance type relay will 'see' during system unstable conditions. Location 
and setting decisions made by the protection engineer are therefore based 
directly on what the relay will 'see'. 
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Table 4.1: Comparison between the existing approach and the new approach 
Existing approach New approach 
Location Tend to equip all distance relays with Impedance loci at all the locations in 
out-of-step blocking protection. Out- the system are studied to determine 
of-step tripping protection is located in the locations for both out-of-step 
the area identified as the electrical blocking and out-of-step tripping 
centre of the system. protection. The method involves the 
use of an ROW1. 
Reach settings The reach settings are calculated from Reach settings are calculated by 
equivalent impedances which studying the impedance loci at the 
represent actual system impedance in chosen locations. The method 
an equivalent two machine system. involves the use of an ROW. 
Timer settings The timer settings are calculated from The timer settings are calculated by 
the rate of change of the impedance in studying the impedance loci and 
the impedance plane. The rate of determining the time for which the 
change of the impedance is assumed impedance remains in an operating 
to be constant and equal to the zone. 
frequency of oscillation of the 
generator rotor angle oscillations. 
What is new in this approach? 
What is new in this approach is the attention that is given to the impedance 
locus 'seen' by a relay at its location. The impedance locus is studied using methods 
developed in the research. These methods were developed to identify correct 
locations for out-of-step blocking and tripping relays and to calculate correct settings 
which would ensure correct detection. 
The methods developed to determine locations and calculate reach settings uses an 
impedance characteristic which defines an area within the impedance plane. This 
characteristic was named by the research as a relay operating window (ROW). The 
way in which the impedance enters and exits the ROW is used to determine 
locations and calculate reach settings. Even though any characteristic shape can be 
used to define a ROW, the research used a rectangular shape characteristic 
because it is easy to define the boundaries and suitable for illustrative purposes. 
1 Relay Operating Window. Definition can be found under the Abbreviations and Terminology section 
of this thesis. 
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Figure 4.1 illustrates the method of using an ROW. The top and bottom boundaries 
of the ROW are represented by Xa and Xb respectively. R1 and Rr represent the left 
and right ROW boundaries respectively. These values are selected based on the 
relay type used and the load encroachment limitations. More is said about the choice 
of these parameters when the methods to identify locations and calculate reach 
settings are presented. 
The impedance values when the impedance locus enters and exits the ROW are 
Renter-actua1+jXenter-actua1 and Rexit-actua1+jXexit-actua1- respectively. The closest distance 
between the impedance locus and the origin of the impedance plane is I Rd+j~ I . 
~ and ~ are used when determining whether a location requires out-of-step 
blocking protection. When these values indicate that the apparent impedance is 
within the ROW, it becomes likely that the apparent impedance may enter the 
distance relay characteristics and cause undesired operation . 
Renter-actua1, Xenter-actua1, Rexit-actua1, Xexit-actua1, Rd and ~ are all used when determining 
whether a location is suitable for out-of-step tripping protection. The reason for this 
is that these parameters define the way in which the apparent impedance will enter 
and exit the out-of-step tripping relay characteristics at a given location. If these 
parameters present an impedance locus that will allow detection at the given 
location, the location should be suitable for an out-of-step tripping relay. 
Renter-actua1, Xenter-actua1, Rexit-actua1, and Xexit-actua1 are used to calculate the reach settings. 
The entry and exit points into and out of the ROW indicates what the size of the 
largest out-of-step relay characteristic should be to ensure that the impedance locus 




..,..- (Renter-actual, Xenter-actual) 
R 
(Rexit-actual, Xexit-actual) 
Figure 4.1: The use of the ROW to evaluate observability of power swings and 
out-of-step conditions 
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The method developed to calculate the timer settings involves the studying of the 
impedance locus as it enters the various operating zones of the out-of-step 
protection relay. A mathematical model representing the relay characteristics is 
included in the power system model and times when the impedance locus enters and 
exits the respective operating zones are recorded. From these recorded times, the 
duration that the impedance stays within an operating zone is calculated. These 
duration times are evaluated to determine the required zone timer settings. 
4.3 The new methods of studying the impedance locus behaviour to 
determine locations and settings 
Chapter 2, section 2.3, discussed the three considerations affecting the application 
of out-of-step protection to allow observability of rotor-angle unstable conditions. 
These are: 
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1 . Relay locations 
2. Relay reach settings; and 
3. Relay timer settings. 
4.3.1 Relay locations 
4.3.1a Out-of-step blocking protection 
To determine whether a chosen location requires out-of-step blocking protection, an 
ROW is chosen to define an area within the impedance plane with the following 
boundaries (refer to Figure 4.1 ): 
Xa = forward reach of the largest distance relay characteristic at that location; 
Xb = reverse reach of the largest distance relay characteristic at that location; 
Rr = maximum resistive value on the R-axis defined by the largest distance 
relay characteristic at the location; 
RI = minimum resistive value on the R-axis defined by the largest distance 
relay characteristic at the location; 
The need for out-of-step blocking protection is established by determining the 
following (refer to Figure 4.1 ): 
The corresponding R value of the perpendicular distance between the 
impedance locus and the origin of the R-X plane 
The corresponding X value of the perpendicular distance between the 
impedance locus and the origin of the R-X plane 
~ and Xi are determined by capturing (monitoring) the R and X values of the 
impedance locus as it crosses the ROW boundaries. This can be done within a 
powers system simulation tool (PSS/E in the case of the research) when doing a 
stability study. A mathematical model representing the boundaries of the ROW can 
be included in the power system model. Rd and Xi are captured only for those times 
when detection for the purpose of blocking should take place i.e. during those times 
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when the power system is oscillating as well as those times when the power system 
becomes unstable2. 
The criterion in identifying locations for out-of-step blocking protection is: 
• If R1 < Rd < Rr and Xb < ~ < Xa then the apparent impedance is inside the 
ROW boundaries and out-of-step blocking protection is needed. 
4.3.1b Out-of-step tripping protection 
To determine whether a location is suitable for out-of-step tripping protection, an 
ROW is chosen to define an area within the impedance plane with the following 
boundaries (refer to Figure 4.1 ): 
Xa = the maximum forward reach specified by the relay manufacturer which 
will be within the design limit of the relay type to be used; 
Xb = the maximum reverse reach specified by the relay manufacturer which 
will be within the design limit of the relay type to be used; 
RI = Rr 
= the maximum allowable resistive reach which will avoid load 
. encroachment. 
The suitability of a chosen location is evaluated by calculating the following for that 
time frame within the stability study when the system is becoming unstable (refer to 
Figure 4. 1 ): 
l2cil = -,,/(Rd2 + ~2)------------------------------------------------------------------------(4. 1) 
%Renter= Renter-actual X 1 00-------------------------------------------------------------( 4. 2) 
Rr{R,} 
2 An alternative approach could be the use of a spreadsheet program which contains the impedance 
locus data captured from the stability study results and a range of data representing the ROW 
boundaries. A comparison of data to determine when the locus crosses the ROW boundaries can then 











Rextt-actual X 1 00-----------------------------------------------------------------( 4. 3) 
Rr{R,} 
The perpendicular distance between the impedance locus and 
the origin of the R-X plane 
The corresponding R value of the impedance locus when 
entering the ROW 
The %R when the impedance enters the ROW on the right-hand 
{left-hand} side of the X-axis, expressed as a percentage of Rr 
{R,} 
The corresponding X value of the impedance locus when 
entering the ROW 
The corresponding R value of the impedance locus when exiting 
the ROW 
The %R when the impedance exits the ROW on the right-hand 
{left-hand} side of the X-axis, expressed as a percentage of Rr 
{R,} 
The corresponding X value of the impedance locus when exiting 
the ROW 
As in the case of determining ~ and N explained under section (4.3.1 a), Ranter-actual, 
Xanter-actua1, Rexit-actua1 and Xaxit-actua1 are determined by capturing (monitoring) the R and X 
values of the impedance locus as it crosses the ROW boundaries. As already 
mentioned, this can be done within a power system simulation tool when doing a 
stability study. A mathematical model representing the boundaries of the ROW can 
be included in the power system model. For the purpose of out-of-step tripping 
protection the Rd, N, Renter-actua1, Xanter-actua1, Rexit-actua1 and Xaxit-actua1 are captured only for 
those times when detection for the purpose of tripping should take place i.e. during 
those times when the power system becomes unstable. 
The criterion in determining the suitability of a chosen location is: 
• R1 < Renter-actua1 < Rr and Xb < Xenter-actua1 < Xa to indicate that the 
impedance is inside the boundaries defined by an out-of-step tripping 
ROW; and 
• I Zct I to be as close as possible to O pu which will ensure that the 
impedance locus enters the out-of-step tripping inner characteristic for 
the purpose of detection3; and 
• %Renter to be as close as possible to 100% as most relay types are 
designed to allow detection when the impedance enters the 
characteristics close to the R-axis; and 
• %Rexit to be as close as possible to 100% as most relay types are 
designed to allow detection when the impedance locus exits the 
characteristics close to the R-axis; and 
• the impedance to enter and exit the ROW in such a way as to allow 
detection according to the detection methodology of the type of relay 
chosen. 
4.3.2 Relay reach settings 
The forward and reverse reach settings are calculated from the following: 
1. the transmission line angle 
2. I Zf1argest dist relay char I = forward reach of largest distance relay characteristic 






3 Many out-of-step tripping relay types exist (1, 9, 13, 14, 30, 40-43, 49). These types of relays require 
that the impedance enter an inner zone to allow detection. 
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4, 5, 6 and 7 are determined as explained under section 4.3.1 b. 
















I Zfl L(j)l--------------------------------------------------------------------(4.4) 
I Zr I L'.'.: 1 80° +q> 1------------------------------------------------------------( 4. 5) 
blocking relay forward reach 
blocking relay reverse reach 
line angle of line on which blocking relay will be located 
t a n - 1 : : -----------------------------------------------------------( 4. 6) 





I maximum forward reach specified for the out-of-step protection used 1-------( 4. 7) 
the greater of .../(Renter-actual 2 + X.nter-actua1 2 ) and ...J(Rexit-actua1 2 + X.xit-actua1 2)--------( 4.8) 
or 
= I maximum reverse reach specified for the out-of-step protection used I 
if calculated I Zr I ~ I Zr1argest dist relay char I 
or 
if calculated I Zr I > I maximum reverse reach specified I 
• for Xenter-actua1 > 0 and Xexit-actua1 > 0: 
IZfl = the greater of ...J(Renter-actua? + Xenter-actua?) and ...J(Rexrt-actua? + Xexrt-actua?) ---(4.9) 
or 
= I maximum forward reach specified for the out-of-step protection used I 
if calculated I Zf I ~ I Zf1argest dist relay char I 
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or 
if calculated I Zfl > I maximum forward reach specified I 
lzrl = I maximum reverse reach specified for the out-of-step protection used 1------( 4. 10) 
• for Xenter-actual > 0 and Xexit-actual < 0: 
I Zfl = -V(Renter-actual 2 + Xenter-actual 2) -------------------------------------(4.11) 
or 
lzrl 






) ~ I Zf1argest dist relay char I 
or 
if calculated I Zfl > I maximum forward reach specified I 
-V(Rexit-actual 
2 + Xexit-actual 2)------------------------------------------(4.12) 
or 





) ~ I Zr1argest dist relay char I 
or 
if calculated I Zr I > I maximum reverse reach specified I 
• for Xenter-actual < 0 and Xexit-actual > 0: 
IZfl 
lzrl 
= 'V ( Rexit-actual 2 + Xexit-actual 2)-----------------------------------------( 4 · 1 3) 
or 






) ~ I Zf1argest dist relay char I 
or 
if calculated I Zf I > I maximum forward reach specified I 
-V(Renter-actual 
2 + Xenter-actual 2)------------------------------------(4.14) 
or 





) ~ I Zr1argest dist relay char I 
or 
if calculated I Zr I > I maximum reverse reach specified I 
where 











= inner zone forward reach for blocking relay 
= as specified for the out-of-step protection used--------------(4.15) 
or 
: I Zf1argest dist relay char I if calculated I Zfinner I~ I Zf1argest dist relay char I 
= inner zone reverse reach for blocking relay 
= as specified for the out-of-step protection used--------------(4.16) 
or 
= I Zr1argest dist relay char I if calculated I Zrinner I~ I Zr1argest dist relay char I 
= line impedance of line on which blocking relay will be located 







I Zf I L'.cpl-----------------------------------------------------------------( 4.17) 
I Zr I L'.180°+cpl----------------------------------------------------------( 4.18) 
tripping relay forward reach 
tripping relay reverse reach 
line angle of line on which tripping relay will be located 
t a n - 1 : : ---------------------------------------------------------( 4. 1 9) 
• for Xenter-actual < 0 and Xexit-actual < 0: 
J Zfl = I maximum forward reach specified for the out-of-step protection used 1------(4.20) 
lzrl = the greater of ..J(Renter-actua1 2 + Xenter-actua1 2) and ..J(Rexit-actua1 2 + Xexit-actua1 2)-----( 4.21) 
or 
= I maximum reverse reach specified for the out-of-step protection used I 
if calculated I Zr I > I maximum reverse reach specified I 
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• for Xenter-actual > 0 and Xexit-actual > 0: 
!Zfi = the greater Of .../(Renter-actua? + Xenter-actua?) and .../(Rexrt-actua? + Xexit-actua?) -(4.22) 
or 
= I maximum forward reach specified for the out-of-step protection used I 
if calculated I Zfl > I maximum forward reach specified I 
lzrl = I maximum reverse reach specified for the out-of-step protection used 1-----( 4.23) 
• for Xenter-actual > 0 and Xexit-actual < 0: 
I Zf I = "'1(Renter-actual 2 + Xenter-actual 2) ---------------------------------------( 4.24) 
or 
IZrl 
= I maximum forward reach specified for the out-of-step protection used I 
= 
if calculated I Zfl > I maximum forward reach specified I 
"'1 ( Rexit-actual 2 + Xexit-actual 2)---------------------------------------------( 4. 2 5) 
or 
= I maximum reverse reach specified for the out-of-step protection used I 
if calculated I Zr I > I maximum reverse reach specified I 
• for Xenter-actual < 0 and Xexit-actual > 0: 




I Zfinner I 
I Zrinnerl 
= I maximum forward reach specified for the out-of-step protection used I 
= 
if calculated I Zf I > I maximum forward reach specified I 
"'1 ( Renter-actual 2 + Xenter-actual 2)------------------------------------------( 4. 27) 
or 




if calculated I Zr I > I maximum reverse reach specified I 
inner zone forward reach for tripping relay 
as specified for the out-of-step protection used--------------(4.28) 
inner zone reverse reach for tripping relay 
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= as specified for the out-of-step protection used-------------(4.29) 
Rl+jXI = line impedance of line on which tripping relay will be located 
4.3.3 Relay timer settings 
The timer setting for a protection relay operating zone is calculated by determining 
the time (duration) for which the impedance remains in that operating zone. This is 
done by using a mathematical model representing the out-of-step protection relay 
characteristics in an impedance plane. The model is included in the power system 
model and a stability study is done. For the stability study done the impedance locus 
entry and exit times into and out of the operating zone are recorded. The duration 
that the apparent impedance stays within the operating zone represents the timer 
setting required to allow detection for the particular stability study done. 
For out-of-step blocking protection the entry and exit times are recorded during that 
time when the system is experiencing power oscillations. The reason for this is that 
out-of-step blocking relays should detect during power oscillating conditions in order 
to block undesired distance relay operation. 
For out-of-step tripping protection, the entry and exit times are recorded during that 
time when the system becomes unstable. The reason for this is that out-of-step 
tripping relays should detect only when the system becomes unstable and not while 
the system is experiencing power oscillations. 
Figure 4.2 illustrates the method by showing concentric type characteristics with two 
operating zones ( operating zone 1 and operating zone 2). Each of the operating 
zones require a timer setting. Depending on whether the timer settings are to be 
calculated for an out-of-step blocking relay or an out-of-step tripping relay, the times 
t1, t2 and t3 are recorded during that time when the relay should detect. 
With the recorded times t1, t2 and t3 known, the timer settings for the respective 
operating zones shown within Figure 4.2 are calculated as follows: 
T-operating zone 1 
T-operating zone 2 
where 
T-operating zone 1 












t2 - t 1 ------------------------------------------------------------( 4. 30) 
t3 - t2-------------------------------------. ----------------------( 4. 31 ) 
timer for operating zone 1 
timer for operating zone 2 
time at which the impedance enters the operating zone 1 
time at which the impedance exits operating zone 1 and 
enters operating zone 2 
time at which the impedance exits operating zone 2 and 
enters operating zone 1 
4.4 Case study: Determining and testing the reliability of the new approach 
Out-of-step protection was applied to the Eskom system, using the new approach. 
The methods presented to analyse the impedance locus behaviour were used to 
determine relay locations and calculate relay settings. Due to the number of 
calculations involved, all the calculations and examples are contained in Appendix 
E. 
The stability study used to demonstrate the application method (choice of locations 
and calculating settings) as well as evaluate the out-of-step protection performance, 
is the stability study presented in Chapter 3, under section 3.3.1. 
As in the case of demonstrating the existing approach and its limitations, the use of a 
single stability study was found to be sufficient to illustrate the new application 
approach and demonstrate the methods of studying the impedance locus to 
determine locations and calculate settings. However, as mentioned in section 1.4, no 
10 of Chapter 1 , a single study would not be sufficient in practice to determine the 
most suitable locations and settings for the relays. 
Operating zone 1 
Operating zone 2 
Impedance locus / 
Out-of-step protection characteristics 
( concentric circle type) 




The protection performance was recorded and evaluated by including mathematical 
models, representing the behaviour of the protection relays, in the power system 
model. Appendix B contains a description of the mathematical models used to 
represent the protection behaviour. The protection relays were located at the 
locations identified in Appendix E with the reach and timer settings also calculated in 
Appendix E. A summary of the protection performance results are presented under 
section 4.4.1. Appendix F provides details of the protection performance results. 
4.4.1 Verification and protection performance results 
According to the stability study results shown in Figure 3.1, Chapter 3, the system 
underwent power oscillations before it became unstable. For this reason, it was 
expected that the impedance 'seen' by both the out-of-step blocking and the out-of-
step tripping relays at their respective locations in the system would pass through 
the relay characteristics a number of times. 
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The performance of the out-of-step blocking and tripping protection was evaluated 
by determining the percentage of correct detection for the total number of locations 
where correct detection should take place. The percentage was therefore calculated 
as follows: 
% detection = number of locations where correct detection took place x 100% 
number of locations where protection is located 
Out-of-step blocking protection 
The purpose of the out-of-step blocking protection is to detect when the impedance 
enters the characteristic zones and stays there long enough to allow the zone timers 
to expire. This will enable distance relay blocking every time there is a possibility of 
undesired operation of distance relays. 
In the stability study done, the impedance passed through the out-of-step blocking 
protection characteristics more than once. Table 4.2 provides a summary of the out-
of-step blocking protection evaluation results. The percentage of detection is 100% 
as shown in Table 4.2 which means that detection for the purpose of blocking took 
place at all the locations. Even though one would expect perfect performance 
because the same stability study done for the purpose of evaluation was also used 
for setting the relays, the improvement in protection performance is evident. 
Furthermore, with reference to section 1.4 no 1 O of Chapter 1, one stability study 
was used only to illustrate the new approach and the improvement in protection 
performance. As mentioned under section 1.4 no 10 of Chapter 1, in practice the 
application of out-of-step protection should be done with more than one stability 
study. The more stability studies used, the more reliable the protection. 
Note that only the results for the portion of the Eskom system shown in Figure C1, in 
Appendix C was evaluated. Appendix F provides details of the protection 
performance results. 
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Table 4.2: Out-of-step blocking protection evaluation results 
Total number of locations where out-of-step blocking 23 
protection was applied 
Total number of locations where out-of-step blocking 23 
protection detected 
% detection 100% 
Reasons for nondetection • None 
Out-of-step tripping protection 
The purpose of the out-of-step tripping protection is to not detect during power 
swing conditions but detect during system out-of-step conditions. This will enable it 
to send a tripping signal to selected locations to initiate islanding. 
As in the case of the out-of-step blocking protection, the impedance passed through 
the out-of-step tripping protection characteristics more than once. Table 4.3 provides 
a summary of the out-of-step tripping protection evaluation results. The percentage 
of detection is 100% which means that non detection during power oscillations took 
place and detection during system instability took place. The protection performance 
was therefore correct at all the locations. Note that as for the out-of-step blocking 
protection evaluation, only the results for a portion of the Eskom system shown in 
Figure C1, in Appendix C was evaluated. Appendix F provides a detailed 
presentation of the protection performance results. 
Table 4.3: Out-of-step tripping protection evaluation results 
Total number of locations where out-of-step tripping 4 
protection was applied 
Total number of locations where out-of-step tripping 4 
protection detected 
% detection 100% 
Reasons for nondetection • None 
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4.5 Discussion of verification and protection performance results for the 
case study presented under section 4.4. 
Both the out-of-step blocking and tripping protection relays performed correctly 
according to the simulation results. 
The out-of-step blocking relays applied within the power system detected during 
power oscillations. As a results no undesired operation of distance relays occurred. 
The out-of-step tripping relays did not detect during the power oscillation conditions 
but did detect when the system became unstable. This performance of the out-of-
step tripping relays is correct as out-of-step tripping relays should only detect and 
operate when the system is unstable. 
From the above findings, the manner in which the out-of-step protection was applied 
according to the new approach, shows an improvement on the existing approach 
presented in Chapter 3. Even though the test regarding the new approach's 
reliability was done based on only one stability study, a definite improvement in 
protection performance took place. For the one stability study done and using the 
existing approach, only 41, 67% of all out-of-step blocking relays and 33,33 % of all 
out-of-step· tripping relays detected correctly. For the same stability study done and 
using the new approach, a 100 % of all out-of-step blocking relays and 100 % of all 
out-of-step tripping relays detected correctly. As already mentioned before, even 
though one would expect perfect performance because the same stability study done 
for the purpose of evaluation was also used for setting the relays, the improvement 
in protection performance is evident. With reference to section 1.4 no 1 O of Chapter 
1, one stability study was used only to illustrate the new approach and the 
improvement in protection performance. As mentioned under section 1.4 no 10 of 
Chapter 1, it is necessary in practice to make use of more than one stability study 
when applying out-of-step protection. The more studies, the more reliable the 
protection becomes. 
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4.6 Summary and conclusions 
In this chapter a new approach of applying out-of-step protection, which involves the 
studying of the impedance locus behaviour at all locations, was presented. In 
summary the approach entails the following: 
1. The modelling of the power system (the actual power system); and 
2. Studying the apparent impedance at all the locations within the power system. 
The new approach was developed based on the limitations and shortcomings of the 
existing approach. Table 4.1 at the beginning of this chapter provides a comparison 
between the existing approach and the new approach. 
The new approach was illustrated, tested and investigated by means of a case study 
in which out-of-step protection was applied to an actual power system. An 
investigation of the case study results indicated the following regarding the new 
approach: 
Both the out-of-step blocking and tripping protection relays performed correctly 
because: 
1. Results regarding the behaviour of the electrical quantities of the power system 
was used to determine locations and settings. A two machine equivalent system 
approach to interpret results were not used; and 
2. Studying the impedance locus behaviour at all locations is an indication of what 
an impedance type relay will 'see' during system unstable conditions. Location 
and setting decisions by the protection engineer are therefore based directly on 
what the relay will 'see'. 
74 
The conclusions from this chapter are the following: 
1. Studying the actual behaviour of the power system electrical quantities provides 
more accurate results for applying out-of-step protection. The reason for this is 
that the electrical quantities of an actual system does not necessarily behave 
similarly to the behaviour of the electrical quantities of a two machine system; and 
2. Applying out-of-step protection according to the new approach shown an 
improvement on the existing approach presented in Chapter 3. Table 4.4 shows a 
comparison between the protection performance results for the case studies done 
in chapters 3 and 4. It can be seen that the use of the new approach resulted in 
improved protection performance compared with the protection performance when 
applying the protection using the existing approach. 
Table 4.4: Comparison between the protection performance results for the case 
studies done in chapters 3 and 4 
Case study Blocking protection Tripping protection 
Case study Chapter 3 % detection = 41,67 % % detection = 33,33 % 
(existing approach) 




REAL CASE APPLICATION OF THE NEW APPROACH 
In 1996 and 1997 Eskom investigated the use of out-of-step tripping protection 
and in 1997 out-of-step tripping protection was applied to the Eskom transmission 
system, using the new approach and methods of calculating reach and timer 
settings as presented in Chapter 4. In this chapter this real case application of 
out-of-step tripping protection to the Eskom system is presented (Detail regarding 
this investigation is documented in reference [39). 
For this real case application of the new approach the following input information 
from Eskom was required: 
1. a range of stability study results 1; 
2. the pre-selected relay locations2; 
3. the out-of-step tripping relay to be used; and 
4. the out-of-step tripping philosophy and scheme design to be used as well as 
protection coordination philosophies applicable to out-of-step tripping 
protection. 
Figure 5.1 shows a block diagram with the Eskom input requirements to enable 
the use of the new approach. The diagram also shows at what stage final results 
were determined and verification of the application took place. 
1 The block diagram under section 1.1 in Chapter 1 illustrates the procedure followed when 
applying out-of-step protection. It can be seen that the system stability analysis investigation 
!block 1) serves as an input for the out-if-step protection application process (block 2). 
At the time when the individual analysis of the stability study results were done, only the new 
methods of calculating reach and timer settings were testes and accepted by Eskom. As a result 
locations for the out-of-step tripping relays were pre-selected according to the approach presented 
under section (5.1.2). 
lneut r!!9uirements from Eskom 
: 1. a range of stability studiesl .... -
:2. the pre-selected relay locations : .... -
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Figure 5. 1: Block diagram showing the Eskom input requirements to enable the 
use of the new approach. 
The application involved the following: 
1. Modelling the Eskom power system for the purpose of system dynamic 
analysis. 
2. Doing system stability studies to identify those studies which will be 
representative of most unstable scenarios within the Eskom system (four 
stability studies were identified which were used in the application process). 
3. Analysing each of the four stability studies to determine suitable locations and 
settings for the individual stability studies. The settings were calculated 
according to the new methods presented in Chapter 4. 
4. Analysing the overall results obtained under 3. to identify final locations and 
settings to comply with the protection coordination and application 
philosophies used by Eskom. 
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5. Verifying the choice of locations and settings by doing the four stability studies 
with protection models, representing the protection behaviour, included in the 
power system model. In addition to the four stability studies an accelerated 
simulation of the 7 June 1996 incident was also used to verify the out-of-step 
protection application. 
5.1 Presenting the input information from Eskom to apply out-of-step 
tripping protection 
The following sections present work done by Eskom. To illustrate and enable the 
use of the new approach, this work was needed as input information. 
5.1.1 Presenting the stability studies [39] 
Numerous stability studies were done to determine the conditions and 
contingencies for which the system will become unstable. From the range of 
stability studies that were done, four studies were identified to be representative 
of most system conditions and contingencies which will produce instability in the 
Eskom system. The four stability studies are those listed in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1 · Stability studies representative of most system conditions and 
contingencies which will produce instability in the Eskom system 
Case 1: Busbar fault at Hydra during Protection clearance by switching the following lines: 
peak load conditions • Beta series compensated 
• Droerivier series compensated 1 &2 
• Droerivier 3 
Case 2: Busbar fault at Hydra during Protection clearance by switching the following lines: 
minimum load conditions • Beta series compensated 
• Droerivier series compensated 1&2 
• Droerivier 3 
Case 3: Busbar fault at Grootvlei Protection clearance by switching the following lines: 
during peak load conditions • Leander 
• Perseus 
• Atlas 
Second busbar fault 1 • Zeus 1 
second later at Alpha 765 kV Protection clearance by switching the following: 
during peak load conditions • Alpha transformers 1 &2 
• Beta 765 kV 1&2 lines 
Case 4: Busbar fault at Beta during Protection clearance by switching the following: 
peak load conditions • Beta transformers 1 &2 
• Perseus 1&2 lines 
• Hydra series compensated line 
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Figure 5.2b: Angle oscillation results for Case 2 
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Figure 5.2d: Angle oscillation results for Case 4 
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5.1.2 Presenting the pre-selected out-of-step tripping relay locations [39] 
At the time when the individual analysis of the stability study results were done, 
only the new methods of calculating the-reach and timer settings were tested and 
accepted by Eskom. As a result, the choice of location(s) of the out-of-step 
. tripping relays were made as follows: 
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2. For each of the four stability studies the impedance locus at the locations 
where the electrical centre is located was studied. 
3. Based on the 'appearance' of the impedance loci as well as the detection 
philosophy for the out-of-step tripping relay used, locations were chosen. 
4. The choice of locations were to be tested in the verification process. 
The out-of-step tripping relay locations selected in this manner are listed in Table 
5.2. From points 1 to 4 above it can be seen that neither the existing approach not 
the new approach was used in determining the locations. It was a strategic 
decision by Eskom to locate the relays at the locations listed in Table 5.2. The 
decision was based of points 1 to 4 above as well as what was found to be the 
most suitable location for the purpose of islanding (the islanding investigation is a 
separate investigation as indicated under section 1. 1 in Chapter 1 ). 
Table 5.2: Out-of-step tripping relay locations 
Substation (SS) Transmission line (s) leaving the substation 
At Droerivier SS • Droerivier-Hydra series compensated 400 kV lines 
• Droerivier-Muldersvlei series compensated 400 kV 
• Droerivier-Bacchus series compensated 400 kV line; 
At Aries SS • Aries-Kronos series compensated 400 kV line 
'· Aries-Helios series compensated 400 kV line • 
5.1.3 Presenting the out-of-step tripping relay used [39] 
Eskom uses the 0ST1000 out-of-step tripping protection relay from General 
Electric [44]. It uses the characteristic type shown in the Figure 5.3 and detection 
takes place as follows (for more detail about the relay refer to reference [44]): 
Detection 'on the way in': When the impedance enters the outer zone, the outer 
zone timer T1 will start. When the impedance enters the middle zone, after the 
outer zone timer has expired, the middle zone timer T2 will start. When the 
impedance enters the inner zone, after the middle zone timer has expired, an 
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inner zone timer T3 will start. Detection will take place after the inner zone timer 
has expired [44]. 
Detection 'on the way out': In addition to detection 'on the way in', a timer T4 will 
start when the impedance enters the middle zone for the second time after the 
inner zone timer has expired. Detection will take place when the impedance exists 
the characteristics after the timer T4 has expired [44]. 
outer zones 
lmpedancelocus ~ 
T1 = Outer-zone timer 
T2 = Middle-zone timer .___R 
T3 = Inner-zone timer 
T4 = Timer for detection on the way out 
F = Forward reach 
R = Reverse reach 
Figure 5.3: The GE 0ST1000 relay characteristics used by Eskom 
For the application presented in this chapter Eskom used detection 'on the way' 
in. Timer T 4 is therefore not used. In addition, Eskom set the timer T3 to be 1 O 
msec in all application cases. The settings for the 0ST1000 relay which 
determines the size of the outer, middle and inner zones respectively are 
calculated according to the setting method presented in the 0ST1000 relay 
manual (refer to reference [44]). 
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5.1.4 Presenting the out-of-step tripping protection philosophy and scheme 
design used as well as the protection coordination philosophies 
applicable to out-of-step tripping relay settings [39] 
In summary the out-of-step tripping philosophy and scheme design entails (The 
philosophy and scheme design was selected by Eskom in accordance with 
Eskom's protection coordination and application philosophies as well as the 
necessary requirements to allow islanding during unstable conditions for all 
possible stability studies investigated and not investigated [39]. 
• The choice of out-of-step tripping relay locations to be pre-selected 
according to the approach presented under section (5.1.2) 
• 0ST1000 GE out-of-step tripping relays to be installed with a 'tripping on 
the way in' detection: 
• Relays to be duplicated at their locations. A two out of two detection 
(main one and main two) should initiate operation (tripping of breaker). 
• The required tripping scheme to be the following: 
At each chosen location: 
If any one of the relay 'pairs' should detect an out-of-step condition, 
tripping of breakers at the location should to take place which will 
enable islanding at that location. 
The above imply that when system instability is detected by out-of-step 
tripping relays at only one location, system separation will only take 
place at that one location. When detection takes place at all locations, 
system separation should be enabled at all locations. This is 
acceptable because investigations indicated that when system 
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instability is detected at one of the locations, it will be detected at the 
other locations, unless the contingency which caused instability also 
resulted in the non availability of measurement at one of the other 
locations. This approach was chosen because a telecommunication 
system for the purpose of intertripping is not available at all locations 
within the Eskom system. 
• Final reach settings for out-of-step tripping relays 
For each location, the maximum forward and reverse reach 
calculated for all stability study cases to be taken as the final forward 
and reverse reach setting respectively. The reason for this approach is 
because the maximum reach will also enable detection for those cases 
where a smaller reach setting would have been sufficient. The approach 
suggests that the relay characteristics should rather be larger than 
smaller to enable detection of all possible unstable conditions. 
• Final timer settings for out-of-step tripping relays 
For each location, the minimum T1 and T2 timer setting (refer to 
section (5.1.3)) for all stability study cases, to be taken as the final T1 
and T2 timer · setting respectively. The reason for this approach is 
because the minimum timer setting will also enable detection for those 
cases where the rate of change of the impedance may be faster that 
what the minimum timer has been calculated for. The approach suggests 
that the relay timers should time out faster rather than slower as this 
decreases the risk of an unstable condition not being detected. 
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5.2 The calculation of the relay reach and timer settings according to the 
new methods in the new approach presented in this thesis [39] 
5.2.1 Out-of-step tripping relay reach settings 
With the locations being pre-selected, the ROWs for each location as well as the 
respective Renter-actual, Xenter-actua1, Rexit-actua1, and Xexit-actua1 values at each location for 
each study had to be determined before reach settings could be calculated. The 
following steps were therefore followed: 
Step 1: Determining the ROWs 
The ROWs were determined according to the specification 
presented under section (4.3.1 b), Chapter 4. This specification is 
used when ROWs should be selected to determine whether 
locations are suitable for out-of-step tripping protection. For clarity 
the specification is repeated: 
Xa = the maximum forward reach specified by the relay 
manufacturer which will be within the design limit of the 
relay type to be used; 
Xb = the maximum reverse reach specified by the relay 
manufacturer which will be within the design limit of the 
relay type to be used; 
RI = Rr 
= the maximum allowable resistive reach which will avoid 
load encroachment. 
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ROW's RI and Rr boundaries 
Eskom's National Control allows lines to be loaded up to their 90° 
thermal limit after which load shedding to deload the line becomes a 
consideration. The load encroachment border should therefore allow 
for this operating condition. This is done by calculating the apparent 
impedance in the impedance plane which corresponds to the 90° 
thermal limit loading of the line at those locations where relays were 
to be located. 
The 90° MVA thermal limits for the lines at the locations where 
relays were to be located are listed in Table 5.3. The apparent 
impedance loading in ohms primary and pu are also listed. 
Table 5.3: 90° line loading (MVA, Ohms primary, pu) 
Location goo thermal ratings goo impedance loading go0 impedance loading limit 
(MVA) limit (Ohms primary) (pu) 
(all 400 kV lines) = 400 kV2/line rating = imp (ohms)/1600 (system 
MVA base impe) 
Aries-Kronos 876 183 0, 11 
Aries-Helios 876 183 0, 11 
Droerivier-Hydra 1124 142 0,09 
Droerivier-Bacchus 1028 156 0,10 
Droerivier-Muldersvlei 1028 156 0,10 
The ROW's RI and Rr boundaries for the respective locations were 
chosen to be those listed in Table 5.3. 
ROW's Xa and Xb boundaries 
Maximum forward and reverse reach settings for the 0ST1000 relay 
(x25 Tap and 1 Amp secondary) should not exceed 93,75 ohms 
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secondary according to the relay specifications [44]. Using the CT 
and VT ratios at the respective locations where relays are to be 
located (listed in Table 5.4) the pu Xa and Xb boundaries for the 
ROWs were calculated. 
Table 5.4: pu Xa and Xb boundaries for the ROWs 
Location CT ratio Maximum Ohms ROW's Xa and Xb 
(VT ratio: settings (x25 Tap and 1 boundaries 
400 kV :110 V) Amp secondary) note: I Xal = I Xbl 
Aries-Kronos 1200: 1 93,75 Ohms sec 0,178 pu 
Aries-Helios 1200: 1 93,75 Ohms sec 0, 178 pu 
Droerivier-Hydra 1600: 1 93,75 Ohms sec 0, 133 pu 
Droerivier-Bacchus 1600: 1 93,75 Ohms sec 0,133 pu 
Droerivier-Muldersvlei 1600: 1 93,75 Ohms sec 0,133 pu 
Step 2: Determining Renter-actual, Xenter-actua1t Rexit-actua1t and Xex1t-actua1 
The Renter-actual, Xenter-actua1, Rex1t-actua1, and Xex1t-actua1 entry and exit values 
were calculated according to the method presented under section 
(4.3.1 b), Chapter 4. This method was explained to be the following: 
Renter-actual, Xenter-actual, Rexit-actual and Xex1t-actual are determined by 
capturing (monitoring) the Rand X values of the impedance locus as 
it crosses the ROW boundaries. This can be done within a power 
system simulation tool (PSS/E in the case on the research) when 
doing a stability study. A mathematical model representing the 
boundaries of the ROW can be included in the power system model. 
For the purpose of out-of-step tripping protection The Renter-actua1, Xenter-
actuai, Rex1t-actua1 and Xex1t-actua1 are captured only for those times when 
detection for the purpose of tripping should take place i.e. during 
those times when the power system becomes unstable. The times 
when detection should take place were obtained from the rotor angle 
oscillation results shown in Figure 5.2. Table 5.5 lists the Renter-actual, 
Xenter-actua1, Rex1t-actua1, and Xex1t-actua1 during that time when detection 
Step 3: 
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during each of the four unstable cases should take place i.e. when 
the system becomes unstable. 
Calculating the relay reach settings 
The reach settings for each stability study were calculated using the 
new method presented in Chapter 4 under section 4.3.2b. Table 5.5 
also lists the calculated reach settings required for the individual 
stability study cases. Note that for cases 1 and 2 the contingencies 
involved the loss of the 400 kV supply to Droerivier SS. For this 
reason the relays located at Droerivier will not 'see' any impedance 
and therefore not detect the instability. As an example the reach 
settings for case 4 at the Droerivier-Bacchus location is shown: 
Reach settings for out-of-step tripping protection at Droerivier-Bacchus - Case 4 
To allow the out-of-step tripping relay at Droerivier-Bacchus to detect power system 
unstable conditions during a contingency such as the one simulated in case 4, the forward 
and reverse reaches in the impedance plane are calculated as follows (Figure 5.4 shows the 
impedance locus and the ROW to enable the calculation of the reach settings. Figure 5.5 
shows the relay characteristics, with calculated reach settings, in the impedance plane): 
Zf = I Zfl Lcpl (eq. 4.17) 
= 0, 101 pu L81,56° 
Zr = I Zr! L180°+cpl (eq. 4.18) 
= 0, 129 pu L'.180°+81,56° 
where 
Zf = forward reach 
I maximum forward reach specified for the out-of-step protection used I = 0, 178 pu [Table 5.4) 
Zr = reverse reach 










[from Table 5.5) 
[from Table 5.5) 
[from Table 5.5) 
88 
Xexrt-actual = 0,019 pu [from Table 5.5] 
Xenter-actual < 0 and Xexrt-actual > 0 therefore: 




) (eq. 4.26) 
= 0,101 pu 
Xenter-actual < 0 and Xexit-actual > 0 therefore: 
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Figure 5.4: ROW and impedance 'seen' at Droerivier-Bacchus - Case 4 
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Out-of-step tripping protection characteristics with forward and reverse reaches, 
load encroachment outer boundaries also shown. The settings for the 0ST1000 
relay which determines the size of the outer, middle and inner zones respectively 
were calculated according to the setting method presented in the 0ST1000 relay 
manual [44). 
5.2.2 Out-of-step tripping relay timer settings 
The timer settings for each stability study were calculated using the new method 
presented in Chapter 4 under section 4.3.3. With the reach settings known and 
the size of the outer, middle and inner zones respectively known, the 0ST1000 
relay characteristics were mathematically modeled at the chosen locations using 
the available mathematical models for protection in the PTI PSS/E library of 
models. The stability studies were repeated and the times when the impedance 
locus entered and exited the various characteristic zones were recorded within 
PSS/E for each respective stability study case. Figure 5.6 shows typical relay 
characteristics for an 0ST1000 relay. The entry and exist times (t1, t2 and t3) 
recorded during a stability study is shown. The recorded times in PSS/E (t1, t2 
and t3) as well as the calculated T1 and T2 timer settings for the respective 






Figure 5.6: Times recorded on PSS/E simulation to calculate timer settings 
As an example the timer setting calculations for case 4 at the Droerivier-Bacchus 
location is shown: 
Timer settings for the out-of-step tripping protection at Droerivier-Bacchus-case 4 
Figure 5. 7 shows the protection characteristics, with the impedance 'seen' at Bacchus-
Droerivier during the out-of-step condition simulated in case 4. The zone entry times as 
recorded in PSS/E are also shown. 
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[From Table 5.6) 
[From Table 5.6) 
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CHNL• 3: [R 505- ~85] 
DROERIVIER-BRCCHUS CASE 4 
Figure 5.7: Impedance locus and out-of-step tripping protection characteristics 
at Bacchus-Droerivier - Case 4 
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Table 5.5: R + jX ROW entries and exits and calculated reach settings 
Locations R + jX entry R + jX exit lztl angle lzrl angle 
(pu) (pu) (pu) (degrees) (pu) (degrees) 
Case 1 Aries-Kronos -0, 1 OO-j0,004 - 0,178 76,68 0, 101 256,68 
system Aries-Helios 0, 120-j0,010 - 0,178 75,80 0, 120 255,80 
unstable Droerivier-Hydra - - - 85,47 - 265,47 
t>3,5s Droerivier-Bacchus - - - 81,56 - 261,56 
Droerivier-Muldersvlei - - - 81,88 - 261,88 
Case2 Aries-Kronos -0, 119-j0,019 -0, 118-j0,040 0,178 76,68 0,125 256,68 
system Aries-Helios 0, 119-j0,002 0, 119-j0,246 0,122 75,80 0, 119 255,80 
unstable Droerivier-Hydra - - - 85,47 - 265,47 
t>3,5S Droerivier-Bacchus - - - 81,56 - 261,56 
Droerivier-Muldersvlei - - - 81,88 - 261,88 
Case3 Aries-Kronos -0, 119+j0,006 -0, 117-0,015 0,147 76,68 0, 118 256,68 
system Aries-Helios -0,000-p, 1 n 0, 119-j0,092 0,178 75,80 0,177 255,80 
unstable Droerivier-Hydra -0,039+j0, 133 -0, 118-j0,055 0,133 85,47 0,130 265,47 
t>2,5s Droerivier-Bacchus 0,017-jO, 132 0, 024+j0, 13'.l 0, 132 81,56 0, 133 261,56 
Droerivier-Muldersvlei 0,043-jO, 132 0, 119-j0,066 0,133 81,88 0,133 261,88 
Case4 Aries-Kronos -0, 109+j0,024 did not exit 0, 112 76,68 0, 178 256,68 
system Aries-Helios 0,119-jO, 109 0, 11 O-j0,041 0,178 75,80 0, 118 255,80 
unstable Droerivier-Hydra 0, 119-j0,094 0, 119+j0,001 0,119 85,47 0,133 265,47 
t>6,5s Droerivier-Bacchus 0,099-j0,003 0,099+j0,019 0, 101 81,56 0, 129 261,56 
Droerivier-Muldersvlei 0, 119-j0,098 0, 118-j0,049 0,133 81,88 0,133 261,88 
Table 5.6: Zone entry and exit times as well as calculated timer settings 
Locations t1 (s) t2 (s) t3 (s) T1 (s) 
Case 1 Aries-Kronos 1,32 1,39 2,2 0,07 
system Aries-Helios 4,2 4,25 4,74 0,05 
unstable at Droerivier-Hydra - - - -
t>3,5s Droerivier-Bacchus - - - -
Droerivier-Muldersvlei - - - -
Case2 Aries-Kronos 3,12 3,16 3,48 0,04 
system Aries-Helios 2,96 2,99 3,06 0,03 
unstable at Droerivier-Hydra - - - -
t>3,5s Droerivier-Bacchus - - - -
Droerivier-Muldersvlei - - - -
Case3 Aries-Kronos 2,58 2,59 2,68 0,01 
system Aries-Helios 2,65 2,69 2,87 0,04 
unstable at Droerivier-Hydra 2,65 2,66 2,82 0,01 
t>2,5s Droerivier-Bacchus 2,65 2,66 2,80 0,01 
Droerivier-Muldersvlei 2,61 2,63 2,81 0,02 
Case4 Aries-Kronos 6,92 7,05 7,195 0,13 
system Aries-Helios 6,95 7,05 7,13 0,09 
unstable at Droerivier-Hydra 7,03 7,07 7,19 0,04 
t>6,5s Droerivier-Bacchus 6,98 7,05 7,16 0,07 
Droerivier-Muldersvlei 7,02 7,07 7,19 0,05 
5.3 Final choice for reach and timer settings according to Eskom's 























With reference to Eskom's protection application philosophies presented under 
section (5.1.4) above the maximum forward and reverse reach calculated for all 
four stability study cases, were taken as the final forward and reverse reach 
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setting respectively. The final forward and reverse reach value, taken from Table 
5.5 are listed in Table 5.7. 
Table 5.7: Final reach settings for the specific locations 
Locations Forward reach Reverse reach 
Aries-Kronos 0, 178 L'.76,68° 0, 178 L'.256,68° 
Aries-Helios 0, 178 L'.75,80° 0, 177 L'.255,80° 
Droerivier-Hydra 0, 133 L'.85,47° 0, 133 L'.265,47° 
Droerivier-Bacchus 0, 133 L'.81,56° 0,133 L'.261,56° 
Droerivier-Muldersvlei 0, 133 L'.81,88° 0, 133 L'.261,88° 
With reference to Eskom's protection application philosophy presented under 
section (5.1.4) above the minimum T1 and T2 timer setting for all four stability 
study cases, were taken as the final T1 and T2 timer setting respectively. The 
final T1 and T2 timer settings, taken from Table 5.6 are listed in Table 5.8. 
Table 5.8: Final timer settings for the specific locations 
Locations T1 (s) T2 (s) 
Aries-Kronos 0,01 0,09 
Aries-Helios 0,03 0,07 
'· 
Droerivier-Hydra 0,01 0,16 
Droerivier-Bacchus 0,01 0,14 
Droerivier-Muldersvlei 0,02 0,18 
5.4 Verifying the locations, settings and application [39] 
Using the final reach and timer settings determined from the overall analysis the 
behaviour of the protection was mathematically modeled at the chosen locations. 
The protection was modelled to behave according to Eskom's out-of-step tripping 
protection scheme design presented under section (5.1.4). The available 
mathematical models for protection in the PTI PSS/E library of models were used. 
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The chosen locations and settings were verified by repeating the four stability 
study cases. The results indicated that all the out-of-step tripping relays operated 
at their respective locations. The relays did not detect during power oscillating 
conditions but did detect during those times when the system became unstable. 
The results of the verification therefore indicated correct application (locations, 
settings and out-of-step protection scheme-design). 
In addition to the four stability study cases, the protection locations, settings and 
the out-of-step protection scheme design for the Eskom system were also verified 
by simulating an accelerated version of the system unstable incident that occurred 
within the Eskom system on 7 June 19963. The results indicated that even though 
relays at some of the locations did not operate, the protection scheme operated 
correctly for the purpose of islanding. It was therefore conclude that the out-of-
step protection application is correct because relays at the remaining locations 
operated to allow correct performance of the overall protection scheme. (The 
possibility of nonoperation of relays during instability scenarios not covered in the 
selection of stability studies used to determine locations and settings were 
discussed under section 1.4 no 1 O of Chapter 1.) 
A summary of the verification results i.e. status of detection and at what time 
detection took place can be seen in Table 5.9. 
Table 5.9 also shows protection performance for the accelerated simulation of the 
June 1996 incident. Figure 5.8 shows the angle oscillations during the June 1996 
incident. It can be seen in Figure 5.8 that system oscillations occurred before the 
system became unstable. The accelerated simulation of the incident was done 
over a period of 5 seconds even though the actual time during the incident was 
approximately 45 minutes [37]. According to the 5 second simulation the system 
3 Note that the simulation of the 7 June 1996 incident was not used for calculating settings. The 
reason for this is that the simulation was not completed at that time when settings were calculated. 
However, during the commissioning period, an accelerated simulation of the incident was 
completed and could therefore be used to verify the out-of-step tripping protection application. 
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went unstable after 2 seconds and for the purpose of verification, detection of 
instability must take place during this time. 
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Figure 5.8 Angle oscillation results for the June 1996 incident (courtesy of Eskom 
report reference [37]) 
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Table 5.9a: Relay performance for case 1 
Locations Relay performance Comment Protection performance according to 
philosophy 
Case 1 Aries- No detection during The tripping protection did not detect to The relays at both the locations at Aries detected 
Kronos oscillations (t < 3,5 s). initiate operation during power oscillations and system separation was initiated at Aries. 
Detection during instability but did detect to initiate operation during 
at t = 4,691 s system instability. 
system Aries- No detection during As above In the case of Droerivier the system is already 
unstable Helios oscillations (t < 3,5 s). separated because of the contingency. 
at 
Detection during instability 
at t = 4,771 s 
1>3,5 s Droerivier- No detection during The tripping protection did not detect to Islanding therefore took place when the system 
Hydra oscillations (t < 3,5 s). initiate operation during power oscillations or became unstable which indicate correct application 
No detection during system instability. The contingency involved of out-of-step tripping protection. 
instability (t > 3,5 s). the loss of transmission lines to Droerivier 
and measurement for the purpose of 
protection could not take place. 
Droerivier- No detection during As above 
Bacchus oscillations (t < 3,5 s). 
No detection during 
instability (t > 3,5 s). 
Droerivier- No detection during As above 
Muldersvlei oscillations (t < 3,5 s). 
No detection during 
instability (t > 3,5 s). 
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Table 5.9b: Relay performance for case 2 
Locations Relay performance Comment Protection performance according to 
philosophy 
Case 2 Aries- No detection during The tripping protection did not detect to The relays at both the locations at Aries detected 
Kronos oscillations (t < 3,5 s). initiate operation during power oscillations and system separation was initiated at Aries. 
Detection during instability but did detect to initiate operation during 
at t = 3,536 s system instability. 
system Aries- No detection during As above In the case of Droerivier the system is already 
unstable Helios oscillations (t < 3,5 s). separated because of the contingency. 
at 
Detection during instability 
att=3,618S 
t>3,5s Droerivier- No detection during The tripping protection did not detect to Islanding therefore took place when the system 
Hydra oscillations (t < 3,5 s). initiate operation during power oscillations or became unstable which indicate correct application 
No detection during system instability. The contingency involved of out-of-step tripping protection. 
instability (t > 3,5 s). the loss of transmission lines to Droerivier 
and measurement for the purpose of 
protection could not take place. 
Droerivier- No detection during As above 
Bacchus oscillations (t < 3,5 s). 
No detection during 
instability (t > 3,5 s). 
Droerivier- No detection during As above 
Muldersvlei oscillations (t < 3,5 s). 
No detection during 
instability (t > 3,5 s). 
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Table 5.9c: Relay performance for case 3 
Locations Relay performance Comment Protection performance according to 
philosophy 
Case 3 Aries- No detection during The tripping protection did not detect to The relays at both the locations at Aries detected. 
Kronos oscillations (t < 2,5 s). initiate operation during power oscillations The relays at the three locations at Droerivier also 
Detection during instability but did detect to initiate operation during detected. System separation was therefore initiated 
at t = 2,936 s system instability. at both Aries and Droerivier. 
system Aries- No detection during As above Islanding therefore took place when the system 
unstable Helios oscillations (t < 2,5 s). became unstable which indicate correct application 
at 
Detection during instability of out-of-step tripping protection. 
at t = 2,796 s 
t>2,5s Droerivier- No detection during As above 
Hydra oscillations (t < 2,5 s). 
Detection during instability 
at t = 2,826 s 
Droerivier- No detection during As above 
Bacchus oscillations (t < 2,5 s). 
Detection during instability 
at t = 2,796 s 
Droerivier- No detection during As above 
Muldersvlei oscillations (t < 2,5 s). 
Detection during instability 
at t = 2,817 s 
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Table 5.9d: Relay performance for case 4 
Locations Relay performance Comment Protection performance according to 
philosophy 
Case4 Aries- No detection during The · tripping protection did not detect to The relays at both the locations at Aries detected. 
Kronos oscillations (t < 6,5 s). initiate operation during power oscillations The relays at the three locations at Droerivier also 
Detection during instability but did detect to initiate operate during detected. System separation was therefore initiated 
at t = 7,236 s system instability. at both Aries and Droerivier. 
system Aries- No detection during As above Islanding therefore took place when the system 
unstable Helios oscillations (t < 6,5 s). became unstable which indicate correct application 
at 
Detection during instability of out-of-step tripping protection. 
at t = 7,318 s 
t>6,5S Droerivier- No detection during As above 
Hydra oscillations (t < 6,5 s). 
Detection during instability 
at t = 7,246 s 
Droerivier- No detection during As above 
Bacchus oscillations (t < 6,5 s). 
Detection during instability 
at t = 7,217 s 
Droerivier- No detection during As above 
Muldersvlei oscillations (t < 6,5 s). 
Detection during instability 
at t = 7,207 s 
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Table 5. 9e: Relay performance for the June 1996 incident 
Locations I Relay performance 
June Aries- No detection during 
1996 Kronos oscillations (t < 2 s). 
incident Detection during instability 
at t = 2,450 s 
system I Aries- No detection during 
unstable at Helios oscillations (t < 2 s). 
1>2 s 
No detection during 
instability (t > 2 s) 
refer to Droerivier- No detection during 
Figure Hydra oscillations (t < 2 s). 
(5.7) No detection during 
and ref instability (t > 2 s) 
(37] 
Droerivier- No detection during 
Bacchus oscillations (t < 2 s). 
Detection during instability 
at t = 2,380 s 
Droerivier- I No detection during 
Muldersvlei oscillations (t < 2 s). 
No detection during 
instability (t > 2 s) 
Comment Protection 
philosophy 
performance according to 
Tripping protection did not detect to initiate The relays at one of the locations at Aries 
operation during oscillations but did detect to detected. System separation was therefore 
initiate operation during instability. initiated at Aries. 
Tripping protection did not detect to initiate The relays at one of the locations at Droerivier 
operation during oscillations. The protection detected. System separation was therefore 
also did not detect to initiate operation initiated at Droerivier. 
during instability. The reason for this is that 
for the particular system condition, the 
instability was not observed at Aries-Helios. 
Tripping protection did not detect to initiate Islanding therefore took place when the system 
operation during oscillations. The protection became unstable which indicate correct application 
also did not detect to initiate operation of out-of-step tripping protection. Note that the out-
during instability. The reason for this is that of-step tripping protection scheme operated 
for the particular system condition, the correctly even though some of the relays did not 
instability was not observed at Droerivier- observe instability. 
Hydra. 
Tripping protection did not detect to initiate 
operation during oscillations but did detect to 
initiate operation during instability. 
Tripping protection did not detect to initiate 
operation during oscillations. The protection 
also did not detect to initiate operation 
during instability. The reason for this is that 
the Droerivier-Muldersvlei line was not in 
service when the incident took place. No 
measurement was therefore available to 
allow detection. 
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5.5 Summary and conclusions 
In this chapter a real case application of the new approach was presented (Detail 
regarding this investigation is documented in reference [39]). The real case 
involves the application of out-of-step tripping protection to the Eskom system 
which took place in 1997. Eskom used the new approach to calculate reach and 
timer settings for their out-of-step tripping relays. For this real case application the 
locations were pre-selected. The locations, settings and scheme design were 
verified through simulation by doing the stability studies used to determine 
settings. In addition to these stability studies, an accelerated simulation of the 
actual incident that occurred in June 1996 was also done. 
The verification results were presented in this chapter. The results indicated that 
the choice of locations, settings and protection scheme design for the purpose of 
islanding would be suitable for most unstable conditions (including the incident 
that occurred on the 7 June 1996) within the Eskom system. 
As a result of the investigation and protection performance results presented in 
this chapter, Eskom tested and commissioned their out-of-step tripping relays at 
the locati~ns listed in Table 5.2. The relays were set with the reach and timer 
settings listed in Tables 5. 7 and 5.8 respectively. The testing and commissioning 
of the relays took place in May of 1997. 
From this chapter the following can be concluded: 
1. The new approach is reliable because application was tested with a number of 
stability studies and correct protection performance for the purpose of 
islanding resulted in each case; 
2. It is believed that the new approach could be acceptable for any power system 
or utility because it proved to be successful for the Eskom system. The reason 
for this is that the Eskom power system, just like other power systems and 
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utilities, also experiences a variety of operating conditions and disturbances 




SUMMARY, DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
6.1 Summary 
In this research the application of out-of-step blocking and tripping protection was 
investigated. The motivation for the research was provided by system unstable 
incidents that occurred in Eskom, the electricity utility of South Africa. 
Detailed out-of-step protection investigations indicated that the out-of-step 
blocking and tripping protection applied according to a method which is based on 
an existing approach failed to detect the unstable conditions. The investigations 
indicated problems with regard to the following: 
• Locations of out-of-step tripping protection; 
• Out-of-step tripping-relay forward and reverse reach settings; 
• Out-of-step blocking and tripping protection timer settings; and 
• Characteristic types used for the purposes of out-of-step blocking and tripping 
protection. 
In summary, the detailed investigations showed that the existing approach of 
applying out-of-step blocking and tripping protection is not adequate as it does 
not allow the necessary observability1 and correct detection of rotor-angle 
unstable conditions [38,39]. 
The existing approach (presented in Chapter 3) appears to involve the following 
according to literature: 
1 The use of the term observability are in the context of local "observation" i.e. the trajectory of an 
impedance locus as 'seen' by an impedance type relay. It does not refer to "observability and 
controllability" of power system states. 
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1. the approach is based on the behaviour of the electrical quantities (voltage, 
current, rotor angle, etc.) of a two machine power system; 
2. the tripping relay locations are selected based on the location of an electrical 
centre (also known as the voltage zero), determined from stability studies; 
3. in many cases out-of-step blocking protection is located at all the locations 
where distance relays are located; 
4. a source impedance, or equivalent impedance representing system impedance 
in front of and behind a location is used to calculate the forward and reverse 
reach settings respectively for a relay located at that location; and 
5. a maximum swing frequency, determined from stability studies, is used to 
calculate relay timer settings. 
The existing approach was tested and investigated by means of a case study in 
which out-of-step protection was applied to an actual power system. The case 
study results indicated the following regarding the existing approach: 
1. During system instability, the electrical quantities of an actual power system 
does not necessarily behave similar to the behaviour of the electrical 
quantities of a two machine system; 
2. The assumption that all distance relays should be equipped with out-of-step 
blocking protection may be over-cautious because many such blocking relays 
may be redundant in many stability events; 
3. The use of an electrical centre area to identify locations for out-of-step tripping 
relays are not reliable to ensure observability of unstable conditions; 
4. The use of equivalent impedances to calculate reach settings ignores dynamic 
influences within the real system that affects system impedance; and 
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· 5. The use of swing frequencies ignores the dynamic influences within the power 
system which affects the voltage and current measured by the relay at the 
relay location. 
In summary it is believed that too many assumptions are made in the existing 
approach and it seems that there is a need to either improve the existing 
approach or to identify and develop a new approach for applying out-of-step 
protection. 
Therefore, from limitations and shortcomings identified in the investigation of the 
existing approach, a new approach, based on the studying of the impedance 
locus at all locations, was developed. In summary the new approach entails the 
following: (Chapter 4 presents the new approach in detail) 
1. mathematical modelling of the power system (the actual power system); and 
2. studying the impedance locus behaviour at all relay locations. 
The new approach was tested and investigated by means of a case study in which 
out-of-step protection was applied to an actual power system. An investigation of 
the case study results indicated the following regarding the new approach: 
Both the out-of-step blocking and tripping protection relays performed correctly 
because: 
1. Results regarding the behaviour of the electrical quantities of the power 
system was used to determine locations and settings. A two machine 
equivalent system approach to interpret results were not used; and 
2. Studying the impedance locus behaviour at all distance relay locations is an 
indication of what an impedance type relay will 'see' during system unstable 
conditions. Location and setting decisions by the protection engineer are 
therefore based directly on what the relay will 'see'. 
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As additional support for the new approach, a real case application of out-of-step 
tripping protection to the Eskom system was presented in Chapter 5. This real 
case is an Eskom investigation which took place in 1996 and 1997. Eskom 
investigated the use of out-of-step tripping protection and in 1997 out-of-step 
tripping protection was applied to the Eskom transmission system, using the new 
approach and methods of calculating reach and timer settings as presented in 
Chapter 4. Eskom tested and commissioned their out-of-step tripping relays at the 
locations identified according to the new approach. The relays were also set with 
the reach and timer settings calculated according the new approach. The testing 
and commissioning of the relays took place in May of 1997 (Detail regarding this · 
investigation is documented in reference [39]. 
6.2 Discussion 
The existing approach of applying out-of-step protection to a power system seems 
to be using many assumptions. With regard to out-of-step blocking protection 
locations, it is assumed in most cases that all distance protection relays require 
blocking, irrespective of whether all distance relays will undergo undesired 
operation or not. In the identification of out-of-step tripping protection locations, an 
electrical centre area is determined which in itself is derived from an equivalent 
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two machine system approach. 
When determining the reach settings for out-of-step protection relays, the existing 
approach seems to be making use of an equivalent two machine system 
approach, with calculated equivalent impedances to represent the actual power 
system impedance. 
The timer settings are calculated from a rotor angle swing frequency. Firstly it is 
assumed that this frequency is the same as the rate of change of the impedance 
'seen' by any relay within the system. Secondly the approach seems to base its 
calculation of timer settings on the assumption that the impedance loci 'seen' by 
relays during unstable conditions are circular. 
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From the above a number of comments can be made regarding the reliability of 
the existing approach when wanting to ensure correct application of out-of-step 
protection (a more detail discussion is presented in Chapter 3): 
1. An equivalent two machine system approach is not suitable when dealing with 
the application of out-of-step protection because results obtained are not 
representative of real case scenarios; 
2. The use of equivalent impedances ignores the influence of parallel lines, static 
and dynamic compensation element such as SVC, shunt capacitor and reactor 
banks and series capacitor banks, and other aspects determining the 
configuration and dynamic behaviour of a power system. It therefore provides 
false information regarding reach setting requirements. 
3. The use of a rotor angle swing frequency incorrectly assumes that the rate of 
change of impedance 'seen' by an out-of-step relay has the same frequency. 
In addition it was found in the research that the rate of change of the 
impedance is not constant. It is therefore easy to calculate incorrect timer 
settings. 
Even though the existing approach may have its advantages, it seems to over 
simplify the procedure of applying out-of-step protection to a power system. When 
considering the effect of incorrect performance of this protection during incidents 
when it is called upon to operate correctly, should be proof enough that the 
application of the protection should not be made that simple. In addition one can 
add the number of incorrect performances of out-of-step protection relays 
(instability not detected) as further support that the existing approach may not be 
the best approach. With fast, powerful computers and new advanced computer 
software available for power system analysis, more detail analyses are possible 
which is also less time consuming than in the past. 
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The new approach identified in the research is new, original and effective 
because attention is given to the impedance locus 'seen' by a relay at its location. 
The impedance locus is studied using methods developed in the research. These 
methods were developed to identify correct locations for out-of-step blocking and 
tripping relays and to calculate correct settings which would ensure correct 
detection. 
It should, however, be noted that both the existing approach and the new 
approach are techniques for linking relay settings to the results of power system 
stability studies. A technique could never include the full range of events which 
may occur in a power system that could lead to system instability. The main 
reason for this is that a power system model, and not the actual power system, is 
studied. It is therefore always possible that the expert(s) performing the stability 
investigation may miss an incident that could lead to instability on the actual 
power system. A margin of insecurity will therefore always exist i.e. for that 
percentage of system unstable cases which may not have been covered during 
the stability study investigation and therefore not covered in the selection of 
stability studies used, nonoperation of the protection could still occur. It is 
therefore important to include as many stability studies as possible in the stability 
investigation. 
A specific technique of linking the individual stability study results with the relay 
settings could either improve or weaken the reliability of the protection to perform 
correctly during an unstable incident. Two case studies presented in the thesis 
show that the technique used in the new approach improves the reliability of the 
protection to perform correctly during an unstable incident. 
110 
6.3 Conclusions 
The conclusions drawn from the research are the following: 
1. Assumptions made in the existing approach seem to be the following: 
• voltage zeros are used to determine tripping relay locations; 
• blocking relays are located at all distance relay locations; 
• equivalent impedances are used to determine reach settings; and 
• swing frequencies are used to determine timer settings. 
These assumptions could lead to incorrect performance of out-of-step 
protection; 
2. The four assumptions made in the existing approach over-simplify the 
procedure of applying out-of-step protection; 
3. There is a need to either improve the existing approach or identify a new and 
better . approach. An example of improving the existing approach could be 
anything which eliminates some or all of its limitations identified in Chapter 3. 
References [12] and [20] presents cases where improvements on the existing 
approach were studied. Examples of new and better approach could be either 
the use of the new approach presented in this thesis or the use of the phaser 
angle measurement technique presented in references [24, 46, 47, 48]; 
4. Applying out-of-step protection according to the new approach presented in 
this thesis shows an improvement of protection performance during unstable 
conditions; 
5. The new approach presented in this thesis is reliable because a real case 
application was tested with a number of stability studies and correct protection 
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performance resulted in each case (refer to the real case application in 
Chapter 5)2; 
6. Even though the new approach was only tested on the Eskom system, the new 
approach could be acceptable for any complex power system or utility. The 
reason for this is that the Eskom power system is a complex power system, 
just like other power systems and utilities. In addition, the Eskom system's 
configuration is also typical of a power system that experiences stability 
related constraints i.e. long transmission lines connecting generator power 
stations and supplying power over long distances along parallel paths to load 
demand areas; 
7. The new approach increases the reliability of out-of-step protection and thus 
increases confidence in the correct performance and application thereof. 
When considering the revenue loss during a system blackout which resulted 
mainly because out-of-step protection did not operate correctly for the purpose 
of islanding, extra expenditure to enable the use of the new approach could be 
justified; and 
8. In practice, new locations and settings, based on the new approach, should 
'avert' .incorrect protection operation during an actual incident which, with the 
'old' locations and settings, based on the existing approach, could respond 
inappropriately in response to the disturbance. 
2 The real case application (locations, settings and protection scheme design) were verified by 
repeating the selection of stability studies used. The results indicated that all the out-of-step 
tripping relays performed correctly at their respective locations and the protection scheme design 
operated correctly to allow system islanding. 
In addition to the selection of stability studies used, the protection locations, settings and the out-
of-step protection scheme design for the Eskom system were also verified by simulating the 
system unstable incident that occurred within the Eskom system on 7 June 1996. The results 
indicated that even though relays at some of the locations did not operate the protection scheme 
operated correctly for the purpose of islanding. The out-of-step protection application is therefore 
correct for the unstable incident because relays at the remaining locations operated to allow 
correct performance of the overall protection scheme for the purpose of islanding (the possibility of 
nonoperation of relays during unstable cases not covered in the selection of stability studies used 
to determine locations and settings were discussed under section 1.4 no 1 O of Chapter 1.) 
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APPENDIX A 
THE ESKOM SYSTEM AND ESKOM'S CAPE SYSTEM 
A 1: The Eskom system 
The Eskom system is shown in Figure A 1. At present Eskom (the electricity supply 
utility of South Africa) supplies approximately 96% of the electricity used in South 
Africa. 
South Africa has vast coal deposits in the Mpumalanga highveld. For economic 
reasons most of Eskom's generation is therefore concentrated near these 
coalfields. 
With the widely dispersed load centres in South Africa, the concentration of power 
generation in the Mpumalanga highveld poses problems in the operation of a 
system where power has to be transmitted over long distances to load centres in 
different parts of the country; for example from Johannesburg to Cape Town 
(1 200 km), from Johannesburg to Durban (600 km) and from Johannesburg to the 
Northern 'Province (300 km). In addition to the coal-fired power stations in the 
Mpumalanga highveld, Eskom therefore also has a nuclear power station 
(Koeberg) just outside Cape Town, two pumped storage power stations - one in 
the Cape (Palmiet) and one in Natal (Drakensberg) - and a remotely situated coal-
fired power station in the Northern Province (Matimba). 
Power is distributed to the load centres via a combination of 765, 400, 275 and 
220 kV lines. Some of these lines span distances of 400 km or more. Due to the 
great distances over which power must be transmitted, many 400 kV lines are 40-
70% series-compensated. In many cases large static var compensators (with an 
operating range of approximately 300 Mvar) and shunt capacitor and reactor 
devices are located en route to the load centres to improve power flow via the 
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long-distance transmission lines and to provide reactive power support (assist in 
system voltage control). 
In addition to the transmission network in South Africa, Eskom also has tie lines 
connecting it with the neighbouring utilities north of South Africa. At present 
Eskom (at Matimba Power Station) is connected with Zesa (Zimbabwe) via a 400 
kV AC line which spans a distance of approximately 420 km. Eskom (at Spitskop 
Substation) is also connected with BPC (Botswana) via three 132 kV lines. A third 
400 kV AC interconnection exists between Eskom (at Aries Substation) and 
NamPower (Namibia) and a fourth interconnection consists of two 132 kV lines 
between Eskom (at Komatipoort Substation) and EDM (Mozambique). 
A2: Eskom's Cape system 
The main supply to the Cape system as well as the Cape system is shown in 
Figure A2. Table A 1 lists the line impedance data for the Cape system. Hydra 
Substation is the main point of coupling between the northern generation pool and 
the Cape system. From Hydra Substation to the main load centre in the south 
there are two 400 kV parallel routes. These routes are known as the northern 
route and the southern/western route. As can be seen in Figure A2, the northern 
route consists of one single 400 kV line route between Hydra Substation and 
Koeberg Nuclear Power Station. The southern/western route is more secure as 
there are more 400 kV lines in parallel. The total distance between Hydra 
Substation and Koeberg Nuclear Power Station is approximately 800 km. Two 
generation stations are situated in the Cape system: Koeberg Nuclear Power 
Station and the Palmiet pumped storage scheme. The generating capacities of 
these power stations are 1 800 MW and 400 MW respectively. Koeberg Power 
Station has a four-loop control device performing the functions of both an 
excitation system and a stabiliser. Palmiet Power Station has an excitation control 
device. The Cape system also houses three large static var compensators (SVCs) 
for the purpose of voltage control, each with a capacity of 250 Mvar capacitive 
and 150 Mvar inductive. Two of these SVCs are located at Hydra Substation and 
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the third is located at Muldersvlei Substation, situated close to Koeberg. The 1996 
maximum recorded demand for the Cape system south of Hydra Substation was 
approximately 3 000 MW. The load types within the Cape system comprise 
industry, commercial, domestic, farming (small machines) and traction. 
Power has to be imported from the Mpumalanga area over a distance of 
approximately 1 400 km to supply the Cape system load demand. Incidents that 
weaken this supply route may therefore produce system power swings or even 
out-of-step conditions. The stability study discussed in Chapter 3, section 3.3.1, 
represents one possible contingency which would weaken the system to a point 
where it becomes unstable. 
Table A1: Line impedance data for the Cape system 
Location Line impedance Location Line impedance 
Rlln• (pu) Xllne(pu) Rllne (pu) Xllne(pu) 
Hydra-Kronos 0,0028 0,0119 Droerivier-Muldersvlei 0,0061 0,0424 
Kronos-Hydra 0,0028 0,0119 Muldersvlei-Droerivier 0,0061 0,0424 
Kronos-Aries 0,0024 0,0088 Droerivier-Proteus 0,0068 0,0393 
Aries-Kronos 0,0024 0,0088 Proteus-Droerivier 0,0068 0,0393 
Aries-Helios 0,0025 0,0098 Droerivier-Bacchus 0,0060 0,0407 
Helios-Aries 0,0025 0,0098 Bacchus-Droerivier 0,0060 0,0407 
Helios-Juno 0,0025 0,0104 Bacchus-Palmiet 0,0013 0,0159 
Juno-Helios 0,0025 0,0104 Palmiet-Bacchus 0,0013 0,0159 
Juno-Aurora 0,0028 0,0112 Bacchus-Muldersvlei 0,0017 0,0217 
Aurora-Juno 0,0028 0,0112 Muldersvlei-Bacchus 0,0017 0,0217 
Aurora-Koeberg 0,0013 0,0170 Muldersvlei-Koeberg 1 0,0006 0,0081 
Koe berg-Aurora 0,0013 0,0170 Koeberg-Muldersvlei 1 0,0006 0,0081 
Hydra-Droerivier 1 0,0038 0,0479 Muldersvlei-Koeberg 2 0,0006 0,0081 
Droerivier-Hydra 1 0,0038 0,0479 Koeberg-Muldersvlei 2 0,0006 0,0081 
Hydra-Droerivier 2 0,0038 0,0479 Muldersvlei-Acacia 0,0007 0,0091 
Droerivier-Hydra 2 0,0038 0,0479 Acacia-Muldersvlei 0,0007 0,0091 
Hydra-Droerivier 3 0,0037 0,0262 Acacia-Koeberg 0,0005 0,0063 
Droerivier-Hydra 3 0,0037 0,0262 Koe berg-Acacia 0,0005 0,0063 
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Figure A2: The main supply to the Cape system and the Cape system 
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APPENDIX B 
OUT .. oF .. STEP BLOCKING AND TRIPPING PROTECTION 
• DETECTION METHODOLOGY 
• MATHEMATICAL REPRESENTATION 
81: Detection methodology (out•of-step blocking and tripping protection) 
Out-of-step blocking protection 
For the purposes of the research out-of-step blocking protection using two 
concentric circle characteristics and one characteristic timer (Tb) was used (see 
Figure 81 and refer to Chapter 1, section 1.4 no 7 for reason). The outer 
characteristic's forward reach and reverse reach as well as the characteristic timer 
are determined from setting procedures. 
For the purposes of the research the following specifications were chosen: 
1. The forward and reverse reach settings should not exceed 0, 1 pu and -0, 1 pu 
respectively. 
2. The left and right boundaries of the outer characteristics should not exceed 
-0, 1 pu and 0, 1 pu respectively to avoid load encroachment. 
I 




less than the outer characteristic's forward reach and reverse reach 
respectively (In reference [15] it is stated that for a concentric circle type 
characteristic an outer reach is typically 1,3 times an inner reach). 
Detection takes place when the following sequence of events have been 
completed: 
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1. The impedance enters the outer zone. 
2. The impedance remains in the outer zone long enough to allow the zone timer 
to expire. 
3. The impedance enters the inner zone. 







Figure 81: Out-of-step blocking protection 
Out-of-step tripping protection 
X 
Zone characteristic timer T~/ 
Time enter 
outer zone (t1) 
Time exit outer 
zone and enter 
inner zone (t2) 
Detection and 
R 
blocking action when 
impedance enters inner zone 
For the purposes of the research out-of-step tripping protection using two 
concentric circle characteristics and two characteristic timers - an outer-zone 
timer (Tto) and an inner-zone timer (Tti) - was used (see Figure 82 and refer to 
Chapter 1, section 1.4 no 7 for reason) 1• The outer characteristic's forward reach 
and reverse reach as well as the two characteristic timers are determined from 
setting procedures. 
1 Even though the out-of-step tripping protection's detection methodology appears to be the same 
as that of the out-of-step blocking protection, differences between the detection methodologies do 
exist. The complete detection methodology of the out-of-step tripping protection is therefore 
presented. 
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For the purposes of the research the following specifications were chosen: 
1. The forward and reverse reach settings should not exceed 0, 1 pu and -0, 1 pu 
respectively. 
2. The left and right boundaries of the outer characteristics should not exceed 
-0, 1 pu and 0, 1 pu respectively to avoid load encroachment. 
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less than the outer characteristic's forward reach and reverse reach 
respectively. 
Detection takes place when the following sequence of events have been 
completed: 
1. The impedance enters the outer zone. 
2. The impedance remains in the outer zone tong enough to allow the outer-zone 
timer to expire. 
3. The impedance enters the inner zone. 
4. The impedance remains in the inner zone long enough to allow the inner-zone 
timer to expire. 
5. The impedance exits the relay characteristics on the side opposite that which it 
entered. 






Impedance locus 7 -------
Detection and islanding initiation 
when impedance exists the outer 
zone on the oposite side that which it 
entered 
Figure 82: Out-of-step tripping protection 
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B2: Mathematical representation (out-of-step blocking and tripping 
protection) 
The above out-of-step blocking and tripping protection were mathematically 
represented for the purpose of including the mathematical representation in the 
power system model during the verification of out-of-step protection application 
according to both the existing and the new out-of-step protection application 
approaches, discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 respectively. In Chapter 4 the 
mathematical representation of the characteristics was also used to determine the 
timer settings. 
For both out-of-step blocking and out-of-step tripping protection, examples are 
given to illustrate the use of the mathematical representation. 
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Out-of-step blocking protection 
The mathematical equations representing the out-of-step blocking relay 
characteristics are as follows: 
Outer characteristic: 
zradlus (outer cha/ 
where 
I zradius (outer char> I 
I Ztorward reach (outer char) I 
I Zreverse reach (outer char) I 
R 
X 
80 + jbo 





















absolute value of the radius of the outer circle characteristic 
I 
2 
X ( I Z1orwarc1 reach (outer char) I + I Zreverse reach (outer char) I ) 
absolute value of the outer characteristic forward reach 
absolute value of the outer characteristic reverse reach 
variable R in the impedance (RIX) plane 
variable X in the impedance (RIX) plane 
circle offset-parameters for the outer zone 
I ~ (outer char) I L (1)1 
absolute value of the offset from the origin due to forward and 
reverse reach settings 
I zfcrward reach (outer zone) I - I Zrac1ius (outer zone) I 
transmission-line angle determined from line resistance and 
reactance 
(R-a/ + (X-b/ 
absolute value of the radius of the inner circle characteristic 
= 
I Zraward reach (inner char) I = 
= 




ai + jbi = 
= 






X ( I Zrorward reach (inner char) I + I Zreverse reach (inner char) I ) 
absolute value of the inner characteristic forward reach 
0,7692 X I Zfolward reach (outer char) I 
absolute value of the inner characteristic reverse reach 
0, 7692 X I Zreverse reach (outer char) I 
variable R in the impedance {RIX) plane 
variable X in the impedance {RIX) plane 
circle offset-parameters for the inner zone 
I Zotrset (inner char) I L <Pl 
absolute value of the offset from the origin due to forward and 
reverse reach settings 
I 4ffset (outer char) I 
transmission-tine angle determined from line resistance and 
reactance 
The mathematical equation to represent the time for which the impedance remains 




lenter (outer zone) = 
!exit (outer zone) = 
lexit (outer zone) - lenter (outer zone) 
time for which impedance remains in outer zone 
time at which impedance locus enters the outer zone 
time at which impedance locus exits the outer zone and enters the inner 
zone 
The mathematical equations representing detection of the out-of-step blocking 
protection are as follows: 
if 
!monitor > Tb 
B-vii 
while 
I Rinner char I < I R1ocusl < I Router char I and -
I Xnner char I < I X1ocus I < I Xouter char I -
then detection when 
I R1ocusl < I Rinner char I and 
I X1ocusl < I Xinner char I 
where 
Tb = zone timer setting for blocking protection 
Router char + jXouter char = impedance value in impedance plane representing a point on the 
outer characteristic boundary 
Rinner char + jXnner char = 
= 
impedance value in impedance plane representing a point on the 
inner characteristic boundary 
impedance value representing a point on the impedance locus 
Example: - Mathematical representation of the out-of-step blocking relay at 
Aries-Helios (settings calculated using Eskom's method which is based on 
the existing approach) 
The out-of-step blocking protection characteristics are shown in Figure B3. 
Outer characteristic: 
2 





(R-aol + (X-bo)2 
(R-0,0025)2 + (X-0,0097)2 
f Zractius (outer char) / = 
I 
- X (0,06 + 0,04) 
2 
[from Table C3b, Appendix CJ 
= 0,05 
Bo+ jbo = circle offset-parameters for the outer zone 
= /Zottset (outer char)/ L<p1 
= 0,01L75,8° 
= 0, 0025 + jO, 0097 
B-viii 
/ Zoffset (outer char) / = f Ztorward reach (outer zone) / - / Zradius (outer zone) / 








/ Zradius (inner char) / = 
= 
= 
I z,,,,_ .. - (Inner char} I = 
= 
I z,. ..... - (1nnor char/ I = 
= 
ai + jbi = 
= 
75,8° [from Table C3b, Appendix CJ 
R 2 2 ( -aJ + (X-bJ 
(R-0, 0025)2 + (X-0, 0097;2 
1 
2 
X ( f Ztorward reach (inner char) / + f Zreverse reach (inner char) /) 
..!_ X (0,0460 + 0,0310) 
2 
0,038 
0, 7692 X 0, 06 
0,046 
0, 7692 X 0, 04 
0,031 
0,01L75,8° 
0, 0025 + jO, 0097 
The mathematical equations representing detection of the out-of-step blocking 




/ Rinner char/ 




then detection when 





Router char + JXouter char = 
(Tb= 15 ms) 
f R1ocusf ~ 
f X1ocusf ~ 
I Rinnercharl and 
/ X;nner char/ 
[from Table C5a, Appendix CJ 
I Router char I and 
/ Xouter char/ 
zone timer setting for blocking protection 
15 ms [from Table C5a, Appendix CJ 
impedance value in impedance plane representing a point 
on the outer characteristic boundary 
R;nner char + JX;nner char = 
R1ocus + jX1ocus 





impedance value in impedance plane representing a point 
on the inner characteristic boundary 












Figure 83: The out-of-step blocking protection characteristics 
Out-of-step tripping protection 
The mathematical equations representing the out-of-step tripping characteristics 





I Zradius (outer char) I = absolute value of the radius of the outer circle characteristic 
= 
I Zrorwarc:1 reach (outer char) I = 
I Zreverse reach (outer char) I = 
R = 
X = 
8o + jbo = 
= 




Zrac1ius (inner char) 
2 = 
where 
I Zradius (Inner char) I = 
= 
I Ztorward reach (inner char) I = 
= 




ai + jbi = 
= 
I Zotrset (inner char) I = 
B-x 
1 
2 X ( I Z1orwarc1 reach (outer char) I + I Zreverse reach (outer char) I ) 
absolute value of the outer characteristic forward reach 
absolute value of the outer characteristic reverse reach 
variable R in the impedance (RIX) plane 
variable X in the impedance (RIX) plane 
circle offset-parameters for the outer zone 
I Zotrset (outer char) I L </>I 
absolute value of the offset from the origin due to forward and 
reverse reach settings 
I Zrorwarc1 reach (outer zone) I - I Zradius (outer zone) I 
transmission-line angle determined from line resistance and 
reactance 
(R-ai)2 + (X-bi)2 
absolute value of the radius of the inner circle characteristic 
1 
2 X { I Ztorward reach (Inner char) I + I Zreverse reach (inner char) I ) 
absolute value of the inner characteristic forward reach 
0, 7692 X I Ztorward reach (outer char) I 
absolute value of the inner characteristic reverse reach 
0, 7 6 92 X I Zreverse reach (outer char) I 
variable R in the impedance (RIX) plane 
variable X in the impedance (RIX) plane 
circle offset-parameters for the inner zone 
I loffset (inner char) I Lcp, 
absolute value of the offset from the origin due to forward and 
reverse reach settings 
cp, 
B-xi 
= I Zotrset (outer char) I 
= transmission-line angle determined from line resistance and 
reactance 
The mathematical equation to represent the time for which the impedance remains 
in the outer zone and inner zone respectively is as follows: 
!monitor (outer zone) 
!monitor (inner zone) 
where 
tmonitor (outer zone) 
!monitor (Inner zone) 
lenter (outer zone) 
!exit (outer zone) 
lenter (inner zone) 









!exit (outer zone) - 4lnter (outer zone) 
iextt (inner zone) - lenter (inner zone) 
time that impedance spends in outer zone 
time that impedance spends in inner zone 
time at which impedance enters the outer zone 
time at which impedance exits the outer zone and enters the 
inner zone 
time at which impedance enters the inner zone 
time at which impedance exits the inner zone and enters the 
outer zone 
The mathematical equations representing detection of the out-of-step tripping 
protection are as follows: 
If 
!monitor (outer zone) > Tto -
while 
I Rinner char I < I R1ocusl < I Router char I -
I Xinner char I < I X1ocusl < I Xouter char I -
and if 
!monitor (inner zone) > Tti -
while 
I Riocusl < I Rinner char I -
I X1ocusl 
then detection when 
I Riocus-exit I 





I Xinner char I 
I Router char I 
I Xouter char I 
B-xii 






Router char + jXouter char = 
Rinner char + jXinner char = 
R1ocus + jX1ocus = 
R1ocus-enter + jX1ocus-enter = 
R1ocus•xit + jX1ocus-exit = 
outer-zone timer setting for tripping protection 
inner-zone timer setting for tripping protection 
impedance value in impedance plane representing a point on the 
outer characteristic boundary 
impedance value in impedance plane representing a point on the 
inner characteristic boundary 
impedance value representing a point on the impedance locus 
impedance value representing a point on the impedance locus 
when impedance enters the outer characteristic 
impedance value representing a point on the impedance locus 
when impedance exits the outer characteristic 
Example - Mathematical representation of out-of-step tripping relay at 
Bacchus-Droerivier (settings calculated using the new method in the new 
approach) 
The out-of-step tripping protection characteristics are shown in Figure B4. 
Outer characteristics: 




/Zrac1ius (outer charJ / = 
= 
Bo+ jbo = 
= 
/Zoffset (outer char)/ = 
(R-aol + (X-bol 
(R-0, 0006)2 + (X-0, 0001 )2 
1 




0, 0006 + jO, 0001 
0, 1- 0,0999 






Zradius (inner char) 
(0,00769)2 
where 
f Zradius (inner char) f 
f Z- reacl> /inner char/ f 
I z.,. .... "'""" r,,,,,.,. c11ar1 I 
ai + jbi 















81,57° [from Table E4b, Appendix EJ 
(R-aJ2 + (X-bJ2 
(R-0,0006)2 + (X-0,0001)2 
1 
2 X ( f ZtorwarrJ f!lach (inner char) f + f Zreverse f!lach (inner char) /) 
1 
- X (0, 0769 + 0, 0770) 
2 
0,0069 
0,7692 X 0, 1 
0,0769 
0, 7693 X 0,0998 
0,0770 
f Zoffset (Inner char) f L <Pt 
f Zoffset (outer char) f 
0, 0006L81, 57° 
0,0006 + j0,0001 
The mathematical equations representing detection of the out-of-step tripping 
protection are as follows: 
' If 
frnonitor (outer zone) > (Tto = 18 ms) [from Table E5b, Appendix EJ 
while 
f Rinner char f < /R1ocusf < / Router char f 
/ Xinner char/ < /X1ocusf < / Xouter char f 
and if 
frnonitor (inner zone) > (Tti = 450 ms) [from Table E5b, Appendix EJ 
while 
/ R1ocusf < / R;nner char f 
f Xiocusf < f X;nner char/ 
then detection when 
/ R1ocusf > f Router char f 
f Xiocusf > / Xouter char f 
and 
B-xiv 








Router char + JXouter char = 
R;nner Char + JX;nner char = 
R1ocus + JX1ocus = 
R1ocu11 .. nter + fX1ocus .. nter = 
R1ocus ... xit + jXiocua .. xit = 
Outer-zone timer setting Tti = 1 B ms 
Inner-zone timer setting Tto = 450 ms 
-0.15 -0.12 
outer-zone timer setting for tripping protection 
1Bms 
inner-zone timer setting for tripping protection 
450ms 
impedance value in impedance plane representing a point 
on the outer characteristic boundary 
impedance value in impedance plane representing a point 
on the inner characteristic boundary 
impedance value representing a point on the impedance 
locus 
impedance value representing a point on the impedance 
locus when impedance enters the outer characteristic 
impedance value representing a point on the impedance 
locus when impedance exits the outer characteristic 
o.15xT 
I Outer characteristic 







(OP769f = (R-0,0006)2 + (X-0,0001)2 
-0.15 
Figure 84: Out-of-step tripping protection characteristics 
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APPENDIX C 
OUT-OF-STEP PROTECTION APPLICATION BASED ON THE 
EXISTING APPROACH AND USING ESKOM'S METHODS 
Out of step was applied to the Eskom transmission system according to existing 
approach, using Eskom's methods of determining relay locations and calculating 
relay settings (reach and timer) (Eskom's methods are presented under section 
(3.3.2) in Chapter 3.) 
The location and reach settings were selected and calculated for out-of-step 
blocking an tripping protection using concentric circle type characteristics. The 
protection type used for the purposes of the research is presented in Appendix B. 
For those calculations and investigations that require stability study results, the 
stability study presented under section 3.3.1 in Chapter 3 was done to provide the 
necessary results. 
Due to th~ size of the Eskom transmission system results for a portion of the 
system were presented as results for the remaining system are additional 
information and does not add any futher value to the thesis contribution. The 
portion of the Eskom transmission system for which results are presented, is 
shown in Figure C1. 
C1 Locations 
Out-of-step blocking protection 
Out-of-step blocking protection was placed at all the locations in the Eskom 
transmission system. Table C1 lists the locations for the portion of the system 
shown in Figure C1. 
C-ii 












Aurora-Koeberg Muldersvlei-Koeberg 1 
Koeberg-Aurora Koeberg-Muldersvlei 1 
Hydra-Droerivier 1 Muldersvlei-Koeberg 2 
Droerivier-Hydra 1 Koeberg-Muldersvlei 2 
Hydra-Droerivier 2 Muldersvlei-Acacia 
Droerivier-Hydra 2 Acacia-Muldersvlei 
Hydra-Droerivier 3 Acacia-Koe berg 
Droerivier-Hydra 3 Koeberg-Acacia 
C-iii 
System north of Hydra with large generation capacity 
Aurora SS 
•. .·· ......... 




• Out-of-step blocking protection locations (also distance relay locations) 
• Out-of-step tripping protection locations 
Figure C1: Portion of Eskom transmission system for which results are 
presented. 
C-iv 
Out-of-step tripping protection 
The voltage oscillations for the stability study done (refer to Chapter 3 section 
3.3.1) can be seen in Figure C2. The voltage magnitudes for the substations in 
the northern and southern/western routes were plotted. From these plots it can be 
seen that the electrical centre in the northern route is located at Hydra Substation 
because the voltage magnitude is closest to zero at Hydra. The electrical centre in 
the southern/western route is also located at Hydra Substations because the 
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Figure C2b: Voltage oscillations in southern/western route 
Out-of-step tripping protection was placed at the electrical centre location. Figure 
C1 shows the out-of-step tripping protection locations in the portion of the Eskom 
transmission system shown. These locations are also listed in Table C2. 






C2 Reach settings 
The forward and reverse reaches for both the out-of-step tripping and the out-of-
step blocking protection were calculated as explained under section (3.3.2b) in 
Chapter 3. Table C3a gives the Thevenin impedance calculated for the respective 
locations shown in Figure C1. Table C3b lists the reaches for the out-of-step 
C-vi 
blocking protection locations and Table C3c lists the reaches for the out-of-step 
tripping protection locations. These reaches were used to calculate the required 
zone characteristics for the blocking and tripping protection at the respective 
locations. 
Two examples are given: firstly the reach calculation for the purpose of 
determining the reach settings for blocking protection located at Aries-Kronos and 
secondly the reach calculation for the purpose of determining the reach settings 
for tripping protection located at Hydra-Droerivier 1. 
Example 1 : Blocking protection reach settings at Aries-Kronos 
With reference to Figure C3, the line impedance data listed in Table A 1 in Appendix A, 
and the Thevenin impedance data listed in Table C3a, the reach settings were 
calculated as follows (Figure C4 shows the protection characteristics, with calculated 
reach settings, in the impedance plane): 
Zf = /Zf/ Lq,, 
= 0,0398 pu L74, 74° 
Zr = /zr/L180+cp, 
= 0,0528 pu L254, 74° 
· where 
Zf = forward reach 
Zr = reverse reach 
/Zf/ = impedance forward reach 
= ABS{(line impedance)+(Thevenin impedance in front of Kronos SS)j 
= /(0,0024 + j0,0088) + (0,0100 + j0,0290)/ 
= /0,0124+j0,0378/ 
= 0,0398pu 
/Zr/ = impedance reverse reach 
= ABS(Thevenin impedance behind Aries SS) 
= Io, 022o+jo, 04ao I 
= 0,0528pu 




tan - r XI 
R l 
tan_ 1 0,0088 
0,0024 
= 74, 74° 
= line impedance 





[from Table A 1, Appendix A] 
Kronos SS 
(next remote station) 
~--10,0091 L74,74 = 0,0024 +jo,ooaa 
line impedance (pu) 
0,0220+j0,0480 0,0100+j0,0290 
..__ ___ __, Thevenin impedance Thevenin impedance ..__ ____ __. 
behind Aries SS (pu) in front of Kronos SS (pu) 
~ 
• Out-of-step protection location 
Figure C3: Forward and reverse reach calculation, Aries-Kronos 
X 0,0398 pu L74, 74° 
Outer characteristic -----------. 
0,0306L74, 74° 
Inner characteristic 
= 111,3 x outer zone char 
R 
0,0406 pu L(180+74, 74) 0 
0,0528 pu L(180+74, 74) 0 
Figure C4: Reach settings for out-of-step blocking protection at Aries-Kronos 
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Example 2: Tripping protection reach settings at Hydra-Droerivier 1 
With reference to Figure C5, the line impedance data listed in Table A 1 in Appendix A, 
and the Theveinin impedance data listed in Table C3a, the reach settings were 
calculated as follows (Figure C6 shows the protection characteristics, with calculated 
reach settings, in the impedance plane): 
Zf = /Zf/Lcp, 
= 0, 0680 pu LBS, 46° 
Zr = I Zr I L1 BO+<p1 
= 0,0150 pu L256,46° 
where 
Zf = forward reach 
Zr = reverse reach 
/Zf/ = impedance forward reach 
= ABS[(Une impedance)+(Thevenin impedance in front of Droerivier SS)} 
= /(0,0038 + j0,0479) + (0,0080 + j0,0190)/ 
= /0,0120 + j0,0670/ 
= 0,0680pu 
/Zr/ = impedance reverse reach 





= -1 X l tan -
R l 
= tan - 1 0,0479 
0,0038 
= 85,46° 
Rl+JXI = line impedance 






(next remote station) 
o,0481 L85,46° = o,0038 +j0,0479 
line impedance (pu) 
0,0070+j0,0130 0,0080+j0,0019 
,____-T'""-~ Thevenin impedance Thevenin impedance,____,. ___ _. 
behind Hydra SS (pu) in front of Droerivier SS (pu,__..._ 
---+ 
• Out-of-step protection location 
Figure CS: Forward and reverse reach calculation, Hydra-Droerivier 1 
X 
Outer characteristic --------------. 
Inner characteristic 
= 111,3 x outer-zone char 
R 
0,0115 pu L(180+85,46) 0 
Figure C6: Reach settings for out-of-step tripping protection at Hydra-Droerivier 1 
Table C3a: Thevinin impedance at respective locations in the system 
Location (local - Thevlnin Impedance behind Thevinin impedance in front of 
remote) local station (pu) remote station (pu) 
R X R X 
Hydra-Kronos 0,074 0,015 0,024 0,056 
Kronos-Hydra 0,024 0,056 0,074 0,015 
Kronos-Aries 0,010 0,029 0,022 0,048 
Aries-Kronos 0,022 0,048 0,010 0,029 
Aries-Helios 0,015 0,034 0,016 0,049 
Helios-Aries 0,016 0,049 0,015 0,034 
C-x 
Table C3a (cont): Thevinin impedance at respective locations in the system 
Location (local - Thevinin impedance behind Thevinin impedance in front of 
remote) local station (pu) remote station (pu' 
Helios-Juno 0,016 0,043 0,015 0,042 
Juno-Helios 0,015 0,042 0,016 0,043 
Juno-Aurora 0,019 0,054 0,012 0,030 
Aurora-Juno 0,012 0,030 0,019 0,054 
Aurora-Koeberg 0,024 0,045 0,008 0,018 
Koeberg-Aurora 0,008 0,018 0,024 0,045 
Hydra-Droerivier 1 0,007 0,013 0,008 0,019 
Droerivier-Hydra 1 0,008 0,019 0,007 0,013 
Hydra-Droerivier 2 0,007 0,013 0,008 0,019 
Droerivier-Hydra 2 0,008 0,019 0,007 0,013 
Hydra-Droerivier 3 0,007 0,013 0,008 0,017 
Droerivier-Hydra 3 0,008 0,017 0,007 0,013 
Droerivier-Muldersvlei 0,008 0,019 0,009 0,017 
Muldersvlei-Droerivier 0,009 0,017 0,008 0,019 
Droerivier-Proteus 0,007 0,017 0,022 0,057 
Proteus-Droerivier 0,022 0,057 0,007 0,017 
Droerivier-Bacchus 0,008 0,018 0,008 0,022 
Bacchus-Droerivier 0,008 0,022 0,008 0,018 
Bacchus-Palmiet 0,013 0,025 0,000 0,064 
Palmiet-Bacchus 0,000 0,064 0,013 0,025 
Bacchus-Muldersvlei 0,009 0,028 0,010 0,018 
Muldersvlei-Bacchus 0,010 0,018 0,009 0,028 
Muldersvlei-Koeberg 1 0,009 0,016 0,008 0,016 
Koeberg-Muldersvlei 1 0,008 0,016 0,009 0,016 
Muldersvlei-Koeberg 2 0,009 0,016 0,008 0,016 
Koeberg-Muldersvlei 2 0,008 0,016 0,009 0,016 
Muldersvlei-Acacia 0,008 0,016 0,010 0,020 
Acacia-Muldersvlei 0,010 0,020 0,008 0,016 
Acacia-Koeberg 0,011 0,021 0,008 0,016 
Koe berg-Acacia 0,008 0,016 0,011 0,021 
Table C3b: Forward and reverse reach settings at blocking protection locations 
Location Forward Reverse Line Location Forward Reverse Line 
reach reach angle reach reach angle 
Hydra-Kronos 0,07 0,08 76,68 Droerivier-Muldersvlei 0,06 0,02 81,88 
Kronos-Hydra 0,08 0,06 76,68 Muldersvlei-Droerivier 0,06 0,02 81,88 
Kronos-Aries 0,06 0,03 74,75 Droerivier-Proteus 0,10 0,02 80,18 
Aries-Kronos 0,04 0,05 74,74 Proteus-Droerivier 0,06 0,06 80,18 
Aries-Helios 0,06 0,04 75,80 Droerivier-Bacchus 0,06 0,02 81,56 
Helios-Aries 0,05 0,05 75,80 Bacchus-Droerivier 0,06 0,02 81,56 
Helios-Juno 0,06 0,05 76,48 Bacchus-Palmiet 0,08 0,03 85,31 
Juno-Helios 0,06 0,04 76,48 Palmiet-Bacchus 0,04 0,06 85,31 
Juno-Aurora 0,04 0,06 75,96 Bacchus-Muldersvlei 0,04 0,03 85,52 
Aurora-Juno 0,07 0,03 75,96 Muldersvlei-Bacchus 0,05 0,02 85,52 
Aurora-Koeberg 0,04 0,05 85,63 Muldersvlei-Koeberg 1 0,03 0,02 85,76 
Koeberg-Aurora 0,07 0,02 85,63 Koeberg-Muldersvlei 1 0,03 0,02 85,76 
C-xi 
Table C3b (cont): Forward and reverse reach settings at blocking protection locations 
Location Forward Reverse Line Location Forward Reverse Line 
reach reach angle reach reach anale 
Hydra-Droerivier 1 0,07 0,02 85,46 Muldersvlei-Koeberg 2 0,03 0,02 85,76 
Droerivier-Hydra 1 0,06 0,02 85,47 Koeberg-Muldersvlei 2 0,03 0,02 85,76 
Hydra-Droerivier 2 0,07 0,02 85,47 Muldersvlei-Acacia 0,03 0,02 85,59 
Droerivier-Hydra 2 0,06 0,02 85,47 Acacia-Muldersvlei 0,03 0,02 85,59 
Hydra-Droerivier 3 0,05 0,01 82,04 Acacia-Koeberg 0,02 0,02 85,10 
Droerivier-Hydra 3 0,04 0,02 82,04 Koeberg-Acacia 0,03 0,02 85,10 
Table C3c: Forward and reverse reach settings at tripping protection locations 
Location Forward Reverse Line angle 
reach reach 
Hydra-Kronos 0,07 0,08 76,68 
Hydra-Droerivier 1 0,07 0,02 85,46 
Hydra-Droerivier 1 0,07 0,02 85,47 
Hydra-Droerivier 3 0,05 0,01 82,04 
C3 Timer settings 
The timer settings for both the out-of-step blocking protection and the out-of-step 
tripping protection were calculated from the following equation: 
T setting = 
where 




'1.B seconds------------------------(equation (3.6) in Chapter 3) 
360 * fs 
timer setting for the operating zone(seconds) 
change in angle separation during that time when the apparent 
impedance is within the operating zone(in degrees) 
maximum swing frequency (Hz) 
The maximum swing frequency fs for the stability study presented under section 
(3.3.2c) was determined by calculating the swing frequencies at Koeberg and 
Palmiet Power Stations respectively. The electrical power oscillations at Koeberg 
C-xii 
and Palmiet respectively were used and are shown in Figure C7. The swing 
frequency for each oscillating cycle were calculated (the first two swing 
frequencies for Koeberg are shown in Figure C7). 
The average swing frequencies for a given time range are those listed in Table 
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Figure C?: Calculating swing frequency 
Table C4: Swing frequencies at Koeberg and Palmiet respectively 
Time range(s) Average swing frequency at Average swing frequency at 
Koeberg during time range (Hz) Palmiet during time range (Hz) 
0,00-1,10 0,00 0,00 
1,10 - 2,10 0,31 0,56 
2,10 - 3,50 0,65 0,65 
3,50 - 4,50 0,89 1,85 






















Maximum swing frequency = 2, 78 H~ 






Figure CB: Change in swing frequency with time 
From Figure ca it is clear that the maximum swing frequency at which any of the 
out-of-step blocking or tripping protection should detect unstable conditions is 
2,78 Hz. 
For each relay location ~e was calculated from the forward reach, the reverse 
reach and the difference in characteristic size between the inner and outer zone 1. 
Two examples are given to illustrate the calculation of the timer settings: firstly the 
timer settings for blocking protection located at Aries-Kronos and secondly the 
timer settings for tripping protection located at Hydra-Droerivier 1. 
Example 1: Blocking protection timer settings at Aries-Kronos 
With reference to Figure C9, the reach settings listed in Table C3b, and the detection 
philosophy for out-of-step blocking protection used in this thesis (see Appendix 8), the 
timer settings were calculated as follows: 
1 For both the out-of-step blocking and the out-of-step tripping relays used for the purposes of this 
research the outer zone radius= 1,3 x inner zone radius (refer to Appendix B). 
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Aries-Kronos 
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- x outer char radius 
1,3 
0,0346 
maximum swing frequency 
2,78 Hz 
C-xv 
X 0,0400 pu L74, 74° 
Outer characteristic ------------. 
Inner characteristic 
R 
0,0380 pu L254, 74° 
Impedance locus 
0,0500 pu L254, 74° 
Figure C9: Timer settings for out-of-step blocking relay at Aries-Kronos 
Example 2: Tripping protection timer settings at Hydra-Oroerivier 1 
With reference to Figures C10 and C11, the reach settings listed in Table C3c, and 
the detection philosophy for the out-of-step tripping relay used in this thesis (see 
Appendix B), the timer settings were calculated as follows: 










0, 0150 seconds 
outer-zone timer setting (seconds) for the tripping relay 
located at Hydra-Droerivier 1 
portion of impedance trajectory (MJ) between two chosen 
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= Ba - BAt 
= 104,25° - 90° 
C-xvi 
= 14,25° 
fJA = goo 
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Outer char radius = - (/Zf/ + /Zr/) 
2 




Inner char radius = - x outer char radius 
1,3 
= 1/1,3 X 0,0450 
= 0,0350pu 
fs = 2,78 Hz 
X 0,07 pu LBS,47° 




0,02 pu L265,47° 
Figure C10: Timer settings for out-of-step tripping protection at Hydra-Droerivier 1 
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= 0, 1510 seconds 
where (refer to Figure C11) 
T setttng (inner.zone time Tti) = inner-zone timer setting (seconds) for the tripping relay 
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- x outer char radius 
1,3 
I 
= - x0,0450 
1,3 
= 0,0350 
= 2,78 Hz 
C-xviii 
X 0,07 pu LBS,47° 
Outer characteristic ------------. 
Inner characteristic 
R 
0,0150 pu L265,47° 
Impedance locus 
0,02 pu L265,47° 
Figure C11: Timer settings for out-of-step tripping protection at Hydra-Droerivier 1 
Timer settings were calculated for out-of-step blocking and tripping protection at 
their respective locations. The timers for the blocking and tripping relays are listed 
in Tables CSa and CSb respectively2. The locations are the locations for the 
portion of the transmission system shown in Figure C1. 
2 Note that all the outer-zone and inner-zone timers are the same because: 
1. the outer zone characteristics are 1,3 times the inner zone characteristics for out-of-step 
blocking and tripping protection respectively (refer to appendix B); and 
2. the maximum swing frequency is assumed to be the same everywhere in the system. 
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Table C5a: Out-of-step blocking protection timers 
Location Outer-zone timer Tb Location Outer-zone timer Tb 
(ms) (ms) 
Hydra-Kronos 15 Droerivier-Muldersvlei 15 
Kronos-Hydra 15 Muldersvlei-Droerivier 15 
Kronos-Aries 15 Droerivier-Proteus 15 
Aries-Kronos 15 Proteus-Droerivier 15 
Aries-Helios 15 Droerivier-Bacchus 15 
Helios-Aries 15 Bacchus-Droerivier 15 
Helios-Juno 15 Bacchus-Palmiet 15 
Juno-Helios 15 Palmiet-Bacchus 15 
Juno-Aurora 15 Bacchus-Muldersvlei 15 
Aurora-Juno 15 Muldersvlei-Bacchus 15 
Aurora-Koeberg 15 Muldersvlei-Koeberg 1 15 
Koeberg-Aurora 15 Koeberg-Muldersvlei 1 15 
Hydra-Droerivier 1 15 Muldersvlei-Koeberg 2 15 
Droerivier-Hydra 1 15 Koeberg-Muldersvlei 2 15 
Hydra-Droerivier 2 15 Muldersvlei-Acacia 15 
Droerivier-Hydra 2 15 Acacia-Muldersvlei 15 
Hydra-Droerivier 3 15 Acacia-Koeberg 15 
Droerivier-Hydra 3 15 Koe berg-Acacia 15 
Table C5a: Out-of-step tripping protection timers 
Location Outer-zone timer Tto (ms) Inner-zone timer Tti (ms) 
Hydra-Kronos 15 151 
Hydra-Droerivier 1 15 151 
Hydra-Droerivier 1 15 151 
Hydra-Droerivier 3 15 151 
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APPENDIX D 
VERIFICATION AND PROTECTION PERFORMANCE 
PERFORMANCE RESULTS - CASE STUDY DONE IN CHAPTER 3 
The protection performance was recorded and evaluated by including 
mathematical models, representing the behaviour of out-of-step protection relays 
as well as distance relays, in the power system model. The distance relays were 
modelled at each location within the Eskom transmission system. A mathematical 
model available in PSS/E was used. The distance relay characteristics, zone timer 
settings and calculation method for the reach settings are the following: 
Distance relay characteristics: 
X 
Relay angle 
Distance relay characteristics 
Zone 1 
R 
Zone timer settings: 
For each location the zone timer settings were fixed to be the following (typical 
distance relay zone timer settings used by Eskom): 
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Zone 1 timer= 
Zone 2 timer = 
Zone 3 timer = 
instantaneous operation 
0,4 seconds delay before operation 
0,7 seconds delay before operation 
Calculation method for the reach settings 
The zone reach settings for the distance relays were calculated as follows: 
Zone 1 = 80% X 1211 
Zone 2 = 100% X 1211 
Zone 3 forward = 150% X 1211 
Zone 3 reverse = 10% X 1211 
where 
1211 = line impedance 
The stability study was done and the protection performance was recorded. The 
performance of the out-of-step blocking and tripping protection each time the 
impedance passed through the characteristics was evaluated as follows: 
Detection: 
Nondetection and undesired 
operation of distance protection: 
Correct detection took place according 
to the detection methodology and 
philosophy presented in Appendix 8 for 
out-of-step blocking and triping relays 
respectively. 
Detection by the out-of-step blocking 
relay did not take place and as a result 
undersired operation of distance 
protection took place 
Nondetection with no undesired 
operation of distance protection: 
Nondetection of instability: 
D-iii 
Detection by the out-of-step blocking 
protection did not take place and 
undersired operation of distance 
protection did not take place. 
Detection by the out-of-step tripping 
protection did not take place. 
For those locations where nondetection took place, the reasons why the 
protection did not detect were investigated. 
D1 Out-of-step blocking protection 
In the stability study done, the impedance passed through the out-of-step blocking 
protection characteristics twice at every location: the first time during the initial 
power swing condition and the second time during the out-of-step condition. Table 
01 shows the performance of the out-of-step blocking protection during each time 
the impedance passed through the characteristics. For those locations where 
nondetection took place, the reason is also given. 
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1 Perf1 f out-of block· t 
Location Performance during power swing Performance during out-of-step condition 
condition 
Hydra-Kronos Detection Detection 
Kronos-Hvdra Detection Detection 
Kronos-Aries Detection Detection 
Aries-Kronos Detection Detection 
Aries-Helios Detection Nondetection and undesired operation of distance protection: The zone 
' timer setting Is not sufficient to allow the timer to expire. 
Helios-Aries Detection Detection 
Helios-Juno Detection Detection 
Juno-Helios Detection Nondetection and undesired operation of distance protection: The zone 
timer settina is not sufficient to allow the timer to expire. 
Juno-Aurora Detection Nondetection and undesired operation of distance protection: The zone 
timer settina is not sufficient to allow the timer to expire. 
Aurora-Juno Detection Nondetection and undesired operation of distance protection: The zone 
timer setting is not sufficient to allow the timer to expire. 
Aurora-Koeberg Detection Detection 
Koeberg-Aurora Nondetection: The out-of-step blocking characteristics are Detection 
not large enough to allow detection. 
Hydra-Droerivier 1 Detection Detection 
Droerivier-Hydra 1 Detection Nondetection and undesired operation of distance protection:. Distance 
relay's largest characteristic encroached the out-of-step blocking 
characteristics. 
Hydra-Droerivier 2 Detection Detection 
Droerivier-Hydra 2 Detection Nondetection and undesired operation of distance protection: Distance 
relay's largest characteristic encroached the out-of-step blocking 
. characteristics . 
Hydra-Droerivier 3 Detection 
. 
' Nondete<;tion and undesired operation of distance protection: The zone ·, 
' . timer settina is not sufficient to allow the timer to expire. · . 
Droerivler-Hydra 3 Nondetectlon and undesired operation of distancie Nondetection and undesired operation of distance protection: The 
protection: The zone timer setting is not sufficient to allow zone timer setting is not sufficient to allow the timer to expire. 
the timer to expire. · · 
Droerivier-Muldersvlei Detection Detection 
Muldersvlei-Droerivier Detection Detection 
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Table D1 (cont): Performance of out-of-step blocking protection 
Location Performance during power swing Performance during out-of-step condition 
condition 
Droerivier-Proteus Detection 
' Nondetection and undesired operation of distance protection: The out-of:step blocking characteristics are not large enough to allow 
detection. 
Proteus-Droerivier Detection Nondetectiori and undesired operation of.distance protection: The out-
of .:step blocking characteristics are not large eoough to allow 
· detection. 
Droerivier-Bacchus Detection Detection 
Bacchus-DroMvier Detection Detection 
Bacchus-Palmiet Detection Detection 
Palmiet-Bacchus Detection Detection 
Bacchus-Muldersvlei Nondetection and undesired operation of distance Nondetection and undesired operation of distance protection: The zone 
protection: The zone timer setting is not sufficient to allow timer setting ls not sufficient to allow the timer to expire. 
the timer to exoire; ·. ·• 
Muldersvlei-Bacchus · Nondetection and undesired operation of distance Nondetection and undesired operation of distance protection: The zone 
protection: The zone timer setting is not·sufficient to allow timer setting is not sufficient to allow the timer to expire. 
the timer to expire. . ' 
.. 
·. · .. 
Muldersvlei-Koeberg 1 Nondetection with no undesired operation of distance Nondetection with no undesired operation of distance protection: 
protection: Impedance did not enter characteristics. Impedance did not enter characteristics. .• 
Koeberg-Muldersvlei 1 Nondetection with no undesired operation of distance Noncletection with no undesired opt?ration of distance protection: 
protection: Impedance did not enter characteristics. Impedance did not enter characteristics. 
Muldersvlei-Koeberg 2 · Nondetection with no undesired operation of distance No.ndetection with• no undesired operation of distance protection: 
protection: Impedance did not enter characteristics: ·· Impedance did not enter characteristics. 
Koeberg-Muldersvlel 2 .. Nondetection with no undesired operation of distance 
protection: .Impedance did not enter characteristics. 
Nondetection with no undesired operation of distance protection: 
Impedance did not enter characteristics. · 
Muldersvlei-Acacia N9ndetection with no undesired oper!=llion. of distan9e l'Jondeteetion with no 1,md~ired operation of distance protection: 
protection: impedance did not enter characteristics, ·:-. ... ln,oedance did not enter characteristics. · 
Acacia-Muldersvlei Nondetectlon with no undesired operation of distance Nondetection with. rio undesired operation of distance protection: 
protection: Impedance did not enter characteristics;. ·· .. lmoedance did' not enter characteristics. 
Acacia-Koeberg Nondetection with no undesired operation of distance Nondetection with no undesired operation of distance protection: 
protection: Impedance did not enter cheiracteristics; · . . Impedance did not enter characteristics . 
Koeberg-Acacia Nondetectlon with no undesired operation of .distance Nondetection with no undesired operation of distance protection: 
protection: Impedance did not enter characteristics. Impedance did not eriter characteristics. 
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The locations that are shaded in Table 01 are the locations where power swing 
and out-of-step conditions were not detected and blocking could therefore not be 
initiated. The reasons, also indicated in Table 01, were as follows: 
1. The timer setting was not sufficient to allow the timer to expire. 
2. The out-of-step blocking characteristics were not large enough to allow 
detection. 
3. Distance relay's largest characteristic encroached the out-of-step blocking 
characteristics. 
4. The impedance never entered the relay characteristics. 
1. Zone timer setting not sufficient 
Figure 01 shows the impedance locus 'seen' by the out-of-step blocking 
protection at Juno-Helios. In Figure 01 it can be seen that after the impedance 
had entered the outer zone for the first time, it remained in the outer zone for a 
period of 118 ms. The timer setting for the blocking relay as calculated in 
Appendix .. C was 15 ms. On entering the outer zone for the second time, the 
impedance remained in the outer zone for a period of 14 ms. The impedance 
therefore passed through the characteristics at a faster rate than it did the first 
time. 
Figures 02a and 02b show the change in the impedance 'seen' by the out-of-step 
blocking protection located at Juno-Helios. Figure 02b indicates the time for 
which the impedance remained within the characteristics each time. From Figure 
02b it can be seen that upon the second entry the impedance stayed in the 
characteristics for 0,41 s compared with the first time, when it stayed there for 
0,56 s. The second stay was therefore shorter, which indicates an increased rate 
of change of the impedance. 
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From the above it can be concluded that the rate of change of the impedance is 
not constant. In those cases where nondetection occurred, the rate of change of 
the impedance, when entering the outer zone, was more than the maximum swing 
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Figure 01: Impedance locus and out-of-step blocking protection characteristics 
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Figure 02a: Impedance change with time at Juno-Helios 
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Figure 02b: Impedance entering the relay characteristics at Juno-Helios 
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2. The out-of-step blocking characteristics were not large enough 
At five of the locations listed in Table 01 the impedance entered the out-of-step 
blacking's outer zone, remained inside the outer zone long enough to allow the 
timer to expire, but never entered the inner zone to enable detection of the power 
swing or out-of-step condition. As a consequence, the undesired operation of 
distance relays located at these locations occured. 
Figure 03 shows the impedance locus 'seen' at the Oroerivier-Hydra 1 location. It 
shows that the blocking protection detected the power swing when the impedance 
first entered the characteristics, but upon the second entry the blocking protection 
did not detect because the impedance did not enter the inner zone. 
From the above it can be concluded that the reason for nondetection is that the 
out-of-step blocking characteristic was not large enough to allow detection. 
3. Distance relay's largest characteristic encroached the out-of-step 
blocking characteristics. 
At two locations the distance relay's characteristic reaches exceeded the blocking 
relay's characteristic reaches and undesired operation of the distance relay 
occured. 
Figure 04 shows the relay characteristics of a distance relay located at the 
Oroerivier-Hydra 1 location. The zone reach settings for the distance relay were 






80% x IZII 
0,04 pu 
100% x IZII 
= 0,05 pu 
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Zone 3 forward = 150% x IZII 
= 0,06 pu 
Zone 3 reverse = 10% x IZII 
= 0,004 pu 
where 
IZII = line impedance 
= 0,0481 pu for the Droerivier-Hydra 1 line 
In Figure D4 it can be seen that the zone 3 distance relay characteristic reach 
exceeds the out-of-step blocking protection reach. From the results of the case 
study it is clear that the impedance entered the zone 3 distance relay 
characteristic when it enters the out-of-step blocking's outer zone. Both the zone 
3 distance relay timer and the out-of-step blocking timer started. In this cases the 
impedance did not enter the out-of-step blocking protection's inner zone because 
of the reason given under point 2 above. The distance relay zone 3 timer expired 
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Figure 03: Impedance locus and out-of-step blocking protection characteristics 









Figure 04: Distance relay and out-of-step blocking protection characteristics at 
Droerivier-Hydra 1 
4. Impedance never enters the characteristics 
The existing approach assumes that all the distance relays in the system will 
observe power oscillations and out-of-step conditions and as a results 
undesirable operation will occur. Out-of-step blocking protection is therefore 
typically located at all the locations where distance relays are located. 
At eight of the locations listed in Table 3.1 nondetection occurred because the 
impedance never entered the blocking relay characteristics. The reason for this is 
that the impedance locus behaviour during power oscillations and out-of-step 
conditions is not observed at these locations. The apparent impedance calculated 
from the voltage and current at the relay location does not undergo bscillations 
severe enough to raise concern about possibJe undesired operation of the 
distance relay protection. 
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Figure DSa shows the impedance locus 'seen' at the Muldersvlei-Koeberg 1 
location. Figure DSb shows the apparent impedance 'seen' by a distance relay 
located at Muldersvlei-Koeberg 1. The distance relay characteristics are shown in 
Figure DSb with reach settings calculated as follows: 
Zone 1 = 80% X IZII 
= 0,008 pu 
Zone2 = 100% X jztJ 
= 0,01 pu 
Zone 3 forward = 150% x IZH 
= 0,015 pu 
Zone 3 reverse = 10% x I Zll 
= 0,001 pu 
where 
lztl = line impedance 
= 0,01 pu for the Muldersvlei-Koeberg 1 line 
In Figure 05a it can be seen that the impedance never enters the out-of-step 
blocking characteristics. Figure DSb shows that the impedance never enters the 
distance relay characteristics and therefore does not introduce undesired 
operation of the distance relay during power oscillations or out-of-step conditions. 
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Figure 05a: Impedance locus and out-of-step blocking protection characteristics 
for protection at Muldersvlei-Koeberg 1 
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D2 Out-of-step tripping protection 
The purpose of the out-of-step tripping protection is to not detect power swing 
conditions but detect system out-of-step conditions. This will enable the out-of-
step tripping protection to send a tripping signal to selected locations to initiate 
islanding. 
As in the case of the out-of-step blocking protection, the impedance passed 
through the out-of-step tripping protection characteristics twice: the first time 
during the power swing condition and the second time during the out-of-step 
condition. Table 02 shows the performance of the out-of-step tripping protection 
in the stability study done. For those locations where detection did not take place, 
the reason is also given. 
Table 02: Performance of the out-of-step tripping protection 
Location Performance during power Performance during out-of-
swing condition step condition 
Hydra-Kronos Detection Detection 
Hydra-Droerivier 1 Detection Nondetection of instability: . 
insufficient inner.,zone timer 
setting 
,, 
Hydra-Droerivier 3 Detection Nondetection of instability: .. • 
impedance locus behaviour. did 
not allow detection 
The out-of-step tripping protection at the locations that are shaded in Table 02 
did not detect the out-of-step condition. As shown in Table 02, the reasons for 
nondetection were as follows: 
1. The inner-zone timer setting was not sufficient to allow the timer to expire 
while the impedance passed through the inner zone. 
2. The impedance locus behaviour did not allow detection. 
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1. Insufficient inner-zone timer setting 
The impedance locus 'seen' by the out-of-step tripping relay located at Hydra-
Droerivier 1 can be seen in Figure D6. This example will show insufficient inner-
zone timer setting. 
Upon the first entry (at time = 2,95 s) the impedance remained in the outer zone 
for 150 ms and in the inner zone for 300 ms. The timer settings given in Appendix 
C were calculated to be 15 ms and 151 ms for the outer-zone and inner-zone 
timers respectively. Both timers therefore expired, but the relay did not detect 
because the impedance locus did not exit the characteristic on the side opposite 
that which it originally entered. The relay performance was therefore correct. 
Upon the second entry, during the out-of-step condition, the impedance remained 
in the outer and inner zone for 200 ms and 100 ms respectively. With the same 
timer settings (15 ms and 151 ms for the outer-zone and inner-zone timers 
respectively) the outer-zone timer expired but the inner-zone timer was set too 
slow. Due to an insufficient inner-zone timer setting, detection of the out-of-step 
condition therefore did not take place. 
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Figure 06: Impedance locus and out-of-step tripping protection characteristic 



















2. Out-of-step condition not observable to the out-of-step tripping protection. 
The impedance locus 'seen' by the out-of-step tripping protection located at 
Hydra-Droerivier 3 can be seen in Figure D7. 
Upon the first entry (at time = 3 s) the impedance remained in the outer zone for 
50 ms and in the inner zone for 250 ms. The timer settings given in Appendix C 
were calculated to be 15 ms and 151 ms for the outer-zone and inner-zone timers 
respectively. Both timers therefore expired, but the protection did not detect 
because the impedance locus did not exit the characteristics on the side opposite 
that which it originally entered. The protection performance was therefore correct. 
However, during the out-of-step condition the impedance never entered the 
protection characteristics and the out-of-step condition could therefore not be 
detected. 
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Impedance locus and out-of-step protection characteristics for 




















OUT-OF-STEP PROTECTION APPLICATION BASED ON THE NEW 
APPROACH AND IMPEDANCE LOCUS STUDY METHODS 
Out of step protection was applied to the Eskom transmission system according to 
new approach, using the new methods of studying the impedance locus behaviour to 
determine relay locations and calculating relay settings (reach and timer). 
The location and reach settings were selected and calculated for out-of-step 
blocking an tripping protection using concentric circle type characteristics. The 
protection type used for the purposes of the research is presented in Appendix B. 
For those calculations and investigations that require stability study results, the 
stability study presented under section 3.3.1 in Chapter 3 was done to provide the 
necessary results. 
Due to the si.ze of the Eskom transmission system results for a portion of the system 
were presented as results for the remaining system are additional information and 
does not add any futher value to the thesis contribution. The portion of the Eskom 
transmission system for which results are presented, is shown in Figure C1, 
Appendix C. 
E1 Locations 
The impedance locus at all the distance relay locations in the Eskom transmission 
system was studied. 
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Out-of-step blocking protection 
To identify the need for out-of-step blocking protection, the following criterion was 
used: 
If R1-zone 3 < Rd < Rr-zone 3 and Xt>-zone 3 < Xd < Xa-zone J then the impedance locus is inside 
the boundaries defined by a distance relay zone 3 characteristic 1. The forward and 
reverse reaches of the ROW are Xa-zone J and Xt>-zone 3 respectively. R1.zone 3 and Rr-zone 3 
represent the left and right ROW boundaries respectively. 
A distance relay zone 3 ROW with the following boundary values was chosen for 









150% of abs(line impedance) 
10% of abs(line impedance) 
1/2 x (forward reach+ reverse reach) 
- Rr-zone 3 
1 For the purposes of the research a distance relay zone 3 characteristic was assumed to be the 
largest distance relay characteristic. 
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Table E1: ROW boundaries to determine the need for out-of-step blocking protection 
Location Line Impedance Zone 3 forward Zone 3 reverse Left boundary = -right 
reach (+X.. .. one3) reach (X.,..one3) boundary 
(Ri..one3 = -R.. .. one3} 
Rllne Xllne = 150% of abs(line = 10% of abs(line = 1/2 x (forward reach + 
imoedancel im09dance) reverse reach 
Hydra-Kronos 0,0028 0,0119 0,0184 0,0012 0,0097 
Kronos-Hydra 0,0028 0,0119 0,0184 0,0012 0,0097 
Kronos-Aries 0,0024 0,0088 0,0137 0,0009 0,0072 
Aries-Kronos 0,0024 0,0088 0,0137 0,0009 0,0072 
Aries-Helios 0,0025 0,0098 0,0152 0,0010 0,0080 
Helios-Aries 0,0025 0,0098 0,0151 0,0010 0,0080 
Helios-Juno 0,0025 0,0104 0,0160 0,0010 0,0085 
Juno-Helios 0,0025 0,0104 0,0160 0,0010 0,0085 
Juno-Aurora 0,0028 0,0112 0,0173 0,0011 0,0092 
Aurora-Juno 0,0028 0,0112 0,0173 0,0011 0,0092 
Aurora-Koeberg 0,0013 0,0170 0,0255 0,0017 0,0136 
Koeberg-Aurora 0,0013 0,0170 0,0255 0,0017 0,0136 
Hydra-DroerMer 1 0,0038 0,0479 0,0722 0,0048 0,0385 
Droerivier-Hydra 1 0,0038 0,0479 0,0722 0,0048 0,0385 
Hydra-Droerivier 2 0,0038 0,0479 0,0722 0,0048 0,0385 
Droerivier-Hydra 2 0,0038 0,0479 0,0722 0,0048 0,0385 
Hydra-Droerivier 3 0,0037 0,0262 0,0397 0,0026 0,0211 
Droerivier-Hydra 3 0,0037 0,0262 0,0397 0,0026 0,0211 
Droerivier-Muldersvlei 0,0061 0,0424 0,0642 0,0042 0,0342 
Muldersvtei-DroerMer 0,0061 0,0424 0,0642 0,0042 0,0342 
Droerivier-Proteus 0,0068 0,0393 0,0598 0,0039 0,0319 
Proteus-Droerivier 0,0068 0,0393 0,0598 0,0039 0,0319 
Droerivier-Bacchus 0,0060 0,0407 0,0617 0,0041 0,0329 
Bacchus-Droerivier 0,0060 0,0407 0,0617 0,0041 0,0329 
Bacchus-Palmiet 0,0013 0,0159 0,0240 0,0016 0,0128 
Palmiet-Bacchus 0,0013 0,0159 0,0240 0,0016 0,0128 
Bacchus-Muldersvtei 0,0017 0,0217 0,0326 0,0021 0,0174 
Muldersvtei-Bacchus 0,0017 0,0217 0,0326 0,0021 0,0174 
Muldersvtei-Koeberg 1 0,0006 0,0081 0,0121 0,0008 0,0064 
Koeberg-Muldersvtei 1 0,0006 0,0081 0,0121 0,0008 0,0064 
Muldersvtei-Koeberg 2 0,0006 0,0081 0,0121 0,0008 0,0064 
Koeberg-Muldersvtei 2 0,0006 0,0081 0,0121 0,0008 0,0064 
Muldersvtei-Acacia 0,0007 0,00917 0,0136 0,0009 0,0072 
Acacia-Muldersvtei 0,0007 0,0091 0,0136 0,0009 0,0072 
Acacia-Koeberg 0,0005 0,0063 0,0094 0,0006 0,0050 
Koeberg-Acacia 0,0005 0,0063 0,0094 0,0006 0,0050 
For the purpose of identifying locations where out-of-step blocking is required, Rd 
and ~ as defined under section 4.1.1 in Chapter 4 were calculated. The results are 
listed in Table E2. Table E2 also indicates, with reference to Table E1, whether the 
criterion for the need for out-of-step blocking has been satisfied, indicating that there 
E-iv 
is a need for out-of-step blocking protection. The locations that are shaded in Table 
E2 are the locations where out-of-step blocking is needed. 
Table E2: Rd and Xd as defined under section 4.1.1 in Chapter 4 
Location Tlme •• ..,(s) Rd x.. Criterion satisfied 
Hydra-Kronos <3,5' 0,0043 0,00)4 Yes 
>3.5 coo«> 00331 : No 
Kror,os..Hydra . <3,5 -0,0044 0,0036 Yes 
' >35 -00019 -00188 No 
Kronos-Aries 
._ <3,5 0,0043 ' -0,0036 ; Yes 
>35 00019 · 00192 No 
Arie&-Kronos . <3,5 -0,00ED · O,CU:17 Yes 
>3.5 -00012 -00100 No 
Aries-Helios <3,5 0,0050 -0,0113 Yes 
>35 · 00021 00113 Yes 
Helios-Aries <3,5 -0,casB 0,0210 No 
>35 000)4 -00017 No 
Helios-Juno <3,5 O,CX66 -0,0201 No 
>35 ', -000)4 00017 ·yes 
Juno-Helios <3,5 .-0.0050 O,CX318 ; No 
',' >35 -OCDJ7 O<D39 Yes 
Juno-Aurora <3,5 0,0043 -0,0038' Yes 
>3.5 OCDJ7 -O<Dm No 
Aurora-Juno <3,5 -0,0029 0,0428 No 
> 3,5 -0,0019 0,0202 No 
Aurora-Koeberg < 3,5 -0,0063 -0,0418 No 
> 3,5 -0 0027 -0,0205 No 
Koeberg-Aurora < 3,5 0,0080 0,0601 No 
>35 00366 00066 No 
Hydra-Droerivier 1 ·. <3,5 0,0038 0,0011- Yes 
>35 -00217 OCX312 ' Yes 
oroerivier-Hydra 1 - <3,5 -O,CX54 0,0044 Yes 
>35 00126 -00150 No 
Hydra-Droerivier 2 <3,5 ·0,0038 0,0011 Yes 
>35 '' -00217 . O,CX312 ·yes 
Droerivier-Hydra 2 . <3,5 -0,CX54 0,0044 Yes 
>35 00126 -00150 No 
Hydra-Oroerivler 3 · <3,5 0,0068 0,0024 .Yes 
' >35 -00464 00033 No 
DroerMer-Hydra 3 <3,5 -0,01(5 · 0,0074. Yes 
>35 00254 ·, -00245 - No 
Droerivier-Muldersvlei <3,5 0,0027 -O,a;l54 ,, No 
>35 -00038 •. · 00157 " Yes 
Muklersvtei-Droerivier <3,5 -0,0068 0,0473 Yes 
>35 -00015 -· 
.-
· 0,0253 Yes 
Droerivier-Proteus <3,5 0,0128 -0,0045 No 
>3,5 -O,CX378 00182 No 
Proteus-Oroerivier <3,5 -0,0213 0,0101 Yes 
>35 00279 -00143 No 
Droertvler-Bacchus <3,5 0,00645 · -0,0024 Yes 
>35 -00168 · acme Yes 
Bacchus-Droerivier <3,5 -0,0159 0,0038 Yes 
>35 00014 -OOCX34 Yes 
2 The system stability study results indicated that power swings occurred before 3,5 seconds. 
(Koeberg, being the larger power station, is not out-of-step eventhough Palmiet being the smaller 
power station is already out-of-step, refer to Chapter 3, section 3.3.1 ). After 3,5 seconds the system 
became unstable. (Koeberg and Palmiet power stations are out-of-step, refer to Chapter 3, section 
3.3.1) 
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Table E2 (cont): Rd and Xd as defined under section 4.1.1 in Chapter 4 
Location Tlme ••• ,(s) R.i x.i Criterion satisfied 
Bacchus-Palmiet <3,5 0,0032 .o,cmo No 
>35 ocxm 00013 Yes 
Palmiet-Bacchus <3,5 0,0048 0,0068 Yes 
>35 . 00021 00145 .. ..•.. Yes 
Bacchus-Muldersvlei <3,5 -0,0024 -O,CXE6 - No. " 
>35 -00016 .. -00017 Yes 
Muldersvle1-Baccltu$ <3,5 0,0103 0,0249 Yes 
>3,5 00061 00138 Yes 
Muldersvlei-Koeberg 1 <3,5 -0,0287 -0,0391 No 
> 3,5 -0,0124 -0 0233 No 
Koeberg-Muldersvlei 1 < 3,5 0,0313 0,0464 No 
>35 0,0298 0,0107 No 
Muldersvlei-Koeberg 2 < 3,5 -0,0287 -0,0391 No 
>35 -0 0124 -0,0233 No 
Koeberg-Muldersvlei 2 < 3,5 0,0313 0,0464 No 
> 3,5 0,0298 0,0107 No 
Muldersvlei-Acacia < 3,5 0,00169 -0, 1108 No 
> 3,5 -0,0045 -0,0564 No 
Acacia-Muldersvlei < 3,5 -0,0039 0,1237 No 
> 3,5 00054 0,0665 No 
Acacia-Koeberg < 3,5 -0,0577 -0,0334 No 
> 3,5 -0 0395 -0,0073 No 
Koeberg-Acacia < 3,5 0,0597 0,0382 No 
> 3,5 0,0409 0,0100 No 
Two examples are given to illustrate the method of identifying the need for out-of-
step blocking protection: firstly Kronos-Hydra is evaluated and secondly Acacia-
Koeberg is evaluated. 
Example 1 : The need for out-of-step blocking protection at Kronos-Hydra 
The impedance 'seen' at Kronos-Hydra as obtained from the system stability study 
discussed in Chapter 3, section 3.3. 1 can be seen in Figure E1. Figure E1 also shows 
the distance relay zone 3 ROW with the following boundary values: 
Xa.zone 3 = 150% of abs(Jine impedance) = 0,0184 pu 
Xb-zone 3 = 10% of abs(line impedance) = -0,0012 pu 
R,.zone3 = 112 x (forward reach + reverse reach) = 0,0098pu 
Ri-zone 3 = - Rr-zone 3 = -0,0098 pu 
with 
Kronos-Hydra line impedance = 0,0028 + j0,0119 pu (from Table E1) 
From Figure E1 the following parameters were calculated: 
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During power swing condition (t < 3, 5 s): (Koeberg, being the larger power station, is not out-of-step 
even though Pa/miet being the smaller power station is already out-of-step, refer to Chapter 3, section 3. 3. 1) 
Rd = -0,0044 
xd = 0,0036 
During out-of-step condition (t > 3, 5 s): (Both Koeberg Power Station and Palmiet Power station are 
out-of-step, refer to Chapter 3, section 3.3.1) 
Rd = -0,0019 
xd = -0,0188 
From the above: 
R1.zone 3 < (Rd (power swing) = -0, 0044) < Rr.zone 3 and 
Xb-zone 3 < (Xd (power swing) = 0, 0036) < Xa.zone 3 
R1.zone 3 < (Rd (out-of-step} = -0, 0019) < Rr.zone 3 and 
Xb-zone 3 > (Xd (out-of-step) = -0, 0188) < Xa.zone 3 
During the power swing condition (t < 3, 5 s) the impedance entered the distance relay 
zone 3 ROW During the out-of-step condition (t > 3, 5 s) the impedance did not enter the 
distance relay zone 3 ROW However, to avoid ma/operation of a distance relay at 
Kronos-Hydra during power swing conditions, out-of-step blocking protection is needed. 
0 ut-of-step 
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Figure E1 (cont): Impedance locus and distance relay zone 3 ROW at Hydra-Kronos 
The need for out-of-step blocking protection at Acacia-Koeberq 
The impedance 'seen' at Acacia-Koeberg as obtained from the system stability study 
discussed in Chapter 3, section 3.3.1, can be seen in Figure E2. Figure E2 also shows 
the distance relay zone 3 ROW with the following boundary values: 
Xa':.zone 3 = 150% of abs(line impedance) = 0,0095pu 
Xb-zone3 = 10% of abs(line impedance) = -0,0006pu 
R,-zone3 = 112 x (forward reach+ reverse reach) = 0,0051 pu 
R1-zone 3 = - Rr-zone 3 = -0,0051 pu 
with 
Acacia-Koeberg line impedance = 0, 0005 + jO, 0063 pu (from Table E1) 
From Figure E2 the following parameters were calculated: 
During power swing condition (t < 3, 5 s): (Koeberg, being the larger power station, is not out-of-step 
even though Palmiet being the smaller power station is already out-of-step, refer to Chapter 3, section 3.3.1) 
Rd = -0,0577 
xd = -0,0334 
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During out-of-step condition (t > 3, 5 s): (Both Koeberg Power Station and Palmiet Power Station are 
out-of-step, refer to Chapter 3, section 3. 3. 1) 
Rd = -0,0395 
xd = -0,0073 
From the above: 
R1.zone 3 > (Rd (power swing) = -0, 0577) < Rr.zone 3 and 
Xb-zone 3 > {Xd (power swing) = -0, 0334) < Xa-zone 3 
R1-zone 3 > (Rd (out-of-step) = -0, 0395) < Rr-zone 3 and 
Xb-zone 3 > {Xd (out-of-step) = -0, 00731) < Xa.zone 3 
The impedance did not enter the distance relay zone 3 ROW during either the power 
swing condition (t < 3, 5 s) or the out-of-step condition (t > 3, 5 s). Out-of-step blocking 
protection is therefore not needed at Acacia-Koeberg. 
-0.25 
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Figure E2 (cont): Impedance locus and distance relay zone 3 ROW at Acacia-Koeberg 
Out-of-step tripping 
0.10 
To identify locations for out-of-step tripping protection, the following criterion was 
used: 
• R, < Renter-actua1 < Rr and Xb < Xenter-actua1 < Xa to indicate that the impedance locus is 
inside the boundaries defined by an out-of-step tripping ROW. 
• I Zd I to be as close as possible to O pu which will ensure that the impedance 
enters the out-of-step tripping inner characteristic for the purpose of detection3• 
• %Renter not relevant because of the out-of-step tripping detection methodology 
used for the purposes of the research (refer to Appendix 8). 
• %Rexit not relevant because of the out-of-step tripping detection methodology 
used for the purposes of the research (refer to Appendix 8). 
3 The out-of-step tripping protection type used for the purposes of the research requires that the 
impedance enter an inner zone to allow detection. 
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• The impedance to enter and exit the ROW in such a way as to allow detection 
according to the detection methodology of the type of out-of-step protection 
chosen. (For the purpose of the research the detection methodology is the 
following: 
if Rexit-actua1 > 0, then Renter-actua1 < 0 and vice versa 
Refer to Appendix B) 
An out-of-step tripping ROW with the following boundary values was chosen for 
every location: 
Xa- oos-Row = 0, 1 pu (maximum forward reach setting as specified in Appendix B) 
Xb- oos-Row = -0, 1 pu (maximum reverse reach setting as specified in Appendix B) 
Rr- oos-Row = 0, 1 pu (limit to aviod load encroachment, used for the purposes of the research) 
R1- oos-Row = -0, 1 pu (limit to aviod load encroachment, used for the purposes of the research) 
For the purpose of identifying locations for out-of-step tripping protection all the 
parameters defined under section (4.3.1 b) in Chapter 4 were determined and 
calculated. The results are listed in Table E34. The locations that are shaded in 
Table E3 are the locations where out-of-step tripping protection could be located 
according to the criterion presented above. 
Any one, or all, of the locations that are shaded in Table E3 would be suitable for the 
location of out-of-step tripping relays. For the purposes of the research the following 





4 Note that Table E3 lists the parameters as calculated after 3,5 seconds as the system then becomes 
unstable according to the results of the stability study discussed in Chapter 3 section 3.3.1 (both 
Koeberg Power Station and Palmiet Power Station are out of step). 
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Table E3: Parameter listing to identifv out-of-steo trippino protection locations 
LOCATION R.nte-•1 X.n111, .. o1ual %R.-. R.xit-aotual X.xit-aotual %R.xit IZdl 
Hvdra-Kronos -0,0007 00990 0,7 0,0970 0,0232 97 0 0 0330 
Kronos-Hvdra -0,0027 -0,0992 2,7 -0 0994 00201 99,4 00189 
Kronos-Aries 0,0002 0,0989 02 0 0991 0,0101 99,1 00193 
Aries-Kronos -0 0020 -0,0989 2,0 -0,0970 -0,0102 97,0 0,0100 
Aries-Helios -0,0400 00064 400 00074 -0,0256 97,4 00114 
Helios-Aries 00433 -OCB90 433 · . ..noo75 0.0242 975 00017 
Helto&,;Juno -Oa565 OCB95 565 OCB90 -00632 990 00017 
Juno-Helios 00575 -OCB90 575 -00067 00495 967 0~ 
Juno-Aurora -0 0726 00990 72,6 00989 -0,0865 98 9 0 0088 
Aurora-Juno 0,0754 -0,0985 75,4 -0,0971 0,0699 971 0 0202 
Aurora-Koebera -0,0997 0,0494 99,7 00640 -0,0969 64,0 0,0206 
Koeberg-Aurora 0,0999 -0,0361 999 -0 0643 00954 64,3 0,0372 
Hvdra-Droerivier 1 0,0103 0,0986 10 3 0 0722 0,0983 72,2 0,0380 
Droerivie -Hvdra 1 -0 0329 -0,0988 32 9 -0 0919 -0,0901 91 9 00195 
Hvdra-Droerivier 2 0,0103 0 0986 10,3 0,0722 0,0983 722 00380 
Droerivier-Hvdra 2 -0,0329 -0 0988 32 9 -0,0919 -0,0901 91 9 0 0195 
Hvdra-Droerivier 3 -0 0556 0 0981 55,6 -0,0050 00988 so 0 0706 
Droertvier-Hvdra 3 0,0069 -0 0979 69 -0,0504 -0 0974 50,4 0,0352 
Droerlvier-Muldersvtei -0,0519 0 0986 51,9 0 0963 -0,00892 96 3 0,0161 
Muldersvtei-Droerivier 0 0805 -0 0997 80 5 -0 0958 0,0392 95 8 00253 
Droerivier-Proteus 0,0991 0,0983 991 -0 0112 0 0958 11 2 0,0419 
Proteus-Droerivier -0 0998 -0,0640 998 0,0006 -0 0990 06 0,0313 
Droerlvier-Bacchus 00067 00~ 967 -0,0144 OCB69 144 00194 
Bacchus-Droerivier -OCB70 Qa«!B .· •' 970 a.ems -00036 ~~5 00036 
Bacchus-Palmiet .. 00662 -00958 862 -00990 00027 ·.· 990 00013 
Palmiet-Bacchus -O,CX:178 00066 878 0,0062 0,0068 962 00146 
Bacchus-Muldersvlei -00061 OCBBS 96.1 00789 -00049 789 .. · 00024 
Muldersvlei-Bacchus 00067 -00091 967 -00699 00062 699 00196 
Muldersvlei-Koebera 1 -0,0993 -0,0176 99,3 -0,0995 -0,0507 99 5 0,0289 
Koeberg-Muldersvlei 1 0 0992 -0 0687 992 0 0983 0,0595 98 3 0,0316 
Muldersvlei-Koebera 2 -0 0993 -0 0176 99 3 -0,0995 -0,0507 99,5 0,0289 
Koebera-Muldersvlei 2 0,0992 -0,0687 99,2 0,0983 0,0595 98,3 0,0316 
Muldersvlei-Acacia -0,095 -0 0495 950 00995 -0,0682 99 5 0,0565 
Acacla-Muldersvlei 0,0986 0,0567 98,6 -0 0977 0,0758 97,7 0,0667 
Acacia-Koebera -0 0993 00325 99,3 -0,0993 -0,0241 99,3 0,0401 
Koebera-Acacia 0,0996 -0,0279 99,6 0,0991 0,0302 991 00421 
As an example Bacchus-Droerivier is evaluated to illustrate the method of identifying 
locations for out-of-step tripping protection. 
Example 3: The suitability of Bacchus-Droerivier for out-of-step tripping protection 
The impedance 'seen' at Bacchus-Droerivier as obtained from the system stability study 
discussed in Chapter 3, section 3.3.1, can be seen in Figure E3. Figure E3 also shows 
the out-of-step tripping ROW with the following boundary values: 
Xa- OOS-ROW =O, 1 pu 
Xb- OOS-ROW = -0, 1 pU 
R,_ oos-Row = 0, 1 pu 
R,_ oos-Row = -0, 1 pu 
(maximum forward reach setting as specified in Appendix B) 
(maximum reverse reach setting as specified in Appendix B) 
(limit to aviod load encroachment, used for the purposes of the research) 
(limit to aviod load encroachment, used for the purposes of the research) 
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From Figure E3 the following parameters were calculated: 
During out-of-step condition (t>3, 5 s): (Koeberg and Palmiet power stations are out-of-step, refer to 













• R1-00S-ROW <(Renter-actual= -0,0970) < Rr-OOS-ROW; and 
Xb-OOS-ROW < ()(enter-actual = 0, 0468) < Xa-OOS-ROW 
• (Raxit-actual = -0, 0970) < 0 and (Raxit-actual = 0, 0335) > 0 
• ( I zd I = 0,003647 pu) = o pu. 
• (%Renter-actual= 97,0%) = 100%. 




During the out-of-step condition (t > 3, 5 s) the impedance entered the out-of-step tripping 
ROW in accordance with the criterion indicating that Bacchus-Droijrivier is a suitable 
location for out-of-step tripping protection. 
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Figure E3: Impedance 'seen' at Bacchus-Droerivier 
Out-of-step 
condition 
t > 3,5 s 
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Figure E3 (cont): Impedance 'seen' at Bacchus-Droerivier (smaller scale) 
Power swing condition 
t < 3,5 s 
Out-of-step tripping ROW 
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Figure E3 (cont): Impedance locus and out-of-step tripping ROW at Bacchus-Oroerivier 
0.15 
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E2 Reach settings 
The blocking and tripping reach settings for the respective locations were calculated 
by using the method given under section 4.3.2, Chapter 4. Table E4 lists the 
calculated reach settings for out-of-step blocking and tripping protection 
respectively. 
To illustrate the method of calculating the reach settings for out-of-step blocking or 
tripping, the reach settings for blocking protection located at Kronos-Hydra are 
calculated. 
Example 1 : Reach settings for out-of-step blocking protection at Kronos-Hydra 
To allow the out-of-step blocking protection located at Kronos-Hydra to detect power 
system unstable conditions, the forward and reverse reaches in the impedance plane are 
. calculated as follows (Figure E4 shows the relay characteristics, with calculated reach 
settings, in the impedance plane): 
Zf = /Zf/L<pl 
= 0, 1 pu L:76,76° 
Zr = /Zr/ L180 °+<pl 
= 0,0990 pu L180°+76, 76° 
where 
Zf = forward reach 
I maximum forward reach specified for the out-of-step protection used I = 0, 1 pu 
/Zf;nnerf = 
Zr = 
1/1,3 x /Zf / 
reverse reach 
/maximum reverse reach specified for the out-of-step protection used/ = 0, 1 pu 
/Zr;nne,f = 1/1,3 X /Zr/ 
Renter-actual = -0,0027 pu 
Xenter-actual = -0,0992 pu 
Rexit-actual = -0,0994 pu 
[from Table E3] 
[from Table E3] 
[from Table E3] 
Xexit-actual = 
/ Z ftargest dist relay char / 






Xenter-actua1 < 0 and Xexit-actua1 > 0 therefore: 
= 
= 
/Zf/ = Y(Rexit-actual 2 + Xexit-actual 2) 
= -v(-0, 0994 2 + o, 0201 2J 




[from Table E3] 
[from Table E1] 
[from Table E1] 
= 0, 1 pu because 0, 1014 > I maximum forward reach specified I 
= 1/1,3 x /Zf/ 
= 1 /1, 3 X 0, 1 pu 
= 0,0769 pu 


















-v(-0,003 2 + -0,0992 2) 
0,0990pu 
1/1,3 x / Zf/ 
1/1,3 X 0,0990 pu 
0,0762 pu 
line angle 
XI tan -i --
RI 
tan _ 1 0, 0 1 1 9 
0,0028 




0,0028 + j 0,0119 [from Table E1] 
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Zrinner = 0,0762 pu L180+ 76, 76° 
Zr= 0,0990 pu L180+76,76° 
Figure E4: Out-of-step blocking protection characteristics with forward and reverse reaches 
Table E4a: Maximum forward and reverse reach settings for out-of-step blocking 
protection 
LOCATION Impedance forward reach Impedance reverse reach Line angle 
= IZfl (pu) = IZrl (pu) = <Pline (degrees) 
Hydra-Kronos 0,101812 i.e. 0,1 0,116547 i.e. 0,1 76,68 
Kronos-Hydra 0, 1014 i.e. 0, 1 0,099237 76,76 
Kronos-Aries 0, 100487 i.e. 0, 1 0,124943 i.e. 0,1 74,75 
Aries-Kronos 0, 124322 i.e. 0, 1 0,09892 74,75 
Aries-Helios O 106219 i.e. 0,1 0, 126606 i.e. 0, 1 75,80 
Helios-Juno 0,113932 i.e. 0,1 0, 12837 i.e. 0, 1 76,48 
Juno-Helios 0,135336 i.e. 0,1 0, 114487 i.e. 0, 1 76,48 
Juno-Aurora 0,122767 i.e. 0,1 0,13139 i.e. 0,1 75,96 
Hydra-Droerivier 1 0, 121966 i.e. 0, 1 0,104581 i.e.0,1 85,47 
Droerivier-Hydra 1 0, 104357 i.e. 0, 1 0, 1287 i.e. 0, 1 85,47 
Hydra-Droerivier 2 0 121966 i.e. 0, 1 0, 104581 i.e. 0, 1 85,47 
Droerivier-Hydra 2 0, 104357 i.e. 0, 1 0,1287 i.e. 0,1 85,47 
Hydra-Droerivier 3 0 133327 i.e. 0, 1 0, 112087 i.e. 0, 1 82,04 
Droerivier-Hydra 3 0,106197 i.e. 0,1 0,113644 i.e. 0,1 82,04 
Droerivier-Muldersvlei 0,111425 i.e. 0,1 0,10941 i.e. 0,1 81,88 
Muldersvlei-Droerivier 0,12179 i.e. 0,1 0,128142 i.e. 0,1 81,88 
Proteus-Droerivier 0,09977 0,118558 i.e. 0,1 80,18 
Droerivier-Bacchus 0, 121161 i.e. 0, 1 0,100757 i.e. 0,1 81,56 
Bacchus-Droerivier 0, 1077 i.e. 0, 1 0,099884 81,56 
Bacchus-Palmiet 0, 100168 i.e. 0, 1 0,133265 i.e. 0,1 85,31 
Palmiet-Bacchus 0, 130539 i.e. 0, 1 0,097975 85,31 
Bacchus-Muldersvtei 0,137613 i.e. 0,1 0,123415 i.e. 0,1 85,52 
Muldersvtei-Bacchus 0,119225 i.e. 0,1 0, 138462 i.e. 0, 1 85,52 
E-x"Vii 
Table E4b: Maximum forward and reverse reach settings for out-of-step tripping 
protection 
LOCATION Impedance forward reach Impedance reverse reach Line angle 
= lztl (pu) = lzrl (pu) = <Pnne ldearees) 
Helios-Aries 0, 123009 i.e. 0, 1 0,108055 i.e. 0,1 75,80 
Helios-Juno 0,113932 i.e. 0,1 0, 12837 i.e. 0, 1 76,48 
Bacchus-Droerivier 0,1077 i.e. 0,1 0,099884 81,56 
Bacchus-Muldersvlei 0,137613 i.e. 0,1 0,123415 i.e. 0,1 85,52 
E3 Timer settings 
With the reach settings known, the required zone timer settings for the out-of-step 
blocking and tripping protection respectively can be calculated. The calculation was 
done by: 
• including mathematical models representing the relay characteristics in the power 
system model; 
• doing the stability study presented in Chapter 3 under section 3.3.1 and 
recording the required entry and exit times; and 
• calculating the timer settings according to the method presented under section 
4.3.3 in Chapter 4. 
The timer settings required for out-of-step blocking and out-of-step tripping 
protection at the selected locations are listed in Tables E5a and E5b respectively. 
To illustrate the method of calculating the timer settings for out-of-step blocking and 
tripping protection, the timer settings for tripping protection located at Bacchus-
Droerivier are calculated. Note that the method of calculating timer settings is the 
same for out-of-step blocking and out-of-step tripping protection. 
Example 1: Timer settings for the out-of-step tripping protection at Bacchus-Droerivier 
To allow the out-of-step tripping protection located at Bacchus-Droerivier to detect out-of-
step conditions, the impedance 'seen' at the location, as determined from the stability 
study discussed in Chapter 3, must overlay the out-of-step tripping protection 
E-xviii 
characteristics. Figure ES shows the protection characteristics, with the impedance 'seen' 
at Bacchus-Droerivier during the out-of-step condition. 
From Figure ES the following is calculated: 
Tto= t2 - t1 
= 4,147 - 4, 129 
= 18ms 
Tti = t3- t2 
= 4,S97 - 4, 147 
= 4SOms 
where 
Tto= outer-zone timer 
Tti = inner-zone timer 
t1 = 4,129 s 
t2 = 4,147 s 
t3 = 4,S97 s 
/ 
Power swing \ 





Out-of-step tripping relay 
characteristics 
0.15 0.20 
Figure ES: Impedance locus and out-of-step tripping protection characteristics at 
Bacchus-Droerivier 
E-xix 
Table E5a: Maximum timer settings required for out-of-step blocking protection 
LOCATION Maximum required outer zone timer 
=Tb 
Hydra-Kronos 75 ms 
Kronos-Hydra 66ms 
Kronos-Aries 60 ms 
Aries-Kronos 60 ms 
Aries-Helios 39 ms 
Helios-Juno 33 ms 
Juno-Helios 33 ms 
Juno-Aurora 30 ms 
Hydra-Droerivier 1 42 ms 
Droerivier-Hydra 1 27 ms 
Hydra-Droerivier 2 42 ms 
Droerivier-Hydra 2 27 ms 
Hydra-Droerivier 3 84ms 
Droerivier-Hydra 3 36 ms 
Droerivier-Muldersvtei 39 ms 
Muldersvtei-Droerivier 39ms 
Proteus-Drotrivier 21 ms 
Droerivier-Bacchus 24 ms 
Bacchus-Droerivier 18 ms 
Bacchus-Palmiet 30 ms 
Palmiet-Bacchus 33ms 
Bacchus-Muldersvlei 42 ms 
Muldersvtei-Bacchus 36 ms 
Table E5b: Maximum timer settings required for out-of-step tripping protection 
LOCATION Maximum required outer-zone timer Maximum required Inner-zone 
=Tto timer= Ttl 
Helios-Aries 42ms 525 ms 
Helios-Juno 33ms 504 ms 
Bacchus- DroE!rivier 18 ms 450 ms 
Bacchus-Muldersvlei 42 ms 396 ms 
F-ii 
F1 shows the performance of the out-of-step blocking protection each time the 
impedance passed through the characteristics. 
T bl F1 a e p rf f t f t bl k' e ormance o ou -o -s ep oc rno orotection 
Location Performance during power Performance during out-of-
swing condition steD condition 
Hydra-Kronos Detection Detection 
Kronos-Hydra Detection Detection 
Kronos-Aries Detection Detection 
Aries-Kronos Detection Detection 
Aries-Helios Detection Detection 
Helios-Juno Detection Detection 
Juno-Helios Detection Detection 
Juno-Aurora Detection Detection 
Hvdra-Droerivier 1 Detection Detection 
Droerivier-Hvdra 1 Detection Detection 
Hydra-Droerivier 2 Detection Detection 
Droerivier-Hvdra 2 Detection Detection 
Hvdra-Droerivier 3 Detection Detection 
Droerivier-Hvdra 3 Detection Detection 
Droerivier-Muldersvlei Detection Detection 
Muldersvlei-Droerivier Detection Detection 
Proteus-Droerivier Detection Detection 
Droerivier-Bacchus Detection Detection 
Bacchus-Droerivier Detection Detection 
Bacchus-Palmiet Detection Detection 
Palmiet-Bacchus Detection Detection 
Bacchus-Muldersvlei Detection Detection 
Muldersvlei-Bacchus Detection Detection 
Table F1 shows that detection for the purpose of blocking took place at all the 
locations. ,As an example, Figure F1 shows the impedance 'seen' by the out-of-
step blocking protection located at Aries-Kronos. It can be seen that upon the first 
and second entry into the characteristics the impedance remained in the outer 
zone for 90 ms and 60 ms respectively. The timer setting as calculated in 
Appendix Eis 60 ms. The timer setting was therefore sufficient to allow detection 
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Impedance locus and out-of-step blocking protection characteristics 
for protection located at Aries-Kronos 
F-iv 
F2 Out-of-step tripping protection 
The purpose of the out-of-step tripping protection is to not detect during power 
swing conditions but detect during system out-of-step conditions. This will enable 
it to send a tripping signal to selected locations to initiate islanding. 
As in the case of the out-of-step blocking protection, the impedance passed 
through the out-of-step tripping protection characteristics twice: the first time 
during the power swing condition and the second time during the out-of-step 
condition. Table F2 shows the performance of the out-of-step tripping protection in 
the stability study done. 
T bl F2 a e p fl f t ft t· e ormance o ou -o -s ep nppmo protection 
Location Performance during power swing Performance during out-
condition of-steo condition 
Helios-Aries Detection Detection 
Helios-Juno Detection Detection 
Bacchus-Droerivier Detection Detection 
Bacch us-Muldersvlei Detection Detection 
Table F2 shows that during the initial power swing detection did not take place at 
any of the locations. During the out-of-step condition the out-of-step tripping 
protection detected. Figure F2 shows the impedance 'seen' by the relay located at 
Helios-Juno. When the impedance passed through the protection characteristics 
the first time, it remained in the outer zone for 80 ms and in the inner zone for 980 
ms. All the zone timers expired (timer settings as calculated in Appendix E are 33 
ms and 504 ms for the outer-zone and inner-zone timers respectively). However, 
the impedance did not exit the characteristics on the side opposite that which it 
had entered and detection did not take place. 
Upon the second entry into the characteristics, the impedance remained in the 
zones long enough to allow the timers to expire (70 ms in the outer zone and 530 
ms in the inner zone), and the impedance exited the characteristics on the side 
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